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CHAPTER 1
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKS
By Junhan Kim1
Introduction 1. 
The experience from the 2007 - 2009 global financial crisis was a wake-
up call for central bankers. In the past decade, central bankers around the world 
have become more confident that they can control economic fluctuations including 
inflation. Many countries have adopted inflation targeting as their monetary policy 
framework. The success of inflation targeting in combating inflation led central 
bankers to believe not only that they have conquered inflation but also that they 
can even flatten business cycles, ups and downs of economic activities such as 
consumption  and  investment.  Inflation  was  well  managed  around  what  many 
believe as a level close to price stability, business cycles were mitigated, and a few 
isolated incidences of financial crises were well responded by active interventions 
by central banks and governments.
However,  in  spite  of  these  “achievements”,  there  have  been  warning 
signs  -      financial  imbalances  were  hidden  behind  stable  inflation.  Financial 
liberalisations and rapid financial developments have hindered the detection of 
financial distortions. In emerging market economies, this has been worsened by 
the opening of borders to international capital, which led to distortions in domestic 
financial markets. Intellectual communities including economists in the central 
banking circle may not have paid enough attention on these developments. The 
widespread consensus was that monetary policy is almost perfected, and only 
minor fine tunings were needed.
This mood of self complacency turned into a “red alert” when asset prices, 
especially house prices, started plummeting. Although this phenomenon may have 
been confined to only a few countries, the US being a major example, the effects 
are  nevertheless  felt  around  the  globe  since  financial  markets  are  intertwined 
across sectors. Falling house prices triggered a collapse of financial derivatives 
markets while rapid movements in other asset prices, in turn, caused further global 
contagion. Wholesale credits as well as retail credits that were once abundant have 
now become constrained. Liquidity dried up across the board. Central banks were 
swift to respond but they were not as successful as they were in 1990s or early 
2000s in containing the crisis.
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There are general disagreements about the causes of the crisis. Some may cite 
the irresponsibility or even the immorality of financial market participants including 
bankers, brokers, and analysts. Some would argue that the global imbalances, 
huge trade deficits of the US and corresponding surpluses of the emerging market 
economies including China and other Asian countries, were factors leading to 
the crisis. Some would fault the central bankers and/or governments or financial 
liberalisation and the lax or lack of supervision.
In this research study, we will not try to pinpoint the causes of the current 
financial  crisis.  Recognising  the  possible  causes  of  asset  prices  bubbles  and 
analysing the consequences, however, would enable us to better understand the 
current crisis and be prepared for and further prevent possible onsets of future 
financial instability. We will try to review the individual country’s experiences on 
asset price fluctuations and analyse the causes of and the consequences from them, 
and suggest policy recommendations for preventing and optimally responding to 
a possible future crisis.
This chapter is organised as follows. After a brief discussion on asset 
prices in the introduction section, related literatures are reviewed. The literatures 
related to asset prices are broad with a variety of topics. The review is, therefore, 
grouped into several topics. They are general introductions to asset prices, issues 
on bubbles, the causes and the effects of asset price fluctuations, and lastly, a 
debate on whether monetary policy should react to asset prices. After the literature 
review, a brief summary of each country’s research report is given. The results of 
cross-correlation analyses and factor analyses on each participating country are 
then reported. The last section is the conclusion.
1.1   What is an Asset?
When studying how asset prices are related to other economic decisions, 
one should not avoid defining what the asset prices are. Although it may seem 
unnecessary,  it  is  nonetheless,  extremely  important. This  is  not  because  there 
are any meaningful disagreements about the definition among theorists as well 
as practitioners. The problem, in this ever changing financial world, is that the 
distinction between assets and non-assets seem to be blurred at the border line. As 
it will be clear in later discussion, this blurred distinction seems to be rather the 
root of controversies over whether or not central bank should react to asset prices. 
This is directly related with the question of what it is that central banks are trying 
to stabilise after all. In other words, what is the difference between asset prices and 
prices of goods and services? Asset prices include prices of both financial assets, 
e.g. bonds, equities, and derivatives such as swaps, futures and options based on 
them  and non-financial assets including residential property.  Asset prices can also 
include exchange rates or the prices of durable commodities such as gold. What is 
common in these prices is that they embody the prices of future goods and services.   3
Asset prices will determine the domestic price level for an economy. So the linkage 
between the current and the future prices becomes crucial to understand the very 
nature of asset prices. This is why coping with asset prices has become one of 
the most difficult challenges that central banks around the world have to face. 
Understanding the nature of an economic concept becomes more complicated 
when it involves a dynamic relationship such as the case for asset prices. Not only 
the contemporaneous relationships but also the intertwined links due to financial 
innovations between current and the future should be understood.
What we mean by each piece of puzzle may make a huge difference in 
terms of what central banks are aiming for. Also given the plethora of financial 
terms and concepts, such as liquidity, credit, risks, spreads or many others, one 
may need to go back to the basics and refresh our understandings, or in some 
cases our misunderstandings, so as not to be tangled with unclear and therefore 
misguided uses of these concepts.
What is an asset? A definition in the dictionary seems to indicate that it is 
something that gives a holder a flow of cash or services in the future. This seems 
innocuous enough. However, what it deals with is ‘time’. As much as in physics, the 
questions about time are notoriously tricky ones in economics. We are not asking 
what time really is as in physics, but what the value of it is. This question is rather 
old. There are many different answers throughout the history of economic thoughts 
to these classical questions. One of the recurring and still prevalent implicit themes 
is abstinence. Time is valuable because it makes one hold on to what can give him 
or her, an immediate gratification. As old as a few centuries back when economics 
started to stand out as an separate discipline, and as new as the recent upsurge of 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, one makes an implicit 
assumption that consumption now is more valuable than consumption tomorrow, 
so in order for someone to be persuaded to consume later, there should be an extra 
compensation for the wait. This is the time preference factor, or time discount 
factor, which is assumed to be less than 1, meaning today is preferred to tomorrow. 
When people become more patient, the value of time, and therefore the value of 
assets, will fall.
Of course, the price of an asset is not just about sacrificing something today 
for tomorrow. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, continuing financial innovations 
made conversion between any assets and cash easier. In some cases, it is even 
possible to make a payment in assets such as stocks. This is made possible partly 
because of technological advances with ever increasing speed. A more important 
reason behind this, however, is the fast development of financial markets. Some 
markets, which did not even exist a few years ago, can now execute vast volumes 
of transactions between assets as smoothly as ever. In other words, liquidity of 
financial markets has increased dramatically. Liquidity is defined as the ease with 
which assets are converted into cash.4
Another important aspect of assets, the main focus of this report, is the 
fact that the value of an asset changes over time and under different circumstances. 
On the one hand, if changes in value are to be avoided, an extra premium should 
be paid for the hedge. On the other hand, some seek the changes in value with a 
purpose of gains. Since the value of an asset relies on the future stream of cash or 
services, the expectation about the stream affects the value. If one perceives, for 
whatever reasons, that the stream of cash out of the asset will be doubled in the 
future, the person would be willing to pay about twice as much as he or she would 
have paid otherwise.
1.2   Why do Asset Prices Matter?
Asset prices are important at many levels. First, they are the results of 
more complicated economic decisions. That is, asset prices carry, just like any 
other prices determined by complicated economic decisions, the information about 
the status of the market. This in turn enables decision makers to make the right 
decision based on this information. It is, therefore, only natural to assume that 
the better the information is, the better the decisions one can make. In this regard, 
when asset prices do not reflect what they should, economic decisions are distorted 
and the overall economic welfare will be deteriorated. The 2000s saw recurrent 
asset price misalignments – one may very well call it bubbles – which implies that 
asset prices lost their role as an information carrier.
It  is  not  just  that  asset  prices  carry  information  and  therefore  affect 
economic decisions indirectly, but also that asset prices affect economic decisions 
in more direct ways. A well-known example of this is the so-called ‘wealth effects’. 
According to the permanent income hypothesis, consumption is a function of the 
agent’s wealth, which is the discounted sum of future income flows. Therefore, 
whenever the wealth increases, consumption will increase as well. When asset 
prices rise, house prices for example, the wealth of the agent increases and therefore 
consumption increases. This version of the wealth effect is, however, faced with 
questions as to whether house prices really comprise real wealth. Houses are real 
wealth for individuals, but they do not necessarily comprise real wealth for the 
economy as a whole. This is a typical example of fallacy of composition.
There is another strand of argument of the wealth effect in a slightly more 
sophisticated approach. Since bank credits usually involve information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders, lenders usually request collaterals from  borrowers. 
Houses are the most readily available collaterals for households. Based on this 
common practice, one can postulate a household under borrowing constraint, is 
allowed credits only on the provision of collaterals. Since financing consumption 
is constrained in this case, whenever the house price or the value of the collateral 
rises, the borrowing constraint is loosened, and the household is, therefore, given 
more credit to finance consumption. This line of logic supports a relationship 
between house prices and consumption, in other words, the wealth effect. 5
As interesting as this argument may seem, this is only applicable to 
an economy with well developed financial markets, especially those related to 
housing. The US for example, has well developed mortgage markets, which allow 
households to have easy access to financing their consumption using their houses as 
collaterals. Some described it as houses being their cash machines. In comparison 
to the US or any other economies with developed financial systems, the emerging 
market economies (EMEs) usually lack financial systems comparable to those in 
the US. This may well imply that the link between house prices and consumption, 
via the role of houses as collaterals, is limited at best.
The differing degrees of financial development have to do with the extent 
of  bubbles  formed  during  asset  booms,  and  the  severity  of  shockwaves  after 
the bubble burst. Since houses are used as tools for sustaining a high level of 
consumption, the drops in consumption are deepened when house prices fall. This 
is evidenced by the fact that the epicenter of the financial crisis this time around, is 
not the emerging market economies but rather the US.
Nevertheless, the role of houses or the role of any other assets for that 
matter, should not necessarily be trivialised in EMEs. Most EMEs are small open 
economies and therefore are very susceptible to international capital movements. 
When foreign capital flows in and exchange rates fall (appreciate) and interest rate 
spreads are compressed, asset prices are likely to rise. When the tide is reversed, 
the exact opposite occurs, leaving the domestic financial system in a vulnerable 
situation.
1.3   Bubbles or Not?
The bubble is one of the most elusive concepts in theory as well as in 
practice. There is no consensus about what a bubble even means. Some may define 
it as the portion of asset prices beyond the fundamentals. The fundamental, again, 
means different things to different people, but commonly mentioned usage is the 
discounted sum of the value of future flow of services out of the asset. Obviously, 
the fundamental value of an asset cannot be readily observed since it involves future 
flow of services. Another slightly different and perhaps more technical definition 
of the bubble refers to the portion of asset price solely based on the expectation of 
future price appreciation. Since the complication involves measuring expectation, 
some  try  to  avoid  the  term  ‘bubble’  altogether  and  replace  it  with  “financial 
imbalances” or “asset price misalignments”.
Some may even go further to argue that bubbles do not exist and have not 
existed. According to this line of thought, asset prices cannot be ‘overpriced’, since 
asset prices represent correct or rational evaluation of the asset in efficient markets. 
Some even argue that famous historical examples of bubbles such as the tulip 
mania and other unbelievable episodes of price appreciations can be explained by 6
the fundamentals –therefore, there had been no occurrence of bubbles. Although 
this may not represent the views of the majority, the issue still remains as to how 
we can detect and measure asset price bubbles.
Not only do we not have a commonly agreed definition of bubbles, but 
we also lack the reference or observation in practice by which we can measure 
and identify bubbles in asset prices. Fast rising asset prices should not necessarily 
be identified as bubbles. There are, however, some measures by which we could 
identify  the  fundamental  and  thereby  bubbles  by  subtracting  the  fundamental 
portion from actual asset prices. For house prices, there are practical measures 
such as income to price ratio, debt to income ratio or price to rent ratio, comparable 
to price to earning ratio, or dividend price ratio for equity prices. Unfortunately, 
however, these ratios cannot be applied universally. There are cases where these 
ratios fail to correctly measure the fundamental and bubbles.
Measuring bubbles is somewhat easier after bubbles burst than when 
they are in the middle of formation. It does not mean, however, that a simple rule 
can be applied to judge whether or not bubbles had been formed. Even if there 
is such a rule, it would not be of great use if it only can be used after bubbles 
burst. Nevertheless, we have to exercise a good deal of care when determining the 
existence or the extent of bubbles before or after the bubbles burst.
1.4   Central Banks and Bubbles
There has been a significant degree of controversies about whether or 
not central banks should react to asset price bubbles. The first question that arises 
is that whether it is desirable for central banks to react to asset prices at all. The 
reason central banks try to stabilise inflation at a low level is that low and stable 
inflation improves the welfare of the whole economy. Therefore, whenever the 
general price level rises, central banks are ready to act. Here, the general price level 
refers to prices of goods and services such as the consumer price index (CPI), not 
asset prices. There are many reasons why stable prices are “good”. Most notable 
ones are that stable prices lower uncertainties and thereby help long-term decision 
making. Moreover, stable prices create less distortion in relative prices, for some 
prices are sticky while others are not, which may create distortion when some 
prices changes while others are left unchanged. This means that stable prices are 
desirable not just when prices rise abnormally, from anticipation of future inflation 
for example, but even also when prices rise by the forces of demand and supply.
However, in the case of asset prices, this may be different. First of all, 
it is unclear that asset price fluctuations lower social welfare. If asset prices rise 
purely out of speculations, it may be less of a controversy as to whether or not 
central banks should react to it. The question still remains, however, as to how 
asset price movements due to bubbles should be distinguished from asset price 7
movements due to fundamentals. Unlike prices of goods and services, reacting to 
asset price movements due to fundamentals, do not improve welfare, and in fact it 
may deteriorate welfare.
So there has been a widespread view that central banks should not try to 
pre-empt asset price movements. Some even argue against pricking asset prices 
pre-emptively even if there are bubbles. Of course, this line of argument may be 
just warnings against hasty and abrupt policy actions. Nevertheless, central banks 
around the world seemed to have adhered to this view. In fact, adoption of inflation 
targeting in many countries is a manifestation of this view point. Inflation targeting 
is a monetary policy framework that requires central banks to focus mainly on 
inflation with attempts to stabilise inflation at or around the pre-announced inflation 
target. Some may disagree with this characterisation of inflation targeting and 
argue that inflation targeting does not necessarily limit central banks to be engaged 
solely on price stability. Indeed, there are wide spectrums of interpretations for 
inflation targeting. Some may see it as a sheer rhetoric of central banks without any 
fundamental changes in policy making process. At the other end of the spectrum, 
some see it as a strict rule applied to central banks requiring central banks to set the 
interest rate almost one to one to the inflation level. Somewhere in between, there 
is a view that inflation targeting can be flexible in terms of accommodating policy 
objectives other than inflation.
Whichever the interpretation, it seems clear that the inflation targeting 
framework by its design, at least in the form currently implemented, has a limited 
role in terms of reaction to asset price fluctuations. There are attempts, in this 
regard, to incorporate financial stability into monetary policy framework, or more 
broadly to expand the realm of central banking. This transition is, however, more 
challenging to EMEs than to developed economies. Inflation targeting is adopted 
by many EMEs since it restricts central banks’ role on price stability and thereby 
strengthen the independence of central banks. The adoption of inflation targeting 
in these countries were successful in that the tradition of independence of central 
banks has been insured. The changing role of central banks, however, would imply 
further challenges ahead for this setup.  
2.   Literature Review
In this section we explore the previous analyses related to asset prices. 
The literature on this is in fact so huge that it would be impossible to grasp all the 
aspects of the discourses. The issues are divided into two groups -  the literature 
on the relationship between asset prices and the economy, and the literature on 
how to deal with asset prices with monetary policy. The first is further divided into 
how the economy affects asset prices and how asset prices affect the economy in 
return. In this subsection we will also explore the discussions on asset bubbles. 
The second would mostly be about whether or not central banks need to respond to 8
asset prices fluctuations, if not asset bubbles. If so, what is the best way in which 
central banks react, what are the best instruments to use, and so on.
It may seem trivial, but asset prices, as any other prices of goods and 
services, are determined by the supply and demand. There are many determinants 
of supply and demand, which we can think of as being fundamental. The reason 
that we use the notion of the fundamental is, of course, a possibility of non-
fundamental elements in asset prices, which can be identified as bubbles. The 
economic variables including income, interest rates, market liquidity and future 
prospect of those variables all make up the fundamentals, and the deviation of 
asset prices from the fundamentals is defined as bubbles.
The other side of the coin is how asset prices affect the economy. The 
so-called wealth effects can be one of the examples. However, recent empirical 
analyses show that the magnitude of traditional wealth effect may not be that 
significant. This is overlapped by recent discussions on the role of houses or capital 
as collaterals. The information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders prevent 
borrowers from funding the purchases of consumption goods or investment capital 
freely. Therefore, collaterals or in some cases net worth of the borrowers play 
an  important  role  in  alleviating  the  information  asymmetry,  thereby  enabling 
the funding. One of the (side) effects of this is what is known as the financial 
accelerator, which amplifies business cycles. If there are bubbles in asset prices, 
the amplifying effects may become even larger.
Therefore,  there  naturally  arises  an  issue  about  countering  this 
amplification. The question is whether or not central banks should lean against the 
wind. If there is a bubble, then it would be more important than otherwise. There 
are a large number of literatures on this area, mainly divided into two spheres. The 
one sphere supports the leaning against the wind strategy, while the other does 
not. Of course, there are also somewhat eclectic views. In fact, there are whole 
spectrums of views with the two views at either end.
2.1   Asset Prices and Economy
2.1.1   Asset Pricing: Basics 
The determinants of asset prices are a well studied subject in financial 
economics. There are a number of standard textbooks dealing solely on asset 
pricing. Any textbook on the topic starts with the introduction with a notion of 
‘fundamentals’. This is the asset pricing equation as follows. (See any asset pricing 
textbooks for further details such as Ingersoll (1985), Cochrane (2004), Duffie 
(2001) to name a few).9
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where  p  is the asset price,  x  is the cash or service from the asset,  ∆ is the 
discount factor, and  E  is the expectation operator. This equation means that the 
asset price is the sum of the cash or service from the asset plus discounted future 
expected asset price. The discount factor can be simply a time preference factor, 
usually denoted by a constant β  < 1. Or, it can be a subjective discount factor, also 
known as stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel, which represents a valuation 
of the future not in terms of nominal cash value but in terms of subjective utility. 
This equation represents a simple arbitrage condition, which implies that the asset 
price must be at such a level that the investor is indifferent to either selling it right 
now, or holding it and selling it next period after enjoying the flow of service.
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With a few simplifying assumptions including  0 , = ∆ ∞ ∞p E t , which is 
related with the existence of a bubble, we can interpret this equation as the asset 
price being the sum of the flow of cash or service in terms of utility. The right hand 
side of the equation is the determinant of the asset price, or the fundamental.
Let us first take a look at the discount factor,  ∆. In the literature, this 
comes in various forms. Most notably, it can be written in terms of marginal utility 
from consumption. That is, if the utility function is a CRRA (constant rate of risk 
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What is important is not this particular form of marginal utilities, but 
rather the fact that the discount factor is proportional to the expected consumption 
growth. This implies that the more consumed today and/or the less consumed 
tomorrow, the more valuable the asset becomes today. This can be seen by a simple 
intuition. The risk averse investors, as assumed in this case, would like to make the 
consumption stream, or cash flow in financial terms, smooth over time. Therefore, 
for whatever reason, today’s consumption increases, the investor’s demand for 
asset,  which  is  the  vehicle  for  carrying  over  today’s  cash  over  to  tomorrow, 
increases and therefore the asset price also rises.
A similar logic can be applied not only to consumption but also wealth, 
market values or income. This explains one of the most important determinants of 
asset price, income or overall market (economic) conditions. Of course, the overall 10
economic condition influences not only the discount factor, but also the future cash 
flows or dividends. Therefore, if the future prospect is bright, that is, higher value 
of x, the asset prices rise. This has to do with the bubbles, which are affected by 
the expectation formation. 
The relationship between the discount factor and the asset price can be 
seen in another direction in terms of interest rates. According to the consumer 
choice theory, the (equilibrium) interest rate is closely related with consumption 
growth. That means, again, the discount factor is high (close to 1) when consumption 
growth is low. When consumption growth is low, the interest rate is low. This all 
comes down to the negative relationship between discount factor and the interest 
rate, and further negative relationship between asset prices and interest rates.
2.1.2  Asset Pricing: Bond Prices, Stock Price and House Prices 
Although the determination of bond prices will not be covered in this 
research  study,  a  brief  discussion  will  help  clarify  the  issues  involved  in  the 
determination of stock prices and house prices. One of the unique characteristics 
of bond prices compared to other asset prices is that the interest rate is more than 
just one of the determinants. From the inverse relationship between bond prices 
and interest rates, or yields (to maturity), interest rates by themselves represent 
asset prices. So the issues of bond prices are the issues of interest rates. One of 
the most researched topics in this area is the determinants of the term structure. 
The most prominent theory on this is the expectation hypothesis, which says that 
the long-term interest rate is the time average of the short-term interest rates over 
the duration of the long-term interest rate. The expectation hypothesis has been 
repeatedly tested with mixed results at best. (For examples, see Campbell and 
Shiller (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991)). Some has shown positive results 
(Mankiw and Miron (1986) for example) yet most others gave negative results. 
The failure of the hypothesis has been attributed to a few sources, including time 
varying risk attributes, liquidities, or even central bank’s behaviour. For whatever 
the reason, ongoing theoretical as well as empirical studies aim at explaining and 
forecasting the movement and the relationship between long-term interest rates 
and short-term interest rates. The most eminent strand of research is based on 
the latent factor models. (Duffie and Kan (1996), and Dai and Singleton (2000)). 
Among these, a trend worth noting is an attempt to combine financial econometrics 
with macroeconomic models. (See Ang and Piazzesi (2003), and Rudebusch and 
Wu (2008)). Latent factor models augmented by a macro-structural model seem to 
yield better results. Another strand deals with volatility of returns.
The literatures on stock prices are also abundant in financial economics. 
It is well known that stock returns are not predictable according to random walk 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, econometric analyses have been done for testing various 
spreads such as bid-ask spreads in markets if they have any predictability. The 11
famous  CAPM  theory  has  also  been  extensively  tested.  CAPM  (capital  asset 
pricing model) theory states that individual equity prices can be explained by a 
single factor, which could be market index, consumption, wealth or any other 
similar measure. It all comes down to the correlation between an individual asset 
and the market index or consumption. (See Fama and MacBeth (1973), Fama and 
French (1988), Fama and French (1996) and many others). Present value models 
are also well tested (Campbell and Shiller (1987), Fama and French (1988), Keim 
and Stambaugh (1986) and others). Testing a present value model is the flip side 
of the coin in finding a bubble in asset prices. If the present models or similar fair 
value finding models fail, then it implies that asset prices may have bubbles or non 
fundamental portions in them. Of course depending on a definition of a bubble, 
one may find a situation where asset prices may have deviated from the fair value 
somewhat, but nevertheless have no bubble in them. The literatures on bubbles 
will be discussed later.
The determination of house prices does not draw as much attention as 
bond prices or stock prices. In recent years, however, much attention, especially 
from macroeconomics, has been paid to the subject. Fast rising housing prices and 
the development of housing finances has been worrying many about the possibility 
of bubbles. In the meantime, the global imbalances, large current deficits of the US 
and corresponding current surpluses of EMEs, especially China, are said to have 
contributed to asset booms by compressing the term spreads or helping stabilise 
commodity prices. These phenomena are so closely related that some even see it 
as a kind of an equilibrium (Dooley et al. (2003), Dooley et al. (2004), Caballero 
et al. (2008)). As it turned out, as argued by some, (see Bernanke (2005)) they have 
contributed, at least in part, to the current financial crisis.
House prices, similar to any other assets, are determined by the fundamentals, 
at least in principle. The implicit rent, if it is owner occupied, or the actual rent 
plus related costs, if it is rented, are the stream of cash or services from a house. 
Therefore, the house price should be the sum of the values of the stream. Houses, 
however, unlike bonds or stocks, are very illiquid assets, and the values depend not 
so much on economic factors as geographic locations. Therefore, it is much harder 
to measure the fundamentals. There have been some attempts in this front such as 
introducing hedonic measures (Hoffman and Lorenz (2006)) or applying long-run 
equilibrium conditions (Lee (2006)).
There is another important role of houses as collaterals for borrowings, but 
this will be discussed with the wealth effects and the financial accelerator later.
2.1.3  Asset Pricing: Bubbles 
Bubbles in history date back to the Dutch Tulip Mania in 1630s, South 
Sea Bubbles in early 1700s, or as recently as the Tech bubbles in early 2000s and 
Housing bubbles that followed. Some would argue, albeit in a shrinking number, 12
against the existence of bubbles. According to the efficient market hypothesis such 
as in Fama (1965), there is no room for bubbles, if it is defined as a price not 
supported by fundamentals. An efficient market means many things, but generally 
speaking, it denotes that the equilibrium price in an efficient market reflects all the 
information available at the time so there is no chance for excess return ex ante. 
This is in neo- classical tradition, which hinges on a mathematical assumption 
known  as  the  transversality  condition  we  discussed  earlier  (See  Santos  and 
Woodford (1997)). The controversy in the existence of bubbles can be viewed as 
stemming from those between “behavioural” school and “rational” school (See 
Shiller (1981)).
The debate on the existence or measurement issues of house prices has 
renewed attention since the 1990s, when Japan’s housing bubble burst, followed 
by the so-called Tech bubbles formed and crashed in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
The attention on the issue has been even more intense since the recent burst of the 
housing bubbles around the world, especially in the US.
Attempts to incorporate bubbles into a “rational” agent have been done 
by introducing agents’ optimisation conditions less the transversality condition 
(Blanchard (1979), Blanchard and Watson (1983)). Other attempts expand the 
equilibrium  concepts,  and  therefore  complement  what  rational  expectation 
equilibrium concept runs short. Sunspot equilibrium concepts (Froot and Obstfeld 
(1991)) or introduction of learning (Evans (1991) and those that follow) are the 
examples.
The bubble in itself is important in understanding the inner working of the 
economy, but it has become one of the core subjects that concern central bankers. 
More discussions on this will be covered later.
2.1.4  Wealth Effect 
One of the major channel through which assets affect the economy is 
the wealth effect. The traditional wealth effect is from the permanent income 
hypothesis, i.e., the consumption is (should be) a function of a life time total income, 
or permanent income, so that if the permanent income, in other words wealth, 
increases, the consumption also increases (Friedman (1957), Ando and Modigliani 
(1957)). The actual size of the effect, however, has proven to be somewhat mixed. 
Case et al. (2005), for example, estimated the size of wealth effects from stocks 
and housing using a panel data set from 14 developed countries. They found that 
while the wealth effect from stocks is rather weak, the wealth effect from housing 
is relatively strong.13
Model I
∆Ct = -0.024∆Ct-1 +0.262∆Inct -0.007∆Stockt +0.129∆Houset
(t-value) (-1.84) (4.01) (-1.25) (6.31)
R-square = 0.4047
Model II (Include time trend)
∆Ct = -0.244∆Ct-1 +0.108∆Inct -0.016∆Stockt +0.167∆Houset
(t-value) (-6.01) (1.62) (-2.89) (8.02)
R-square = 0.5286
Model III (Include year specific fixed effects)
∆Ct = -0.031∆Ct-1 +0.244∆Inct -0.007∆Stockt +0.139∆Houset
(t-value) (-1.08) (3.19) (-0.89) (6.31)
R-square = 0.4841
Source: Case et al. (2005)
The estimated size of the wealth effect for the US also seems rather small. 
Gramlich (2002) reported about 0.03 to 0.05 of consumption elasticity on wealth, 
which means 1% increase in wealth makes the consumption increase by 0.03 to 
0.05%. However, the difficulties in identifying a shock in wealth and measuring 
the effects of the shock make it inappropriate to draw the definite conclusion about 
the effectiveness of wealth or asset prices in affecting economic decisions such as 
consumption one way or another.
2.1.5  Financial Accelerator 
The importance of the financial sector in explaining business cycles has 
been somewhat ignored by the mainstream economists. In the neo-classical tradition 
and in the original Keynesian tradition as well, the banking sector is just a shadow 
of the real sector, so it does not warrant a separate consideration in economics. 
However, the size of economic fluctuations over the business cycles that seems to 
be larger than standard economic models can explain identified shocks. This led 
to renewed interests on the role of banking and financial markets in the business 
cycle literature.
In explaining the role of the banking sector, one needs to first explain why 
banks exist apart from open capital markets in the first place. The most prominent 
studies include Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984), and Fama (1980). 
Most of them introduce various kinds of information asymmetry in loan contracts. 
It follows from this tradition that financial accelerator models introduce information 
asymmetry.  Pioneering  studies  include  those  of  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989), 
Bernanke et al. (1998), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). More theoretically oriented 
ones include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). While these concentrate on information 
asymmetry in firm’s financing, Campbell and Hercowitz (2004), Iacoviello (2005), 
Monacelli (2006) and others apply it to household financing decisions with regard 
to housing.14
Common features of this literature are the role of collaterals in borrowings. 
Firms or households are faced with borrowing constraints due to information 
asymmetry so that borrowing from an open capital market is impossible. In order 
to overcome this limit they require equities or networths in projects or houses 
as collaterals. This leads to an “acceleration” effect, i.e., when a positive shock 
occurs, (it does not matter whether it is a demand shock such as a monetary 
policy shock or a supply shock such as a productivity shock) production and/or 
consumption increases. Therefore, asset prices rise out of better prospects. Now, 
high asset prices will relax borrowing constraints since the increase in collateral 
values makes the lender more willing to provide credit to borrowers. More credit 
will in turn increase production or consumption, thereby accelerating the original 
shock.
The role of asset prices in these models can be interpreted as another version 
of the wealth effect since the higher wealth from assets increases consumption. It 
does not, however, mean that a wealth of an individual may necessarily constitute 
the wealth of the economy as a whole. This indicates, for whatever reason, higher 
asset prices may make consumption higher which is also true for the case of bubbles. 
In fact, a rapid rise in house prices in 2000s sparked the debate as to whether the 
then high house prices were in fact real wealth or not. Higher consumption due 
to an individual wealth effect may turn out to be a source of imbalances due to a 
bubble.
2.2   Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
The debate on whether or not central banks should react to asset price 
fluctuations has dichotomised economists into two groups. One group argues that 
central banks should NOT react, let alone target, asset prices. Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999) famously argue against central banks’ direct involvement in asset markets, 
at least ex ante. The reason, from their analysis of the relationship between bubbles 
and economic volatility, is that attempts to stabilise asset prices when there are 
bubbles end up making the economy more volatile, not less. As Greenspan (2002) 
put it, it is hard to prevent bubbles before they form. A more practical strategy 
would be to mitigate the impact when they formed and burst.
“Such data suggest that nothing short of a sharp increase in short-
term rates that engenders a significant economic retrenchment is 
sufficient to check a nascent bubble. The notion that a well-timed 
incremental tightening could have been calibrated to prevent the late 
1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. Instead, we…need to focus 
on policies to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease 
the transition to the next expansion.” (Greenspan 2002).15
In fact, this view has been shared by many, which does not, however, 
preclude central banks’ involvement with asset prices altogether. According to the 
majority who subscribes to this view, as long as asset prices contain information 
that helps forecast future inflation beyond what is available elsewhere, central 
banks need to react to asset prices. The goal is still price stability and the asset 
price role in this case is as an indicator of inflation pressure (See Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999), Bernanke and Gertler (2001)).
The other side of the camp is that central banks should, at least under a 
certain circumstances, react to asset prices. The more famous includes Cecchetti et 
al. (2002). One of the reasons behind this argument is that there is a bias in price 
measures such as the consumer price index (CPI). CPI only measures the prices of 
currently available goods and services. However, there are some biases in it due 
to what can be termed as excluded goods bias (Bryan et al. (2002)). In this case, 
excluded goods are future goods and prices. Here we have to go back to what we 
mean by an asset. An asset is a claim that gives the owner cash or a flow of service 
in the future. So the asset price is equivalent, at least in theory, to future goods and 
services. If for some reason, the current price level does not fully incorporate or is 
not consistent with the prices of future goods and services, there is a rationale for 
central banks to directly respond to asset prices. This is not a claim that assets by 
themselves are important. Also it is not a claim that asset prices should be targeted 
at a certain level.
Another aspect of the debate is on financial stability. The question here is 
whether or not price stability insures financial stability. The traditional answer is 
“yes”. When there is an unexpected rise in inflation and therefore a rise in interest 
rates as well, asset prices fall and the balance sheets of financial institutions will 
deteriorate. Financial institutions have highly leveraged balance sheets. Whenever 
there is a shock large enough to wipe out their net worth, their solvency would 
be called into question, then interbank credit markets and other financial markets 
would not function efficiently. The Savings and Loans crisis in the 1980s is one 
example of this type of occurrence.
However, there are other approaches that would have “no” for an answer. 
Since the 1990s, central banks globally, have been successful in maintaining low 
and stable inflation. According to this view, the stable prices became a fertile 
ground for financial imbalances. As prices were stable, investors were willing to 
take on risks. Even if there were inflationary pressures, they did not realise this due 
to their “over-confidence” in price stability. Central banks were also not expected 
to raise interest rate too high due to the low inflation (See Lowe and Borio (2002), 
White and Borio (2004), Filardo (2004) and others) according to this view.
The debate, however, has been not as simple as one view point versus 
the other. There are many facets to the debate and different arguments among 
economists with differing distances to either side of the camp. Even if there is an 16
agreement on the existence of bubbles, there could be disagreements about whether 
it is a good strategy to prick the bubbles. Robinson and Stone (2005) explore the 
pros and cons of reacting to bubbles using a simple model.
There is an additional issue of measurement. It stems from the question 
of what inflation really is. Should asset price inflation be a part of inflation that 
central bankers should care about? (See Alchian and Klein (1973)) That is, should 
central bankers care about asset prices separately or as a part of inflation? For 
the latter, the debate about asset prices and monetary policy would become less 
critical. All that is needed would be a proper definition of inflation. For inflation 
targeting central banks, this means that central banks can maintain the inflation 
targeting framework and yet incorporate financial stability into the monetary policy 
framework. In this regard, CPI has been questioned as an appropriate measure of 
inflation or cost of living index for some time. Nevertheless, CPI has been a major 
inflation measurement in part because of its familiarity and simplicity. In order 
to replace or modify inflation measurement away from CPI, central banks need 
to consider whether it would affect the transparency and communication strategy 
of central banks. What is important is not just how well central banks conduct 
monetary policy, but also how well they communicate with the public on what they 
are doing (See Geraats (2005)).
Putting aside the debate for a while, and let us take a look at what central 
banks actually did about asset prices. Did they really ignore them as they said they 
did? Rigobon and Sack (2006) and Cecchetti (2003) show that monetary policy 
reacts significantly to stock market movements, as compared to the work of Taylor 
(1993). This is somewhat a controversial result since the identification method of 
a monetary policy shock can be challenged. However, there are some evidences 
showing that what central banks do is somewhat different from what they say they 
do.
3.   Research Findings
3.1   Research Outline
Nine SEACEN countries participated in this research project, namely, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
and  Thailand.  This  section  summarises  the  research  findings  of  the  country 
papers.
Analysis for each country has two parts. The first is a cross-correlation 
analysis between asset prices and other economic variables, and the other is a 
factor analysis2. The first part is more descriptive than analytical. Lead and lag 
structures between asset prices and other variables enable us to see the dynamic
2.  Due to data availability, some of analyses may have been omitted for some countries. Refer to 
the country chapters for the notations and definitions of the variables.17
linkages between the variables, i.e., leading variables are likely to cause the lagging 
variables. However, this comes with a caveat. As noted above, cross correlations 
are more descriptive than analytical while lead-lag relationships do not necessarily 
imply true causal relationships. Nevertheless, cross-correlation analyses give hints 
about possible causal relationships as well as descriptive characteristics of the 
data.
3.2   Cross-correlation Analyses
In this section, cross-correlations between asset prices and other relevant 
variables are calculated for each country. The cross-correlations, albeit incomplete, 
show some dynamic relationships between variables. If a variable leads another 
variable, the variable that leads can be thought of as a candidate for “the cause” 
of the variable that lags. This is in fact the intuition of the Granger causality test. 
However, since we are dealing with a host of possible cause variables, the Granger 
test, which pairs each and every variable to asset prices with different degree of 
leads and lags, is not practical. Instead, cross-correlation analyses are used to 
understand the relationships in perspective.
Calculating cross-correlations are quite standard. The variables, including 
house  prices  and  stock  prices,  are  log-differenced  for  stationarity. The  list  of 
variables, sample period and frequency are different for the countries. However, 
the lists of variables would include at least, interest rates, liquidity measures, and 
real economic activity measures, exchange rates and other asset prices. Cross-
correlations are calculated over 10 periods. Time subscripts represent leads or lags 
of asset prices. 
3.2.1  Indonesia 
Table 1 and 2 report the cross-correlations for Indonesia. Most of the signs 
are in line with theory. Liquidity measures are mostly positively correlated with asset 
prices while interest rates are negatively correlated. Correlation between inflation 
and asset prices is not clear. This can be seen as a part of the global phenomenon 
that the linkage between inflation and asset prices has become weak.18
Table 1
Cross-correlation between Property Prices and Xt±I: Indonesia
Cross correlation coefficients between the house prices in period t (IPG) and GDP Growth (GROWTH), 
GDP gap Log_OGAP), private consumption (CP), M2, M1, M0, total bank lending (CREDIT), total 
household debt (HHD), BI-rate, time deposit rates with 1 month maturity, time deposit rates with 3 
month maturity, time deposit rates with 6 month maturity, time deposit rates with 12 month maturity, 
time deposit rates with 24 month maturity, inflation (inflasi), nominal exchange rate (EXC), real 
effective exchange rates (REER), stock prices (JSX), government bond (SUN7).
Table 2
Cross-correlation between Stock Prices and Xt±I: Indonesia
Cross correlation coefficients between the stock prices in period t (JSX) and GDP Growth (GROWTH), 
GDP gap Log_OGAP), private consumption (CP), M2, M1, M0, total bank lending (CREDIT), total 
household debt (HHD), BI-rate, time deposit rates with 1 month maturity, time deposit rates with 3 
month maturity, time deposit rates with 6 month maturity, time deposit rates with 12 month maturity, 
time deposit rates with 24 month maturity, inflation (inflasi), nominal exchange rate (EXC), real 
effective exchange rates (REER), house prices (IPG), government bond (SUN7).19
3.2.2  Korea  
Table  3  and  4  report  the  cross-correlations  for  Korea.  The  signs  of 
contemporaneous correlations are roughly matched with theoretical prediction. 
For example, interest rates have negative correlations with asset prices. Interest 
rates do not seem to lead or lag asset prices very much. There are some exceptions 
to the signs of the relationship. Yields of 1 year Government Bond and those of 10 
year Government Bond both have positive correlations with house prices. This, of 
course, does not necessarily mean that the theoretical relationship, which says those 
would have negative signs, does not exist. Possible explanations include, short-
term interest rates are heavily influenced by short-term money markets, which 
may not necessarily be related to overall market liquidity, long-term interest rates 
are influenced by future prospect of short-term interest rate movements, monetary 
policy, and/or foreign capital inflows or outflows.
Liquidity measures are positively correlated with asset prices and slightly 
lag the asset prices. Over the decades, the causal relationships between asset prices 
and liquidity measure such as M2 or Lf have attracted much attention. Liquidity, 
or availability of funds in financial markets seem to have extended over the last 
decade, and the relationship between liquidity and interest rate became loose, which 
have worried policy makers and regulators. However, the relationship cannot be 
readily detected due to the complexity of financial markets and lack of theoretical 
models. Further analyses are needed.
Table 3
Cross-correlation between House Prices and Xt±i: Korea
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
Call -0.27  -0.29  -0.33  -0.35  -0.49  -0.52  -0.25  -0.18  -0.18  -0.22  -0.25 
CD -0.26  -0.25  -0.30  -0.35  -0.49  -0.50  -0.28  -0.20  -0.22  -0.26  -0.28 
GB(1 year) 0.12  0.29  0.28  0.20  0.00  0.06  0.18  0.04  -0.02  -0.11  -0.27 
GB(3 year) -0.25  -0.23  -0.23  -0.27  -0.36  -0.44  -0.23  -0.16  -0.23  -0.28  -0.23 
GB(5 year) -0.21  -0.19  -0.21  -0.26  -0.36  -0.45  -0.24  -0.19  -0.27  -0.30  -0.24 
GB(10 year) -0.09  -0.16  0.02  0.32  0.37  0.30  0.26  0.04  -0.11  -0.11  -0.12 
Ex.Rate 0.31  0.31  0.35  0.37  0.22  -0.05  0.01  0.09  0.08  0.15  0.10 
∆Ex.Rate -0.05  -0.08  0.00  0.00  -0.21  -0.17  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.16  -0.10 
∆CPI -0.16  -0.18  -0.11  -0.07  -0.19  -0.10  0.08  0.22  0.05  0.07  -0.06 
∆HH Loan -0.09  -0.04  0.02  0.00  0.10  0.53  0.36  -0.05  -0.28  -0.31  -0.24 
∆Loan 0.08  0.05  -0.02  -0.05  0.18  0.40  0.38  0.05  -0.12  -0.16  -0.15 
∆M1 0.07  0.00  0.02  -0.18  0.00  0.26  -0.26  -0.32  -0.16  -0.08  0.11 
∆M2 -0.43  -0.51  -0.39  -0.32  -0.22  -0.21  -0.22  -0.14  0.00  -0.05  -0.10 
∆Lf -0.40  -0.48  -0.42  -0.34  -0.19  -0.04  -0.13  -0.16  -0.05  -0.09  -0.15 
∆KOSPI 0.11  0.10  0.07  0.01  0.15  0.18  -0.06  -0.28  -0.07  0.07  0.24 
Source: The Bank of Korea, ECOS20
Table 4
Cross-correlation between Stock Prices and Xt±i: Korea
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
Call -0.13  -0.06  0.07  0.09  -0.12  -0.27  -0.14  -0.06  -0.09  -0.05  -0.01 
CD -0.13  -0.04  0.05  0.06  -0.12  -0.27  -0.11  -0.04  -0.09  -0.07  -0.04 
GB(1 year) -0.19  0.03  0.04  -0.02  -0.38  -0.41  0.04  0.04  -0.09  -0.08  0.03 
GB(3 year) -0.22  -0.07  -0.01  0.00  -0.20  -0.34  -0.15  -0.05  -0.15  -0.16  -0.09 
GB(5 year) -0.21  -0.06  0.00  0.00  -0.22  -0.30  -0.14  -0.07  -0.18  -0.18  -0.08 
GB(10 year) -0.02  -0.05  0.00  -0.02  -0.22  -0.18  -0.02  -0.14  -0.22  0.02  0.05 
Ex.Rate -0.02  0.00  0.11  0.25  0.16  0.04  -0.10  -0.11  -0.08  -0.01  0.02 
∆Ex.Rate 0.02  0.03  0.20  0.19  -0.32  -0.29  0.07  -0.12  0.07  0.04  0.00 
∆CPI -0.03  -0.04  0.06  0.14  -0.24  -0.13  -0.04  -0.03  -0.07  -0.08  0.12 
∆HH Loan 0.20  0.16  0.06  -0.36  -0.44  -0.06  0.26  0.06  -0.01  -0.06  0.06 
∆Loan 0.09  0.09  0.08  -0.25  -0.30  0.18  0.19  0.03  -0.10  -0.19  0.13 
∆M1 0.20  0.10  -0.11  -0.24  -0.06  0.20  0.14  -0.23  -0.13  -0.11  -0.13 
∆M2 -0.11  -0.16  -0.07  0.09  0.02  -0.15  -0.17  -0.17  -0.11  -0.07  0.04 
∆Lf -0.02  -0.12  -0.11  -0.05  -0.02  -0.11  -0.10  -0.14  -0.08  -0.06  -0.01 
∆HPI 0.24  0.07  -0.07  -0.28  -0.06  0.18  0.15  0.01  0.07  0.10  0.11 
Source: The Bank of Korea, ECOS
3.2.3  Malaysia
Table  5  reports  the  cross-correlations  for  Malaysia.  The  signs  of 
contemporaneous correlations are roughly matched by the theoretical prediction for 
liquidity measures and interest rates. Variables related with real economic activities 
such as the output gap and loans are not in line with theoretical signs. Considering 
the nature of the stock market, it should not be something out of ordinary. 
Liquidity measures and effective exchange rates somewhat lead asset 
prices, while interest rates are more contemporaneously related with asset prices 
than leading them. 21
Table 5
Cross-correlation between Stock Prices and Xt±i: Malaysia
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
M1 0.08 -0.12 -0.33 -0.29 0.14 0.64 0.57 0.12 -0.13 -0.11 0.04
M3 0.08 -0.07 -0.26 -0.28 -0.07 0.19 0.19 0.12 .010 0.16 0.26
Total Loan 0.09 0.07 -0.09 -0.27 -0.31 -0.24 -0.03 0.23 0.36 0.37 0.29
Real GDP 0.04 -0.08 -0.25 -0.24 0.02 0.37 0.55 0.33 -0.02 -0.16 0.01
Output Gap 0.08 -0.02 -0.22 -0.34 -0.29 -0.07 0.21 0.18 0.07 -0.11 0.01
NEER -0.02 -0.20 -0.33 -0.26 0.03 0.28 0.27 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.16
REER -0.06 -0.25 -0.34 -0.24 0.03 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.19
Chg MYR/
USD
-0.01 0.24 0.28 0.08 -0.21 -0.36 -0.28 -0.09 0.10 0.05 -0.10
MYR/USD -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.03 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.08 -0.10 -0.14
PPI -0.14 0.02 0.13 0.00 -0.15 -0.05 0.18 0.22 0.05 -0.09 -0.16
CPI -0.15 -0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.14
AOIR 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.12 -0.12 -0.30 -0.23 -0.08 0.04 0.13 0.21
IMIR 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.13 -0.25 -0.19 -0.05 0.07 0.11 0.17
Source: International Financial Statistics, Bank Negara Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI), M1 – Monetary Aggregate, M3 – Monetary Aggregate, 
Banking System total loan outstanding, Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Nominal Effective 
Exchange  Rate  (NEER),  Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate  (REER),  Change  Ringgit/US  Dollar 
Exchange Rate (Chg MYR/USD), Ringgit/US Dollar Exchange Rate – level (MYR/USD), Producer 
Price Index (PPI), Consumer Price Index (CPI), Average Overnight Interbank Rate (AOIR), Average 
one-month Interbank Rate (IMIR)
3.2.4  Mongolia 
The sign of the correlation of deposit rate with asset prices are positive, 
and loan rate, although the sign is correctly negative, lags the asset prices. This 
may be due either to a very short financial cycles or counteractive policy responses 
to asset price movements. Liquidity measures are also somewhat counter intuitive. 
They  negatively  lag  the  asset  prices.  The  same  explanation  as  above  can  be 
applied to this result. Inflation seems to lead negatively. Although inflation is 
usually positively related with (nominal) asset prices, the positive relation between 
inflation and asset prices is weak at best. This may be due to underdeveloped 
financial markets, in which the information such as inflation is not incorporated 
into asset prices immediately. Or, as in other countries, this simply reflects the fact 
that asset price booms can occur under stable prices. Real economic activities are 
positively correlated with asset prices and somewhat lag the asset prices. The signs 
are in line with theory. Also asset prices are prices of the future services so it is 
quite natural that they lead real economic activities. The exchange rate is almost 
contemporaneously positively correlated.22
Table 6
Cross-correlation between House Prices and Xt±i: Mongolia
X -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8
Mortgage Loan -0.12 0.13 -0.18 -0.02 0.63 -0.06 -0.38 -0.01 0.09
Inflation 0.08 -0.11 -0.16 -0.34 -0.01 0.50 0.39 0.10 0.03
Stock Price -0.02 -0.13 0.03 0.37 0.29 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.16
GDP Growth -0.02 -0.21 -0.21 0.20 0.36 0.27 0.13 -0.08 0.00
Deposit Rate -0.07 -0.06 0.19 0.34 0.24 -0.36 -0.34 -0.22 -0.01
GDP Gap -0.17 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.14 0.35 0.06 0.09 -0.10
Broad Money -0.01 -0.07 -0.19 0.34 0.06 -0.25 -0.52 0.00 -0.21
Exchange Rate -0.05 0.11 -0.04 0.03 0.17 0.34 -0.34 -0.29 -0.02
Loan Rate 0.08 0.11 0.06 -0.13 -0.18 -0.25 -0.26 -0.12 -0.01
Total Loan -0.11 -0.01 -0.16 -0.03 0.09 -0.13 -0.21 0.02 0.02
Construction Loan -0.26 -0.08 -0.16 0.20 -0.11 -0.10 -0.26 -0.05 -0.09
Remittance 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.12 0.08 -0.09 -0.24 0.26 -0.05
Table 7
Cross- correlation between Stock Prices and Xt±i: Mongolia
X -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8
GDP Growth -0.07 -0.19 -0.16 0.04 0.50 0.42 0.17 -0.06 -0.02
Inflation 0.20 0.06 -0.14 -0.28 -0.22 0.07 0.47 0.39 0.14
Loan Rate 0.26 0.22 0.08 -0.12 -0.23 -0.36 -0.41 -0.44 -0.21
GDP Gap -0.15 -0.18 -0.33 -0.08 0.03 0.23 0.40 0.19 0.09
Housing Price 0.16 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.29 0.37 0.03 -0.13 -0.02
Broad Money 0.02 -0.20 -0.04 0.08 0.25 0.06 -0.17 -0.26 -0.12
Exchange Rate -0.01 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.15 0.24 0.05 -0.66 -0.26
Deposit Rate 0.01 -0.11 -0.04 0.24 0.24 -0.16 -0.49 -0.52 -0.18
Total Loan -0.12 -0.16 -0.05 0.05 0.14 0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.03
  3.2.5  Philippines 
Interest rates are negatively correlated with and slightly lag asset prices. 
The results with liquidity measures are mixed. Some measures such as loans are 
positively correlated and slightly lag asset prices, which seems to be in line with 
theories. However, other liquidity measures such as M3 show unstable cross-
correlation with asset prices. Real economic activities such as GDP gap and GDP 
growth are positively correlated with asset prices and lag them. The exchange rate 
is negatively correlated. The results of cross-correlation of the Philippines are in 
line with theoretical relationships.23
Table 8
Cross-correlation between Commercial Land Value and Xt±i: Philippines
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
∆M3 0.02  -0.07  -0.08  0.08  0.06  -0.24  -0.14  0.26  -0.11  0.11  -0.05 
∆C.Debt1) -0.13  0.05  -0.01  0.03  -0.14  -0.34  0.10  0.17  -0.25  -0.07  -0.09 
∆B.Loans2) -0.05  -0.21  -0.02  0.03  -0.06  0.07  0.08  0.35  -0.11  0.16  0.10 
∆BNL3) -0.22  0.01  -0.14  0.00  -0.12  0.12  0.14  0.30  -0.16  0.17  0.03 
STD rate4) 0.01  -0.08  -0.02  0.00  -0.26  -0.47  -0.41  0.01  -0.12  -0.09  -0.19 
LTD rate5) 0.08  0.00  -0.01  -0.08  -0.32  -0.49  -0.47  -0.37  -0.38  -0.21  -0.22 
Lending rate 0.08  -0.07  -0.08  -0.01  -0.24  -0.49  -0.42  -0.04  -0.11  -0.18  -0.18 
RP rate 0.00  0.03  0.07  0.07  0.00  -0.37  -0.38  -0.15  -0.19  -0.01  -0.08 
RRP rate6) -0.01  0.02  0.06  0.06  -0.01  -0.37  -0.37  -0.12  -0.18  0.00  -0.06 
Inflation 0.08  -0.01  0.03  0.04  -0.14  -0.13  0.23  0.61  0.23  -0.02  0.01 
∆GDP 0.02  0.07  0.02  0.07  0.23  0.00  0.11  -0.04  -0.56  0.02  0.03 
GDP gap -0.06  -0.06  0.00  0.01  0.30  0.44  0.30  0.20  -0.27  0.21  0.16 
∆PCE7) 0.02  0.02  0.09  0.06  0.08  0.15  -0.05  0.10  -0.48  0.02  -0.02 
∆NFIA8) 0.00  -0.01  -0.06  -0.10  -0.05  -0.24  0.20  0.24  -0.09  -0.12  0.07 
∆Stock 0.02  0.03  0.12  0.25  0.23  0.04  -0.24  0.13  0.10  -0.09  -0.13 
∆Ex.rate -0.07  0.12  -0.16  -0.02  -0.18  -0.35  -0.22  0.29  -0.22  -0.14  -0.09 
1) Consumer Debt, 2) Bank Loans, 3) Bank Net Loans, 4) Short-term Deposit rate, 5) Long-term 
Deposit rate, 6) Reverse-RP rate, 7) Personal Consumption Expenditure, 8) Net Factor Income 
Account24
Table 9
Cross correlation between Stock Prices and Xt±i: Philippines
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
∆M3 0.01  -0.21  -0.23  -0.15  -0.05  0.15  -0.20  0.05  0.00  0.11  -0.08 
∆C.Debt 0.04  0.06  0.09  -0.11  0.06  -0.15  -0.03  0.06  0.06  0.07  -0.01 
∆B.Loans 0.03  -0.15  -0.02  -0.36  -0.29  -0.20  -0.09  0.27  0.13  0.10  -0.03 
∆BNL -0.11  -0.19  -0.23  -0.25  -0.07  -0.24  -0.07  0.20  0.05  0.11  -0.07 
STD rate 0.24  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.09  -0.01  -0.25  -0.10  -0.13  -0.11  -0.09 
LTD rate 0.29  0.16  0.20  0.12  0.02  -0.04  -0.21  -0.19  -0.30  -0.28  -0.22 
Lending rate 0.28  0.04  -0.03  0.03  -0.07  0.00  -0.24  -0.12  -0.16  -0.11  -0.12 
RP rate 0.09  -0.19  -0.16  -0.06  0.08  0.07  -0.09  -0.10  -0.14  -0.10  -0.05 
RRP rate 0.09  -0.19  -0.17  -0.07  0.06  0.05  -0.10  -0.10  -0.13  -0.09  -0.04 
Inflation -0.11  0.05  0.02  0.18  -0.01  -0.22  -0.24  0.04  0.34  0.27  0.08 
∆GDP -0.05  0.07  0.07  -0.15  0.19  0.12  0.18  0.17  0.10  -0.04  -0.14 
GDP gap -0.05  -0.17  -0.13  -0.39  -0.14  -0.05  0.19  0.41  0.19  0.04  -0.05 
∆PCE 0.00  -0.05  -0.03  0.02  0.13  -0.03  -0.02  0.27  0.07  0.02  -0.23 
∆NFIA 0.00  -0.22  -0.34  -0.03  0.19  0.06  -0.19  -0.12  0.13  0.03  0.04 
∆CLV1) -0.13  -0.09  0.10  0.13  -0.24  0.04  0.23  0.25  0.12  0.03  0.02 
∆Ex.rate 0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.01  -0.36  -0.32  -0.12  -0.04  0.00  -0.14 
1) Commercial Land Value
3.2.6  Sri Lanka 
Interest rates are negatively correlated with asset prices. They slightly lead 
house prices and slightly lag stock prices. Leading interest rates could imply that 
low interest rates may have caused house price booms. However, this is just a 
correlation, so more investigation about the causal link between interest rates and 
house prices are needed. Liquidity measures are positively correlated with and 
lag asset prices. However, the relationship between liquidity and stock prices are 
somewhat weak and unstable. The correlations with real economic activities are 
very weak and unstable. The exchange rate is positively correlated with house 
prices and negatively related with stock prices.25
Table 10
Cross-correlation between Land Price and Xt±i: Sri Lanka
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
∆M1 0.03  0.07  0.16  0.20  0.27  0.23  0.16  0.05  -0.10  -0.05  -0.13 
∆M2 -0.14  -0.21  -0.03  0.04  0.18  0.29  0.24  0.19  0.06  0.04  -0.10 
∆M4 0.01  -0.10  0.03  0.03  0.10  0.17  0.12  0.15  0.02  0.04  -0.11 
FD rate1) -0.01  -0.22  -0.39  -0.50  -0.55  -0.23  -0.06  0.16  0.41  0.31  0.37 
PL rate2) -0.10  -0.30  -0.42  -0.52  -0.56  -0.40  -0.24  0.01  0.20  0.19  0.27 
GB(3 year) -0.07  -0.28  -0.46  -0.61  -0.64  -0.47  -0.27  0.02  0.27  0.32  0.37 
GB(6 year) -0.08  -0.28  -0.46  -0.59  -0.64  -0.49  -0.30  -0.02  0.24  0.30  0.38 
GB(12 year) -0.07  -0.28  -0.45  -0.58  -0.63  -0.49  -0.31  -0.04  0.21  0.28  0.37 
∆CPI -0.06  -0.16  -0.10  -0.17  -0.12  0.03  0.08  0.17  0.14  0.17  0.07 
∆GDP -0.04  0.05  -0.03  -0.07  -0.05  0.08  0.16  0.14  0.12  0.14  0.21 
∆IP 0.02  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.06  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.00 
∆PC3) -0.14  -0.27  -0.48  -0.43  -0.51  -0.41  -0.19  0.07  0.29  0.44  0.59 
∆Ex.rate -0.02  -0.05  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.22  0.20  0.25  0.23  -0.03  -0.04 
∆Stock 0.02  0.04  0.07  0.06  0.18  0.19  0.22  0.14  0.01  0.02  -0.24 
1) Fixed Deposit rate 2) Prime Lending rate 3) Private Consumption
Table 11
Cross-correlation between Stock Prices and Xt±i: Sri Lanka
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
∆M1 0.06  -0.08  0.23  0.03  0.17  0.17  0.05  0.08  0.13  -0.11  0.10 
∆M2 0.04  -0.13  0.07  -0.04  0.15  0.21  0.13  -0.05  0.11  0.00  0.20 
∆M4 0.17  -0.15  0.03  -0.01  0.04  0.18  0.37  -0.08  0.15  0.04  0.29 
FD rate 0.04  0.03  -0.04  -0.13  -0.17  -0.27  -0.08  -0.17  -0.14  -0.10  -0.13 
PL rate 0.11  0.06  -0.07  -0.04  -0.15  -0.33  -0.29  -0.23  -0.17  -0.12  -0.12 
GB(3 year) 0.11  0.05  -0.10  -0.03  -0.13  -0.29  -0.25  -0.20  -0.17  -0.07  -0.07 
GB(6 year) 0.11  0.05  -0.09  -0.05  -0.14  -0.29  -0.26  -0.21  -0.18  -0.08  -0.07 
GB(12 year) 0.12  0.05  -0.07  -0.05  -0.14  -0.29  -0.26  -0.22  -0.19  -0.09  -0.08 
∆CPI -0.19  -0.15  -0.15  -0.16  -0.01  -0.17  -0.06  -0.04  0.08  -0.06  0.09 
∆GDP -0.17  -0.10  -0.07  -0.20  -0.23  -0.09  0.17  0.27  0.14  0.08  0.09 
∆IP -0.06  -0.20  -0.13  -0.09  -0.05  -0.34  0.13  -0.17  0.04  -0.15  0.08 
∆PC -0.10  -0.09  -0.09  -0.08  -0.20  -0.20  -0.01  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.02 
∆Ex.rate 0.03  -0.01  0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.07  -0.12  -0.26  -0.14  -0.09  -0.16 
∆CLV1) -0.24  0.02  0.01  0.14  0.22  0.19  0.18  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.02 
1) Commercial Land Value26
3.3.7    Taiwan 
Interest rates are negatively correlated with house prices and slightly lead 
house prices. Long-term interest rate, especially, has a strong negative correlation 
with house prices. However, the correlation between interest rates and stock prices 
are very weak and unstable. The results with liquidity measures and asset prices 
are mixed. Liquidity measures seem to have positive correlation with stock prices, 
but the results with house prices vary by liquidity measures. The results with real 
economic activity measures are also somewhat mixed. GDP seems to have positive 
correlation with both asset prices, but other measures have weak and unstable 
correlations with asset prices. The exchange rate has a negative correlation with 
asset prices.
Table 12
Cross-correlation between House Prices and Xt±i: Taiwan
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
∆M2 -0.02  0.10  -0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.09  0.17  0.27  0.07  -0.20  -0.10 
∆Loan -0.03  0.07  0.00  0.04  0.03  0.18  0.19  0.29  0.13  -0.27  -0.18 
∆CDO1) 0.08  0.17  -0.21  -0.24  -0.27  -0.44  -0.34  -0.29  -0.23  -0.05  -0.02 
L / GDP2) -0.10  0.04  0.00  -0.03  -0.17  -0.07  -0.05  0.03  0.13  0.16  0.09 
ON3) -0.36  -0.40  -0.38  -0.36  -0.28  -0.15  -0.22  -0.14  -0.09  -0.03  0.03 
Dis4) -0.43  -0.43  -0.46  -0.35  -0.25  -0.12  -0.09  -0.01  0.02  0.06  0.11 
CP -0.36  -0.41  -0.41  -0.34  -0.29  -0.16  -0.19  -0.14  -0.08  -0.02  0.05 
NL rate5) -0.31  -0.42  -0.42  -0.38  -0.41  -0.34  -0.31  -0.26  -0.22  -0.14  -0.06 
Dep.rate6) -0.39  -0.40  -0.45  -0.34  -0.26  -0.15  -0.13  -0.07  -0.05  0.00  0.08 
GB(10 year) -0.33  -0.30  -0.47  -0.41  -0.34  -0.38  -0.34  -0.25  -0.29  -0.17  -0.12 
∆CPI -0.18  0.11  -0.09  -0.03  -0.06  0.10  0.12  0.10  0.05  -0.05  0.01 
∆Core CPI -0.21  -0.11  -0.34  -0.19  -0.10  -0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02  -0.05  0.02 
∆LI7) 0.10  0.01  0.17  0.15  0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.05  -0.23  -0.23  -0.31 
∆Cons8) 0.13  0.12  0.13  0.10  0.12  0.12  0.22  0.21  0.19  0.07  0.11 
∆GDP 0.06  0.05  0.01  0.07  -0.02  0.04  0.11  0.19  -0.01  -0.28  -0.23 
GDP gap -0.07  0.00  -0.04  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.04  0.24  0.10  -0.12  -0.28 
∆Stock 0.01  0.09  0.18  0.09  -0.03  0.04  0.03  0.13  -0.19  0.01  -0.16 
∆Ex.rate -0.05  -0.12  -0.01  -0.03  0.05  -0.08  -0.14  -0.27  -0.09  0.28  0.14 
C.A.9) 0.33  0.16  0.33  0.20  0.27  0.12  0.18  0.01  0.09  0.18  0.09 
K.A.10) -0.04  0.22  -0.09  -0.06  -0.12  -0.28  -0.11  -0.07  -0.22  -0.29  -0.20 
1) CD outstanding, 2) Loan / GDP ratio, 3) Overnight interest rate, 4) Discount rate, 5)Weighted 
average interest rates of new loans by five leading banks, 6) 1 year deposit rates by banks, 7) Taiwan 
Business Cycle Leading Index, 8) Real Private Final Consumption Expenditure, 9) Current Account 
Balance, 10) Capital and Financial Account Balance27
Table 13
Cross-correlation between Stock Prices and Xt±i: Taiwan
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
∆M2 0.08  0.09  -0.09  -0.02  -0.09  0.43  -0.04  -0.10  -0.31  0.03  0.05 
∆Loan 0.11  0.11  -0.05  -0.08  -0.18  0.38  0.07  -0.06  -0.33  -0.07  0.03 
∆CDO 0.09  0.05  0.13  -0.01  -0.13  0.03  0.13  -0.30  -0.02  0.05  -0.25 
L / GDP -0.12  0.03  -0.10  0.16  0.11  0.09  0.07  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.04 
ON 0.02  0.01  0.04  0.01  -0.17  -0.08  0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.05  -0.05 
Dis 0.04  -0.02  0.03  -0.06  -0.13  -0.10  -0.07  -0.04  0.00  -0.03  -0.01 
CP 0.01  0.01  0.07  -0.01  -0.16  -0.08  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.04  -0.08 
NL rate 0.01  0.03  0.07  0.03  -0.03  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.03 
Dep.rate 0.05  0.00  0.07  -0.03  -0.08  -0.06  -0.07  -0.06  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04 
GB(10 year) -0.01  0.05  0.05  0.03  -0.08  0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.07  -0.03  0.04 
∆CPI 0.01  0.01  0.04  -0.20  0.06  -0.17  0.19  -0.02  -0.04  -0.04  0.04 
∆Core CPI -0.11  0.02  -0.03  0.00  -0.19  0.00  -0.14  0.07  -0.15  0.12  -0.12 
∆LI 0.02  0.10  -0.14  -0.04  0.08  0.66  -0.04  -0.18  -0.31  0.11  0.07 
∆Cons 0.12  0.04  0.05  -0.06  0.07  0.17  0.05  -0.01  -0.01  0.06  0.12 
∆GDP 0.12  -0.04  -0.08  -0.13  0.02  0.42  0.15  -0.22  -0.25  -0.07  0.18 
GDP gap 0.11  0.07  -0.02  -0.10  -0.15  0.23  0.31  0.05  -0.24  -0.19  0.09 
∆HPI -0.16  0.01  -0.19  0.13  0.03  0.04  -0.03  0.09  0.18  0.09  0.01 
∆Ex.rate -0.07  0.01  0.13  0.08  0.04  -0.37  -0.04  0.12  0.32  -0.05  -0.12 
C.A. 0.04  -0.11  -0.04  -0.09  0.05  0.00  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  0.03  -0.01 
K.A. 0.06  0.12  -0.05  0.06  -0.02  0.19  0.04  -0.12  -0.23  0.11  -0.01 
3.2.8    Thailand
Interest rates are negatively correlated with house prices and slightly lead 
house prices. Although the correlations of interest rates with house prices are 
rather weak, those with stock prices are strong and lag stock prices. The results 
with liquidity measures and asset prices are mixed and unstable. The results with 
real economic activity measures are also somewhat mixed. The exchange rate has 
a slightly negative correlation with asset prices but they are weak and unstable.28
Table 14
Cross-correlation between Single House Prices and Xt±i: Thailand
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
∆NM1) 0.07  0.09  -0.03  0.09  0.01  -0.02  -0.37  0.06  -0.13  0.03  0.08 
∆BM2) -0.03  -0.09  -0.01  0.11  -0.01  0.15  0.15  0.18  0.11  0.12  0.06 
∆CBC3) 0.02  0.15  -0.26  0.04  0.11  0.11  0.30  0.12  0.18  0.26  0.22 
∆CBPC4) -0.22  -0.19  -0.09  0.07  0.24  -0.40  -0.03  0.36  -0.18  0.04  0.09 
BY1m -0.06  -0.03  -0.16  -0.20  -0.12  -0.06  0.04  0.07  0.03  0.02  0.01 
BY3m -0.06  -0.06  -0.15  -0.20  -0.12  -0.05  0.03  0.08  0.02  0.02  0.01 
BY1y -0.05  -0.09  -0.15  -0.21  -0.14  -0.06  0.02  0.08  0.02  0.03  0.01 
BY5y -0.03  -0.06  -0.15  -0.16  -0.13  -0.06  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.02  -0.01 
BY10y -0.03  -0.06  -0.14  -0.14  -0.15  -0.07  -0.01  0.01  -0.03  0.00  -0.02 
∆CPI -0.06  0.19  -0.02  -0.04  0.07  0.09  0.12  0.15  -0.01  0.09  0.16 
∆H.F.CPI5) 0.05  -0.02  -0.15  -0.07  -0.03  0.18  0.06  0.04  0.09  0.01  0.08 
∆GDP -0.05  -0.07  0.11  0.19  0.02  0.22  0.03  0.00  0.04  -0.02  -0.04 
GDP gap -0.15  -0.08  -0.14  0.04  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.03  0.00  0.06  0.04 
∆Car Sales 0.01  -0.09  0.20  -0.13  -0.10  -0.10  -0.22  0.07  -0.04  -0.05  0.02 
∆M. Sales6) 0.04  -0.04  0.20  -0.18  -0.09  -0.06  -0.14  0.11  0.05  0.00  0.07 
∆NEER7) -0.04  -0.20  0.18  -0.30  -0.09  -0.14  -0.07  0.09  0.19  0.04  0.02 
∆Stock 0.00  0.13  0.34  0.18  -0.13  -0.11  -0.14  -0.06  0.03  0.12  0.20 
C.A.8) 0.07  0.06  0.01  -0.08  -0.11  -0.14  -0.11  -0.12  -0.13  -0.08  -0.07 
1) Narrow Money, 2) Broad Money, 3) Commercial Bank Credits, 4) Commercial Bank Private 
Credit, 5) Housing and Furnishing CPI, 6) Motorcycle Sales (units),  7)  Nominal  Effective 
Exchange Rate, 8) Current Account Balance29
Table 15
Cross-correlation between Stock Prices and Xt±i: Thailand
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
∆NM -0.05  -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.15  0.07  0.20  0.00  -0.13  -0.06 
∆BM -0.18  -0.07  -0.07  0.09  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.09  0.10  0.11  0.22 
∆CBC -0.22  -0.12  -0.03  0.04  0.00  -0.10  -0.02  0.11  0.20  0.26  0.12 
∆CBPC -0.20  0.05  0.16  -0.05  -0.33  -0.30  0.23  0.18  -0.35  0.11  0.12 
BY1m -0.15  -0.14  -0.08  -0.09  -0.22  -0.43  -0.33  -0.31  -0.23  -0.06  0.03 
BY3m -0.14  -0.14  -0.07  -0.10  -0.22  -0.43  -0.32  -0.31  -0.24  -0.07  0.02 
BY1y -0.14  -0.15  -0.06  -0.08  -0.24  -0.42  -0.30  -0.32  -0.26  -0.07  0.03 
BY5y -0.13  -0.12  -0.02  -0.05  -0.26  -0.39  -0.24  -0.32  -0.32  -0.13  0.00 
BY10y -0.09  -0.10  0.00  -0.05  -0.27  -0.36  -0.24  -0.34  -0.35  -0.17  -0.06 
∆CPI -0.16  -0.08  -0.06  -0.07  -0.22  0.08  0.00  -0.09  0.07  0.09  0.03 
∆H.F.CPI -0.05  -0.09  0.01  0.09  -0.17  -0.04  -0.12  -0.04  0.10  0.04  -0.02 
∆GDP 0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.23  0.04  0.42  0.11  0.22  0.10  0.12  0.05 
GDP gap -0.02  -0.06  -0.10  -0.31  -0.43  -0.14  0.09  0.20  0.22  0.25  0.19 
∆Car Sales 0.07  -0.14  0.05  0.05  0.09  0.43  0.01  -0.02  -0.10  0.01  -0.05 
∆M. Sales 0.08  -0.11  0.04  0.04  0.08  0.44  -0.07  -0.05  -0.09  0.01  -0.04 
∆NEER 0.11  -0.06  -0.11  0.11  0.28  0.03  0.04  0.03  -0.11  0.02  0.08 
∆SHP1) 0.20  0.12  0.03  -0.06  -0.14  -0.11  -0.13  0.18  0.34  0.13  0.00 
C.A. 0.11  0.07  0.10  0.07  0.03  0.09  -0.14  -0.15  -0.23  -0.23  -0.21 
1) Single House Price
3.3   Factor Analyses3
When there are a large number of explanatory variables, regressing a 
dependent variable on all these variables is not practical since it creates problems 
such as multicollinearity, low degree of freedom, inefficiency and others. Instead, 
extracting a few factors from these variables and regressing the dependent variable 
on these factors would yield better results. One of the problems, however, is 
the interpretation of these factors. Estimating factors is basically a theoretical 
procedure, but there is no straightforward interpretation on the factors themselves. 
We can look at the loadings, coefficients to be multiplied to the original data series 
to construct a factor series, but these loadings do not give a definite interpretation 
either.
Nevertheless, by performing factor analyses, we can learn which variable 
or group of variables have more importance than others on affecting the dependent 
variable. After we extract the factors, we attempt to assign a specific meaning 
3.  In order to maintain comparability and consistency between countries, the analyses in this 
section are based on slightly different data sets, if at all, from those of the following country 
chapters. For detailed analyses, refer to the country chapters. 30
to each factor. The possible factors include the “interest rate factor”, “liquidity 
factor”, “real factor”, or “inflation factor”.
3.3.1  Indonesia 
Table 16 and 17 show the factor analysis for Indonesia. Although it seems 
that the factors from this analysis do not allow clear interpretations, one can be 
attempted to give the first factor an interpretation as the liquidity factor, the second 
interest rate factor, and the third the foreign factor.4 
Table 16
Factor Analysis for Property Prices: Indonesia
For variables definition, refer to table 1
Table 17
Factor Analysis for Stock Prices: Indonesia
For variables definition, refer to Table 2
4.  Note here that the signs of factor loadings do not have any significance because the loadings 
with opposite signs would give the same results.31
3.3.2  Korea 
As can be seen from the factor loadings, the first factor represents the 
interest rate movement. The second factor is somewhat obscure, but from the 
loadings of ∆CPI and ∆PPI, it is reasonable to assume that it represents inflation. 
The third factor represents liquidity, the fourth factor represents real economic 
activities. We confine our attention to these four factors since these make up 80% 
of the variance of this group of variables. 
Table 18 and 19 report the results of regression of asset prices on these 
factors. For house prices, except for the third factor, the coefficients for the factors 
are all significant at 5%. The signs of the coefficients are all in line with theory, 
i.e., the coefficient of interest rate is negative, and others are all positive. For 
stock prices, only two factors - the first and the second are significant in line with 
theory.
From these analyses, we find that interest rate and inflation may be the 
major driving forces of asset prices. The effects of liquidity and real economic 
activities on asset prices are not clear.
Table 18
Factor Analysis for House Prices: Korea
X F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 Communality Uniqueness
∆M1 -0.04  -0.42  -0.15  0.26  0.43  -0.07  0.21  0.50 0.50
∆M2 0.58  0.49  -0.36  0.48  0.02  0.05  -0.15  0.95 0.05
∆Lf 0.49  0.23  -0.21  0.80  0.07  -0.02  -0.01  0.99 0.01
∆HH Loan -0.05  -0.41  0.54  0.44  0.37  -0.18  0.27  0.90 0.10
∆Loan -0.05  -0.23  0.24  0.13  0.61  0.05  0.10  0.52 0.48
Call 0.92  0.39  0.01  -0.01  -0.03  0.01  0.03  1.00 0.00
GB (3 year) 1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
GB (5 year) 0.99  0.00  -0.03  -0.04  0.09  -0.01  0.03  1.00 0.00
CD 0.96  0.27  0.00  -0.05  0.01  -0.01  0.02  1.00 0.00
∆CPI 0.27  0.60  0.17  -0.17  0.45  0.10  -0.36  0.83 0.17
∆PPI 0.23  0.61  0.21  -0.29  0.40  0.15  -0.44  0.93 0.07
∆GDP -0.33  -0.69  -0.02  0.25  -0.07  0.36  0.23  0.84 0.16
GDP gap -0.06  -0.12  0.80  0.45  0.15  0.12  0.09  0.91 0.09
∆IP -0.23  -0.60  -0.19  0.06  0.07  0.53  0.21  0.78 0.22
U 0.22  -0.20  -0.81  -0.46  0.07  -0.01  0.04  0.96 0.04
∆KOSPI -0.38  -0.08  -0.34  -0.08  0.32  0.52  0.33  0.76 0.24
∆Ex.Rate 0.32  0.58  0.25  -0.10  0.46  -0.08  -0.07  0.74 0.2632
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 4.93 4.93 2.06 0.34 34%
F2 2.87 7.79 0.74 0.20 53%
F3 2.13 9.92 0.37 0.15 68%
F4 1.77 11.69 0.33 0.12 80%
F5 1.43 13.12 0.64 0.10 90%
F6 0.79 13.91 0.10 0.05 95%
F7 0.69 14.60 — 0.05 100%
Total 14.60 75.97 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆HPI
∆HPI(%) = 0.87 -1.11×F1 +0.46×F2 +0.25×F3 +0.89×F4
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.28) (0.00)
Adjusted R-square = 0.43
Table 19
Factor Analysis for Stock Prices: Korea
X F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 Communality Uniqueness
∆M1 -0.24  0.19  0.29  -0.01  0.22  0.43  0.32  0.53 0.46
∆M2 0.65  0.43  0.02  0.61  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
∆Lf 0.44  0.27  0.25  0.71  -0.06  0.17  0.19  0.92 0.07
∆HH Loan -0.24  -0.49  0.37  0.18  0.18  0.46  0.42  0.89 0.10
∆Loan -0.14  -0.19  0.14  0.01  0.48  0.34  0.27  0.51 0.48
Call 0.97  0.03  0.19  0.07  -0.02  0.00  -0.08  0.99 0.00
GB (3 year) 0.88  0.06  0.42  -0.07  -0.02  -0.04  0.17  0.99 0.00
GB (5 year) 0.88  0.09  0.39  -0.11  0.04  0.01  0.18  0.99 0.00
CD 0.96  0.05  0.24  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
∆CPI 0.53  -0.11  -0.32  0.12  0.59  -0.07  -0.19  0.81 0.18
∆PPI 0.51  -0.16  -0.37  0.05  0.63  -0.22  -0.23  0.95 0.04
∆GDP -0.71  0.09  0.69  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
GDP gap -0.16  -0.72  0.35  0.39  0.18  0.13  0.10  0.90 0.09
∆IP -0.53  0.24  0.49  -0.11  0.09  -0.07  0.08  0.62 0.37
U 0.13  0.80  0.01  -0.57  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
∆KOSPI -0.58  -0.09  0.07  0.28  0.09  0.40  0.12  0.63 0.36
∆Ex.Rate 0.56  -0.20  -0.24  0.11  0.47  0.24  -0.19  0.76 0.23
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 6.27 6.27 4.33 0.43 43%
F2 1.94 8.21 0.04 0.13 56%
F3 1.90 10.11 0.33 0.13 69%
F4 1.56 11.68 0.19 0.10 80%33
F5 1.36 13.05 0.51 0.09 89%
F6 0.85 13.90 0.21 0.05 95%
F7 0.64 14.54 — 0.04 100%
Total 14.54 77.79 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆KOSPI
∆KOSPI(%) = 1.12 -6.35×F1 +0.45×F2 +0.12×F3 -1.56×F4
(p-value) (0.53) (0.00) (0.01) (0.49) (0.39)
Adjusted R-square = 0.24
Figure 1
Factors: Korea
3.3.3  Malaysia 
The first factor has high loadings on real and nominal exchange rates. 
The second factor has high loadings on monetary aggregates and interest rates. 
The third factor has high loadings on price indices. Therefore, the first can be 
interpreted as the foreign factor, the second the monetary factor, and the third as 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.3.4  Mongolia 
The results show that for house prices, the liquidity factor (mostly refers 
to loans) is the most important factor. The second is the real factor due to the high 
loadings on GDP. The third one is a little obscure, but it can be interpreted as 
the foreign factor since the exchange rate has a high loading. It should be noted, 
however, that the regression of house prices on these factors show little statistical 
significance. 
For stock prices, the most influential factor would be the interest rate 
factor, the second is the liquidity factor. Although the regression of stock prices on 
these factors have the correct signs, the statistical significance is very low, which 
is not surprising for stock prices. 
Table 21
Factor Analysis for House Prices: Mongolia
Variables F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 Communality
Inflation -0.35 0.29 0.18 -0.11 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.48 1.00
Deposit rate 0.39 -0.10 -0.07 0.15 -0.12 -0.47 -0.44 0.16 0.40 0.65
Loan rate 0.13 -0.45 0.17 0.54 -0.01 0.04 0.50 0.01 -0.08 1.00
GDP gap -0.17 0.46 0.15 0.51 -0.14 -0.11 -0.21 0.14 0.13 0.35
GDP growth 0.22 0.48 0.20 -0.29 0.07 -0.24 0.07 -0.14 -0.45 0.57
Broad money 0.36 -0.09 -0.26 -0.09 0.27 0.43 -0.19 -0.33 0.12 0.53
Mortgage loan 0.30 -0.08 0.37 -0.15 -0.30 0.44 -0.19 0.60 -0.22 0.83
Construction 
loan
0.29 0.09 -0.36 0.00 0.54 -0.21 0.25 0.56 -0.07 0.69
Total loan 0.38 0.27 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.33 0.05 -0.15 0.40 0.91
Remittance 0.03 0.36 -0.50 0.43 -0.19 0.30 0.01 0.02 -0.31 0.60
Exchange rate 0.23 0.10 0.53 0.31 0.44 -0.04 -0.07 -0.23 -0.14 1.00
Stock price 0.35 0.19 0.00 -0.15 -0.46 -0.18 0.55 -0.12 0.20 0.24
(P – Value)    (0.06)                  (0.54)                    (0.89)             (0.70)
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Table 22
Factor Analysis for Stock Prices: Mongolia
Variables F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 Communality
Inflation -0.43 -0.11 0.15 0.05 0.23 -0.12 0.01 0.48 0.35 0.96
Construction 
loan
0.29 0.24 0.41 -0.28 0.18 -0.11 -0.05 -0.05 0.39 1.00
Broad 
money
0.31 0.25 -0.12 -0.45 -0.08 0.48 -0.04 0.36 0.29 0.90
Mortgage 
loan 
-0.18 0.45 -0.30 -0.28 -0.13 0.03 0.38 -0.15 -0.28 0.42
Total loan 0.19 0.30 0.45 -0.03 0.15 -0.49 0.33 -0.04 -0.15 0.52
GDP gap -0.36 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.05 0.42 0.30 -0.33 0.39 1.00
GDP growth -0.27 0.41 0.01 -0.02 0.15 -0.11 -0.78 -0.12 -0.08 0.47
Loan rate 0.43 -0.21 -0.04 0.33 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.24 -0.06 1.00
Deposit rate 0.38 0.15 -0.22 0.35 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.43 0.38 0.23
Remittance 0.09 0.15 0.55 0.26 -0.36 0.41 -0.14 0.14 -0.40 0.72
Exchange 
rate
0.12 0.30 -0.20 0.31 0.73 0.27 0.10 0.12 -0.21 1.00
House price -0.07 0.45 -0.20 0.39 -0.39 -0.27 0.08 0.46 0.18 0.36
(P – Value)    (0.32)          (0.05)          (0.84)          (0.79)
 
3.3.5  Philippines 
Before the regression analysis, we group the variables including stock 
prices, for possible independent variables. From this set of variables, three factors 
are estimated. The first is the interest rate factor, the second the liquidity factor, and 
the third the real economic factor. Regression results show that only the coefficient 
of interest rate factor is significant and other factors are insignificant. Although 
the interest rate factor seems to have affected house prices, the magnitude is 
somewhat low. This result suggests that the effect of interest rates on house prices 
is econometrically significant but economically relatively not so significant.
For stock prices, a group of variables, which include house prices, produce 
three factors. Both the first and second factors can be interpreted as interest rate 
factors, and the third as the liquidity factor. Regression results show that there is 
not a single factor that influences stock prices. For stock prices, therefore, further 
studies are needed.37
Table 23
Factor Analysis for Land Value: Philippines
X F1 F2 F3 Communality Uniqueness
∆M3 0.11 0.54 -0.06 0.31 0.69
∆C.Debt 0.16 0.45 -0.06 0.23 0.77
∆B.Loans -0.18 0.83 -0.11 0.74 0.26
∆BNL -0.16 0.74 0.07 0.57 0.43
STD rate 0.91 0.05 -0.37 0.96 0.04
LTD rate 0.77 -0.14 -0.30 0.70 0.30
Lending rate 0.92 0.00 -0.40 1.00 0.00
RP rate 0.98 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.00
RRP rate 0.98 0.02 0.21 1.00 0.00
Inflation -0.03 0.24 -0.43 0.24 0.76
∆GDP -0.15 -0.02 0.48 0.26 0.74
GDP gap 0.11 0.35 0.51 0.39 0.61
∆PCE 0.03 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.87
∆NFIA 0.05 0.45 0.07 0.21 0.79
∆Stock 0.04 -0.27 0.11 0.09 0.91
∆Ex.rate 0.47 0.37 -0.08 0.36 0.64
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 4.52 4.52 2.09 0.55 0.55
F2 2.42 6.94 1.18 0.30 0.85
F3 1.25 8.19 — 0.15 1.00
Total 8.19 19.65 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆(Land Value)
∆Land Value(%) = 0.11 -3.57×F1 -0.49×F2 +0.79×F3
(p-value) (0.89) (0.00) (0.56) (0.30)
Adjusted R-square = 0.1838
Table 24
Factor Analysis for Stock Prices: Philippines
X F1 F2 F3 Communality Uniqueness
∆M3 0.06 0.08 0.68 0.48 0.52
∆C.Debt 0.14 0.33 0.41 0.29 0.71
∆B.Loans -0.40 0.11 0.80 0.82 0.18
∆BNL -0.41 -0.07 0.53 0.46 0.54
STD rate 0.60 0.76 0.12 0.94 0.06
LTD rate 0.57 0.60 -0.08 0.69 0.31
Lending rate 0.59 0.81 0.00 1.00 0.00
RP rate 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
RRP rate 1.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00
Inflation -0.15 0.36 0.20 0.19 0.81
∆GDP 0.43 -0.39 0.25 0.40 0.60
GDP gap 0.00 -0.44 0.37 0.34 0.66
∆PCE 0.30 -0.22 0.55 0.44 0.56
∆NFIA -0.08 -0.01 0.33 0.11 0.89
∆CLV -0.37 -0.34 -0.06 0.26 0.74
∆Ex.rate 0.04 0.28 0.18 0.12 0.88
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 3.82 3.82 1.38 0.45 0.45
F2 2.44 6.26 0.17 0.29 0.73
F3 2.27 8.53 — 0.27 1.00
Total 8.53 18.62 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆Stock Index
∆Stock Index(%) = 0.99 +2.89×F1 -1.17×F2 -1.84×F3
(p-value) (0.65) (0.19) (0.59) (0.43)
Adjusted R-square = -0.0139
Figure 2
Factors: Philippines
3.3.6  Sri Lanka 
For land prices, a group of independent variables produce three factors. 
The first is the interest rate factor, the second is the liquidity factor, while the third 
is the other factor. The regression shows that the interest rate factor and the other 
factor are significant although the magnitudes are small.
For stock prices, there are also 3 factors with the same interpretations as 
the factors for house prices. Regression shows that the interest rate factor is the 
only one that is significant. However, the fitness of the model, R2 is somewhat 
low indicating that this factor regression does not seem to be sufficient for finding 
explanatory variables for stock prices.40
Table 25
Factor Analysis for Land Prices: Sri Lanka
X F1 F2 F3 Communality Uniqueness
∆M1 -0.36 0.77 0.09 0.73 0.27
∆M2 -0.23 0.97 0.00 1.00 0.00
∆M4 -0.15 0.57 -0.11 0.36 0.64
FD rate 0.96 0.01 0.14 0.94 0.06
PL rate 0.96 -0.12 -0.18 0.96 0.04
GB (3 year) 1.00 -0.05 -0.02 1.00 0.00
GB (6 year) 1.00 -0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00
GB (12 
year)
0.19 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.96
∆CPI -0.27 0.00 0.36 0.21 0.79
∆GDP -0.06 0.25 -0.01 0.07 0.93
∆IP 0.70 0.01 0.55 0.78 0.22
∆Ex.rate 0.21 -0.22 -0.67 0.54 0.46
∆Stock -0.36 0.08 -0.03 0.14 0.86
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 4.79 4.79 2.79 0.62 0.62
F2 2.00 6.80 1.05 0.26 0.88
F3 0.96 7.76 — 0.12 1.00
Total 7.76 19.35 1.00
 Principal Component Regression on ∆Land Price
∆Land Price(%) = 0.17 -0.95×F1 +0.27×F2 -0.51×F3
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.04)
Adjusted R-square = 0.4241
Table 26
Factor Analysis for Stock Prices: Sri Lanka
X F1 F2 F3 Communality Uniqueness
∆M1 -0.16 0.83 -0.12 0.73 0.27
∆M2 0.02 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
∆M4 -0.01 0.59 0.11 0.36 0.64
FD rate 0.93 -0.23 -0.15 0.94 0.06
PL rate 0.90 -0.35 0.19 0.97 0.03
GB (3 year) 0.95 -0.30 0.01 1.00 0.00
GB (6 year) 0.96 -0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00
GB (12 
year)
0.19 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.96
∆CPI -0.27 0.07 -0.31 0.17 0.83
∆GDP 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.07 0.93
∆IP 0.68 -0.16 -0.49 0.73 0.27
∆Ex.rate 0.15 -0.26 0.70 0.58 0.42
∆Stock -0.51 0.30 0.34 0.47 0.53
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 4.37 4.37 1.73 0.54 0.54
F2 2.64 7.02 1.61 0.33 0.87
F3 1.03 8.05 — 0.13 1.00
Total 8.05 19.44 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆Stock Index
∆Stock Index(%) = 2.65 -5.01×F1 +2.48×F2 0.01×F3
(p-value) (0.27) (0.04) (0.30) (0.99)
Adjusted R-square = 0.0642
Figure 3
Factors: Sri Lanka
3.3.6  Taiwan 
For house prices, six factors are estimated, but we will focus on the first 
four factors. The first one is liquidity, the second is interest rate, the third is inflation 
while the fourth is real economic activities. It is interesting to note that for Taiwan, 
the liquidity factor  and not the interest rate factor, is the first factor unlike other 
countries. This means that liquidity fluctuations are more meaningful than interest 
rates. The regression shows, however, that there is no single factor that explains 
house prices significantly.
For stock prices, four factors are estimated. The first one is interest rate, 
the second is liquidity, the third and the fourth are unclear. From the regression, 
the interest rate factor and the liquidity factor are significant and have the correct 
signs.43
Table 27
Factor Analysis for House Prices: Taiwan
X F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 Communality Uniqueness
∆M2 0.98 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
∆Loan 0.86 -0.12 0.34 0.19 -0.11 0.24 0.97 0.03
∆CDO 0.32 0.21 0.03 -0.16 0.42 0.31 0.45 0.55
L / GDP -0.28 0.14 -0.09 -0.53 -0.30 -0.33 0.59 0.41
ON -0.30 0.95 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.02 1.00 0.00
Dis -0.29 0.67 0.29 0.03 -0.57 -0.12 0.97 0.03
CP -0.32 0.94 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00
NL rate -0.26 0.84 -0.10 -0.08 0.43 0.05 0.98 0.02
Dep.rate -0.33 0.91 0.14 0.03 -0.19 -0.01 1.00 0.00
GB(10 year) -0.08 0.70 0.04 0.08 0.50 0.22 0.81 0.19
∆CPI -0.33 0.04 0.32 0.54 -0.14 0.33 0.63 0.37
∆Core CPI 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
∆LI 0.43 -0.10 0.08 0.49 0.59 -0.25 0.84 0.16
∆Cons 0.45 -0.01 -0.55 0.06 -0.19 -0.15 0.57 0.43
∆GDP 0.68 0.04 0.13 0.61 0.11 0.09 0.88 0.12
GDP gap 0.42 -0.18 0.33 0.54 -0.17 0.42 0.81 0.19
∆Stock 0.55 -0.07 0.18 0.43 0.30 -0.57 0.94 0.06
∆Ex.rate -0.89 -0.08 -0.30 -0.14 0.02 -0.17 0.94 0.06
C.A. 0.06 -0.24 0.14 -0.26 0.06 -0.41 0.32 0.68
K.A. 0.41 -0.03 -0.12 -0.24 0.38 0.39 0.54 0.46
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 4.76 4.76 0.30 0.29 0.29
F2 4.46 9.21 2.48 0.27 0.57
F3 1.98 11.19 0.10 0.12 0.69
F4 1.88 13.08 0.12 0.12 0.81
F5 1.76 14.84 0.37 0.11 0.91
F6 1.39 16.23 — 0.09 1.00
Total 16.23 69.30 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆HPI
∆HPI(%) = 0.58 +0.18×F1 -0.28×F2 +0.23×F3 0.30×F4
(p-value) (0.04) (0.50) (0.30) (0.39) (0.29)
Adjusted R-square = -0.0144
Table 28
Factor Analysis for Stock Prices: Taiwan
X F1 F2 F3 F4 Communality Uniqueness
∆M2 -0.46 0.89 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 0.00
∆Loan -0.49 0.77 0.19 0.28 0.95 0.05
∆CDO 0.04 0.38 -0.48 0.11 0.39 0.61
L / GDP 0.25 -0.21 0.19 -0.67 0.59 0.41
ON 0.98 0.19 0.00 0.05 1.00 0.00
Dis 0.74 0.12 0.61 -0.11 0.95 0.05
CP 0.99 0.16 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 0.00
NL rate 0.86 0.12 -0.48 0.01 0.98 0.02
Dep.rate 0.96 0.16 0.20 -0.01 0.99 0.01
GB(10 year) 0.66 0.26 -0.47 0.28 0.81 0.19
∆CPI 0.20 -0.18 0.35 0.67 0.64 0.36
∆Core CPI 0.05 0.23 0.35 0.24 0.24 0.76
∆LI -0.28 0.35 -0.41 0.33 0.48 0.52
∆Cons -0.25 0.26 -0.05 -0.23 0.19 0.81
∆GDP -0.28 0.65 -0.01 0.50 0.75 0.25
GDP gap -0.34 0.37 0.32 0.68 0.82 0.18
∆HPI -0.22 0.06 0.67 0.05 0.51 0.49
∆Ex.rate 0.34 -0.88 -0.07 -0.20 0.93 0.07
C.A. -0.23 -0.04 -0.03 -0.37 0.19 0.81
K.A. -0.22 0.31 -0.50 0.08 0.40 0.60
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 5.74 5.74 2.27 0.42 0.42
F2 3.47 9.21 1.07 0.25 0.67
F3 2.40 11.61 0.19 0.17 0.84
F4 2.20 13.81 — 0.16 1.00
F5 13.81 40.38 1.00
F6 5.74 5.74 2.27 0.42 0.42
Total 3.47 9.21 1.07 0.25 0.67
Principal Component Regression on ∆HPI
∆HPI(%) = -0.63 -3.72×F1 +5.85×F2 -1.63×F3 +0.95×F4
(p-value) (0.73) (0.05) (0.00) (0.39) (0.62)




For house prices, five factors are estimated. The first and the second are 
interest rate factors while the third is real economic activities, and the rest are 
unclear. The regression result shows that these factors do not have significant 
explanatory power for house prices.
For stock prices, five factors are estimated. The interpretations are similar 
to the factors for house prices. From the regression, the interest rate factors are 
significant and have the correct sign.46
Table 29
Factor Analysis for Single House Prices: Thailand
X F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Communality Uniqueness
∆NM -0.16 -0.13 0.40 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.79
∆BM 0.04 0.13 -0.11 0.04 0.29 0.12 0.88
∆CBC 0.52 -0.47 -0.16 0.03 0.01 0.52 0.48
BY1m 0.88 0.45 0.12 -0.05 0.12 1.00 0.00
BY3m 0.86 0.48 0.12 -0.03 0.11 1.00 0.00
BY1y 0.82 0.55 0.10 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.00
BY5y 0.75 0.63 0.17 -0.04 -0.09 1.00 0.00
BY10y 0.67 0.68 0.24 -0.07 -0.18 1.00 0.00
∆CPI 0.37 0.00 -0.02 0.10 -0.13 0.17 0.83
∆H.F.CPI 0.16 0.16 0.06 -0.16 -0.04 0.08 0.92
∆GDP -0.34 -0.32 -0.02 0.40 -0.28 0.46 0.54
GDP gap 0.49 -0.55 -0.06 0.65 -0.16 1.00 0.00
∆Car Sales -0.49 -0.05 0.76 0.35 0.24 1.00 0.00
∆M. Sales -0.41 -0.10 0.74 0.32 0.23 0.89 0.11
∆NEER -0.37 0.18 -0.12 0.12 0.44 0.39 0.61
∆Stock -0.41 -0.17 0.31 0.10 0.04 0.30 0.70
C.A. -0.28 0.28 0.24 -0.40 0.06 0.38 0.62
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 4.81 4.81 2.38 0.46 0.46
F2 2.43 7.24 0.81 0.23 0.69
F3 1.62 8.86 0.57 0.15 0.84
F4 1.05 9.91 0.45 0.10 0.94
F5 0.60 10.51 — 0.06 1.00
Total 10.51 41.33 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆(Single House Price)
∆Single House Price(%) = 0.38 +0.14×F1 -0.62×F2 -0.66×F3
(p-value) (0.56) (0.82) (0.34) (0.31)
Adjusted R-square = -0.0147
Table 30
Factor Analysis for Stock Prices: Thailand
X F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Communality Uniqueness
∆NM -0.20 -0.12 -0.11 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.79
∆BM 0.26 -0.20 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 0.12 0.88
∆CBC 0.08 0.18 0.54 -0.30 0.31 0.52 0.48
BY1m 0.86 0.44 0.12 0.14 0.17 1.00 0.00
BY3m 0.87 0.44 0.11 0.16 0.14 1.00 0.00
BY1y 0.88 0.41 0.08 0.19 0.07 1.00 0.00
BY5y 0.78 0.55 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.00
BY10y 0.70 0.59 -0.09 0.38 -0.03 1.00 0.00
∆CPI 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.83
∆H.F.CPI 0.16 0.20 -0.12 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.92
∆GDP -0.52 -0.19 0.31 0.18 -0.17 0.46 0.54
GDP gap -0.05 0.01 0.98 0.11 0.15 1.00 0.00
∆Car Sales -0.27 -0.56 -0.20 0.68 0.32 1.00 0.00
∆M. Sales -0.25 -0.51 -0.15 0.64 0.37 0.89 0.11
∆NEER 0.10 -0.54 -0.23 -0.05 -0.18 0.39 0.61
∆SHP -0.12 0.07 0.19 -0.07 -0.09 0.07 0.93
C.A. -0.04 0.03 -0.61 0.06 0.06 0.38 0.62
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 3.97 3.97 1.67 0.39 0.39
F2 2.30 6.28 0.29 0.22 0.61
F3 2.01 8.29 0.60 0.20 0.81
F4 1.41 9.70 0.84 0.14 0.94
F5 0.57 10.27 — 0.06 1.00
Total 10.27 38.52 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆Stock
∆Stock(%) = -1.93 -5.94×F1 -3.92×F2 -2.07×F3
(p-value) (0.32) (0.00) (0.04) (0.28)
Adjusted R-square = 0.1848
Figure 5
Factors: Thailand
4.   Conclusion
Experiences  regarding  asset  price  fluctuations  differ  significantly  by 
countries. Some countries experienced large asset price fluctuations, while others 
did not experience any major asset price movements in recent years. This may 
have been due to the lack of well developed asset markets, domestic financial 
markets being protected from international capital, or institutional and/or regulatory 
environments which prevent asset bubbles from forming to begin with.
Even if a country has not experienced any major asset booms and bust, 
it does not necessarily mean that asset prices movements do not deserve to be 
closely scrutinised. As emerging market economies, the region will have larger 
participation in international financial transactions in the future, and that will bring 
about higher susceptibility and vulnerability of the domestic financial markets to 
international capital movements. Noting this, we analysed and identified possible 
links between asset prices and other economic indicators. By doing so, we could 
propose, albeit general, policy recommendations based on identified causes and 
effects of asset price fluctuations. 
Among the identified causes of asset price fluctuations, interest rates and 
liquidity measures are by far the most conspicuous, although the degree varies 
among countries. This should not come as any surprise, since it is well known that 
interest rates are the most important determinants of asset prices. The fact that 
liquidity measures contribute to asset price fluctuations, although less conspicuous 
than interest rates, indicates that policy makers should pay more attention not only 
on interest rates but also on financial market developments regarding liquidity 
expansion. 
The links between real economic activities and asset prices are not so 
obvious in many countries. Here, special attention should be paid to the link between 49
inflation and asset prices. For many countries, the link between inflation and asset 
prices are not as clear as the traditional view would suggest. The traditional view 
on this is that there exists a tight link between inflation and asset prices, as long as 
inflation is well under control there is little room for asset prices to fluctuate very 
much. This finding suggests that narrowly defined inflation targeting, which says 
that the only duty for an inflation targeting central bank is solely on stabilising 
(current) inflation, is not sufficient for stabilising asset prices and the financial 
system as a whole.
The link between the exchange rate and asset prices also vary among 
countries. This is probably due to the different extent and degree of openness of 
financial markets among countries, and also different degree of susceptibility of the 
financial system and asset prices to international capital. Since we are not sure how 
important international capital is in influencing domestic asset price fluctuations, it 
would be unwise to propose any exchange rate policy measures solely to prevent 
asset price fluctuations. 
Past policy measures, if any, in dealing with asset price fluctuations have 
shown varying degrees of success. As is well known, central banks should not 
directly target asset prices. Therefore, it has been almost conventional wisdom 
that reacting to asset price booms and busts with monetary policy is not such a 
good idea. On the other hand, institutional and/or regulatory changes in response 
to asset price fluctuations are not unheard of in many countries. Government 
policies directly or indirectly have influenced asset prices especially with respect 
to housing construction and related infrastructure. Although we would not try to 
assess the effectiveness of government policies, further study on this issue would 
help clarify the causes and effects of asset price fluctuations. 
This report summarises experiences of a number of SEACEN countries 
and then analysed and identified the causes and effects of asset price fluctuations. 
It also reviewed the policy measures taken in response to asset price fluctuations. 
Although we found many common experiences from which we can draw lessons 
and  future  policy  recommendations,  it  has  been  found  that  the  participating 
countries are in different stages of economic development, with different degrees 
of  openness  and  varying  institutional  and  social  political  environments  and, 
therefore, should not be a subject to a “one size fits all” approach. Although interest 
rate is the most significant determinant of asset prices, it should not be carelessly 
considered as a policy tool for asset prices. The same is true for liquidity measures. 
While liquidity measures have some explanatory power for asset prices, it does not 
necessarily mean that liquidity measures should somehow be controlled. We need 
to be cautious on the direction of causality as well as on the side effects of any 
policy tools to control liquidity. Non-economic environments such as institutional 
arrangements and social customs in asset transactions should be considered in a 
broader perspective. 50
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CHAPTER 2
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKS: 
THE CASE OF CAMBODIA
By Hong Phouma1
1.   Introduction
1.1   Trends in Asset Prices 
    Cambodia, suffering 30 years of isolation from the rest of the world and 
wrecked by political turmoil, civil war and devastation under the Khmer Rouge,   
is rapidly opening up for development.  The economy of Cambodia is in the early 
stage  of  development,  and  tremendous  opportunities  await  investors  who  are 
prepared to enter at ground level. Cambodia offers much potential. While the risks 
are nonetheless real, in no industry is the window of opportunity larger than in the 
property sector.
 
       The real estate sector is under-developed due to a weak property market 
in Cambodia. Without a real estate industry, the concept of market value, ready 
availability of statistics of property transactions, demand and supply trends, as 
well as the amenities and services for property developers are simply not available. 
There is an upside to this. There is potential for investors to buy properties that are 
grossly undervalued and can provide huge returns.
At present, asset price movement in Cambodia is confined to real estate and 
housing, but not to securities as the country does not have a stock market. Cambodia’s 
housing price boomed 25% to 40% annually from 2004 to 2007. Land price increase 
was at the first confined to Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Sihanoukville, but the boom 
spread right across Cambodia. Other booming areas have been the border areas with 
Vietnam and Thailand.
  Land  prices  in  the  capital  of  Phnom  Penh  rose  50%  to  80%  in  2007. 
Residential land prices in Phnom Penh jumped from about US$700 in 2006 to 
US$1,600 per square meter in 2007, while commercial land prices escalated from 
US$1,200 to US$2,500 per square meter over the same period.
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Then, in mid-2008, the bubble burst. The global financial crisis adversely impacted 
Cambodia’s biggest investor, South Korea. The Korean investors started retracting 
their foreign assets to increase their liquidity. It caused a plunge in the real estate 
sales by 30% to 50%.
1.2   Real Economic Activities
  Enjoying a past decade of peace and political stability, Cambodia achieved 
high economic growth at an average of 9.4 % annum. Economic growth reached 
10.6% over the last five years, with a peak at 13.3 % in 2005. Economic growth 
stood at 10.8% in 2006. 10.2% in 2007 and 6.8% in 2008. Cambodia’s economic 





  The average annual rate of the consumer price inflation during the first 10 
months of 2009 was -1.1% in comparison with 27.6% for the same period of 2008. 
The inflation rate in September 2009 was -2.3% against 26.4% for the same month 
of last year. The inflation rate turned negative for the first time in seven years in 
March 2009 with the rate of -0.7%; reaching the bottom of -5.7% in May, before 
picking up slowly thereafter. 
  The negative inflation in the period under review reflected, on one hand, 
the base effect of high CPI in the previous year. It was also the result of benign 
inflation in the neighboring countries, a slowdown in global food and oil prices, and 
a weaker domestic demand contributing to sluggish economic activities, including 
in the real estate sector. 59
  The change in CPI of -2.3% in September 2009 was contributed by food 
and non-alcoholic beverage of -1.1%; housing, water, electricity, gas and other 
fuels of -1.4%; transportation of -1.3%; restaurants of 0.4%; and other 1.1%.
Figure 2
Consumer	Price	Inflation
1.4   Exchange Rates
   Given the high degree of dollarisation in the economy, maintaining the 
stability of the local currency against the US dollar is instrumental in achieving 
price stability. 
Cambodia  remains  committed  to  a  floating  exchange  rate  regime  •	
by  allowing  exchange  rates  to  adjust  to  external  realities,  while 
maintaining a comfortable level of international foreign reserves. 
During an episode of strong growth and capital inflow in 2007 and in  •	
the first half of 2008, the exchange rate of the local currency against 
the US dollar sharply appreciated. 
However, the currency depreciated 2.3% against the US dollar over the  •	
first 10 months of 2009 following pressure from the global financial 
crisis, as foreign investors pulled out the needed cash to meet their 
obligations abroad. 60
Recent depreciation of the riel prompted the largest US dollar liquidity  •	
injection by the central bank in recent history, when the NBC intervened 
in the FX market to conduct foreign exchange sale with increased 
frequency. A total of about US$51 million was offered and sold during 
the first 10 months of 2009, US$49 million more than 2008.
Figure 3
Cambodia Riel/US Dollar
1.5   Monetary Development  
The  performance  of  the  banking  sector  has  been  satisfactory,  though 
challenging.  Following  an  episode  of  stress  and  a  sharp  decline  in  banking 
intermediation, total banking system liquidity gradually improving since the start 
of the second quarter 2009. The broad money supply (M12) has recovered to 19% 
y-o-y in September 2009, from negative growth at the beginning of the year. The 
acceleration in broad money growth during the period under review was largely 
on account of the increase in net foreign assets of the banking system, which rose 
by 28% y-o-y as against a sharp decline in recent period of -7% in November 
2008. Currency outside banks also regained momentum, picking up by 18% in 
September on its level 12 months ago. 
  Foreign  assets  of  the  banking  sector  resumed  its  role  as  the  main 
contributor  to  money  supply  growth  in  September  2009,  after  experiencing  a 
negative contribution at end of 2008. Meanwhile, contribution from net claims 
on government turned positive again in five years since 2003, reflective of the 
government’s spending for fiscal stimulus to compensate the slowdown in private 
activities and to provide for social safety net. Contribution to M2 growth through 
credit to the private sector remained low, mirroring banks’ prudent credit policy in 
the period of weak economic activities. 61
  The annual growth in residents’ deposits with banks in Cambodia rebounded 
to 19% in September 2009. Although this rate of increase was significantly lower 
than the average deposits growth rate during 2007, such positive development 
helped ease banks’ tight liquidity conditions observed in the early period of the 
year. Meanwhile, growth of foreign currency deposits, which accounted for more 
than 90% of total customers’ deposits, grew by 17% y-o-y in September 2009. 




1.6   The Banking Sector
The  global  financial  crisis  had  a  minimal  impact  on  Cambodia’s  •	
banking sector as it financial system is in the developing stage and its 
linkage to the global financial market is remains low. Banks are the 
dominant players in the financial sector and a capital market does not 
yet exist. The banking system is basic, offering banking products such 
as deposits, credits, trade finance, and very few off- balance-sheet 
products. Banks continue to perform the traditional banking activities, 
relying on local deposits rather than external borrowings. They also 
have no exposure to securitised instruments. 
The number of banks increased significantly in recent years, from  •	
23 in 2007 to 30 in 2008, and to 32 in 2009. This has led to rapidly 
expanding bank assets and net worth. However, the pace of growth in 
banks’ assets decelerated remarkably since the beginning of the second 
quarter 2007, before making a slight recovery in the recent months.62
Figure 5
Credit and Deposits
Bank solvency is one of the two main indicators of NBC’s prudential  •	
supervision,  which  is  closely  and  regularly  monitored.  In  the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, prudential bank monitoring 
and examination have been particularly enhanced. The most recent 
performance indicators show that the banking system continues to 
strengthen. It is well capitalised with CAR higher than the required 
norm.  The  latest  indicators  on  banks  performance  show  that  the 
average solvency ratio as of August 2009 is 34%, as compared to the 
minimum regulatory requirement of 15%. All banks have observed 
the prescribed requirement. 
Banks’  liquidity  position  has  been  improving.  During  2007-2008,  •	
although there was no critical risk of liquidity shortage for the banks 
because the average liquidity ratio still remained above the regulatory 
limit of 50%, banks were faced with some liquidity constraint when 
their liquidity ratio fell rapidly from a three-digit level in 2006 to about 
67% in October 2008. Slow deposit growth contributed to the liquidity 
squeeze in the banking system (Figure 7). Some foreign banks had to 
secure a credit line from their parent banks, resulting in an increase in 
banks’ foreign liabilities. However, since November last year, banks’ 
liquidity position has been improving. 63
Figure 6
Liquidity Ratio
The ratio of non-performing loans to total banks’ loans increased to  •	
3.7% in December 2008 from 3.4% in the previous year and climbed 
further to 6.5% in July 2009, in spite of the fact that the total outstanding 
loans did not show substantial change. The recent increase in NPLs 
reflected two things: one was the adverse feedback loop between the 
real economy and the financial sector, especially through the credit 
channel; and, secondly, the strengthening of regulatory supervision 
with the introduction of new regulation on credit classification and 
provisioning in early 2009.
Figure 7
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1.7   Interest Rates Movement 
  In Cambodia, interest rates on deposits calculated by 6-month weighted 
average in riel and US dollar subsequently decreased, that is, interest rates on 
deposits in riel and US dollar fell from 6.46% and 5.48% in December 2008 to 
5.37% and 4.82% in December 2009, respectively. This resulted from an unexpected 
surge in bank liquidity, caused by a substantial growth in public deposits. 
  While at the same time, interest rates on loans calculated by 6-month 
weighted average in riel and US dollar showed an increasing trend. Interest rates 
on loans in riel and US dollar rose from 18.77% and 16.3% in December 2008 to 
22.21% and 17.13% in December 2009, respectively. This development was due 
to the strengthening of bank lending standard, non-performing loan pressure, and 
fragile economic activities.  
  Notably, during the year, the interest rate spreads in riel and US dollar 
jumped from 12.31% and 10.82% in December 2008 to 16.84% and 12.31% in 
December 2009. 
Figure 8
Interest Rates on Loans and Deposits
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2.   Regulations and Policy Responses to Asset Price Fluctuations  
  Cambodia’s real estate sector enjoyed unprecedented growth from 2006 
to mid-2008. During this period the sector created new-found wealth for hundreds 
and construction jobs for thousands. But in a market fuelled by speculators, prices 
became over-inflated; people became intoxicated with property. Speculators who a 
year ago were buying up real estate in the hope of selling it on to developers for a 
profit, have been stranded high and dry as prices fell. Property values fell by 25-30 
% in Cambodia and investment in the sector virtually came to a halt. Construction 
investment fell by 40%. Some major projects have been put on hold or cancelled. 
During the period of real estate boom, lending was based on collateral 
linked to real estate. To avoid commercial banks’ loan exposure to the real estate 
sector, the National Bank of Cambodia restricted access to loan by doubling banks’ 
foreign currency reserve requirement to 16% from 8%, and introduced a 15% 
ceiling for loans to real estate trading.
  
New regulations are being introduced in Cambodia to protect property 
investors from fraud as the country’s real estate industry boomed. Developers 
will be required to deposit 2% of the projects’ total value at the National Bank of 
Cambodia. In February 2009, NBC repealed those restrictions in response to the 
rapid decline in the property market.
3.   The Cause of Asset Price Fluctuations
3.1   Cross-correlations
  The real estate sector in Cambodia is still in its infancy. Cambodia does 
not have a financial market yet, such as stock or bond market. Some local real-
estate agents said that there is no proper system to determine the market price or 
value of property in Cambodia. If someone wants to buy or sell land or house, the 
practice is for the buyer and seller to engage in direct negotiation. Therefore, it 
is very difficult to uncover the trend in prices of land or house in the official data 
publication.
3.2   Factor Analysis
3.2.1   Foreign Investment
   Cambodia in recent years has experienced a real estate boom fuelled by 
South Korean investments, leading many rural and urban residents to sell off their 
land at very high prices, raising rent and values, and boosting the construction 
sector. The Minister of Commerce said that foreign investment capital increased 66
quickly from US$483 million in 2006 to US$2,700 million in 2007 and to US$8,900 
million in the first eight months of 2008. 80 % of the investment in Cambodia is 
linked to construction and real estate. The amount of South Korean investment in 
Cambodia from 1994 to 2004 averaged $1.5 million per year, while in just the first 
nine months of 2007, the amount reached $502.1 million.
Figure 9
Foreign	Direct	Investment	Inflow
3.2.2  Tourist Growth Helps Boost Property Market in Cambodia
  In recent years, the number of visitors arriving in Cambodia had grown 
to two million in 2006, and the arrivals increased by a further 20% in 2007. 
This sustained and aggressive growth of the tourist sector, as well as booming 
construction,  property  and  garment  manufacturing  sectors  contributed  to  the 
economy’s near double-digit growth. In particular, the real estate sector is growing 
at a phenomenal rate and nowhere more pronounced than in the capital Phnom 
Penh, where the land price doubled last year to US$3,000 per square meter, up 
from just US$500 in the year 2000.67
Figure 10
Passenger Arrivals in Cambodia (2001-2008)
3.2.3  Cambodia Property Market Hit by Global Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis spread and adversely impacted countries across 
the world. In Cambodia, the surge in real estate, construction, and property sectors 
in last few years has been affected by the world economic slowdown since 2007. 
Due to the impact of economic downturn, property agencies in Cambodia folded 
their business operation and prices of real estate continue to decline to one third 
of their value in the first quarter of 2009 in comparison with the same period last 
year.
  From research, according to Bung Bonna, CEO of Bonna Realty Group 
and President of the National Valuers’ Association of Cambodia (NVAC), the real 
estate market dropped by 40% in the first three months of 2009, compared with the 
first three months of 2008.
4.   The Effects of Asset Price Boom-busts  
4.1   The Wealth Effect 
 Cambodia’s real estate downturn came about after a distinct boom period 
in 2007. During that year, land prices in Phnom Penh soared by as much as 80%. 
The real estate bubble was triggered by people who saw unhindered and continued 
profitability from investing in real estate. The popular perception was that land and 
newly built apartment units would continue to be in high demand, and thus could 
be sold easily for a high return.
  The global crisis, both an outcome and a cause of the global real-estate 
meltdown, eventually pricked Cambodia’s domestic real-estate bubble. The bubble 
was unsustainable in the face of a worsening credit crunch, tighter bank lending, 68
investment flight, and greater investor and consumer wariness. The global crisis 
dissolved public confidence in the real estate sector. On the supply side, it is said 
to have pushed the number of suppliers up by 45 %, while demand is said to 
have stagnated or even decreased to about 5%. As result of these developments, 
prices went down by 30% to 40% and sales plummeted by 50% to 80%. These 
developments resulted in the reduction of the wealth of brokers, architects and 
other higher skilled employees in real estate and property development. Likewise, 
the construction sector suffered job losses or increased unemployment. Real estate 
investors, traders, and buyers have already voiced grave concern regarding this 
sudden turn of event from boom to bust. The downturn is largely attributable to 
the slowing down of foreign investment, wealth reduction and slashed incomes, 
driving people to lower their consumption.
4.2   The Effects of Asset Price on Soundness of Financial System
Recognising the severity of the global crisis, the NBC took swift action to 
support local economic development and real estate sector by easing credit flow 
in the economy. The cap on credit to the real estate sector was abolished and the 
reserve requirement was reduced to 12% by early 2009. In the meantime, only 
customer deposits were subject to the reserve requirement, while bank’s placement 
and borrowing funds were excluded from the reserve requirement. The technique 
for reporting and monitoring reserve was also amended to provide more flexibility 
for banks in managing their liquidity. The initiatives were enacted to ease banks’ 
liquidity pressure to provide more room for them in extending credit to customers 
as well as injecting more funds to stimulate economic growth.
The lifting of the 15% ceiling to the real estate sector does not imply 
that the supervisory authority is allowing banks to have more exposure to real 
estate risk. In fact, the banking community at large had already recognised the risk 
involved with real estate investment and largely agreed with the requirement to 
adopt the appropriate requirements to mitigate risks. A few banks concentrating 
in real estate investment and financing of residential mortgage are being closely 
monitored. By the end of 2008, credit extended to the real estate sector in banking 
system accounted for 14% of the total portfolio, while credit to the construction 
sector was recorded at 8%.
5.   Policy Response  
  The government is strongly urged to direct its attention to the real estate 
sector. Some crucial policy options it can undertake are:
Development of the legal framework for real estate by  establishing  •	
standards  for  valuation,  commissions/fees  and  real  estate  agency 
operations;  adoption  of  a  code  of  conduct  for  developers;  and 
enactment of a housing development act;69
The National Valuers’ Association of Cambodia to join the membership  •	
of the ASEAN Valuers’ Association;
Establishment of an institute to provide professional training for real  •	
estate personnel;
Establishment of a housing developers’ association; •	
Making  relevant  documents  more  readily  accessible  to  investors,  •	
reducing the bureaucratic red-tape and enforcing the laws offering 
protection to investors;
Suspension of regulations that tighten government control or cause  •	
hindrance to investors;
Lowering of the interest rate on banks loans for the real estate sector;  •	
and
Making data on land values more widely available to the public. •	
6.   Conclusion  
In Cambodia, the development of real estate sector is in the stage of infancy. 
There is no proper law or legislation to regulate this sector as yet. Uncertainties and 
risks are expected to prevail in this sector in 2009. Perceiving that the government is 
showing more concern about mitigating the impact of the downturn on other sectors, 
private developers have appealed for the authorities to devout more attention to the 
real estate sector. A major recommendation, among the recommended options, is 
the development of the relevant legal framework. Presently, the government and 
the private sector are working together and collaborating closely in overcoming 
the challenges of the global recession and facilitating investors and businessmen 
to do business in Cambodia.70
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CHAPTER 3
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKS: 
THE CASE OF INDONESIA
By Difi Johansyah1, G.A. Diah Utari and Muslimin Anwar2
Introduction 1. 
Indonesia has been successful in maintaining resilient economic growth as 
well as monetary and financial stability over the past three years which contributed 
positively  to  investor  sentiment.  This  positive  outlook  was  reflected,  among 
other conditions, by a significant increase in the Jakarta Stock Exchange’s (JSX) 
composite index, a relatively low government bond yield during 2006 to 2008 
and a steady increase in the property index. The Jakarta stock index performance 
earned Indonesia a third spot among the best performing stock exchange in the Asia 
Pacific region. The government bond became an attractive instrument to foreign 
investors, stimulating an increase in foreign ownership.  The rise in the foreign 
ownership of domestic government bonds is a vote of foreign investor confidence 
in the domestic economy. 
The Indonesian financial market is perceptive to shocks happening abroad, 
given the linkage between the domestic and global financial markets. The global 
financial crisis was marked by a significant drop in the stock index across the 
world. It led to portfolio adjustment of global investors in emerging countries, 
including Indonesia. The stock index fell significantly and government bond yield 
increased. 
The movement of asset prices is an issue of concern to the central bank 
since it may have important implications for monetary and financial stability. 
The recent large swings in the asset prices have not influenced the monetary and 
financial stability significantly in Indonesia. This was due to prudential banking 
practice and the integrated efforts taken by the monetary and fiscal authority to 
curb the negative impact of asset price decline. Nevertheless, we must remain 
watchful and be alert to asset price fluctuations. 
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This study examines the causes of fluctuations in asset prices, assesses 
their impact on monetary and financial stability, and determines their implications 
for central bank policies. Bank Indonesia currently adopts an inflation targeting 
framework (ITF) as its monetary policy framework and the inflation target to be 
achieved over the next several periods is announced to the public. Application of the 
ITF does not necessarily mean that the central bank only pays attention to inflation, 
but it also takes into account economic growth, overall policy and economic trends. 
Furthermore, the ITF is not a rigid formulation, but a comprehensive framework 
for formulating and implementing monetary policy. 
Following  this  introduction,  the  trends  in  asset  prices  as  well  as  the 
macroeconomic and financial variables are reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, we 
look at the causes of asset price fluctuations. In Section 4, we discuss the effects of 
asset price fluctuations on the economy, i.e. consumption through the wealth-effect 
channel and on the soundness of financial system. We outline the policy response 
in Section 5, and present our conclusion in Section 6. 
Trends in Asset Price and Macroeconomic and Financial Variables 2. 
2.1  Trends in Asset Prices  
  The stock price increased significantly starting in year 2003 and reached 
the peak by the end of 2007 (Figure 1). The average increase in the stock price 
index during those years was about 44% per year. The JSX composite index closed 
at 2745 points by the end of 2007, a jump of 940.3 points in a year (52.15 %). This 
was the highest level recorded in the history of the Indonesian stock exchange. The 
increase in the composite index was far above that of the regional stock exchanges. 
Kospi, South Korea, recorded an increase of 32.3%, followed by KLSE, Malaysia, 
31.8%;  SET, Thailand,  26.2%;  PSE,  Philippines,  21.4%;  and  STI,  Singapore, 
16.6%. As the result, the Jakarta Stock Exchange achieved the third spot as the 
best performing bourse in the Asia Pacific region, after Shenzen and Shanghai. 
At the beginning of 2008, the stock market performed relatively well. 
However, due to the strong linkage between the domestic and international markets, 
the composite index corrected significantly in the second semester of 2008. The 
linkage between domestic and international markets has made the stock market 
perceptive to shocks happening abroad. The negative sentiment arising from the 
global financial crisis induced foreign investors worldwide to reduce their portfolios 
in emerging markets, including Indonesia, which led to a correction in the indices. 
The Composite Index closed at 1355 points at the end of 2008, a drop of 50.64% 
as compared to the previous year. The Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) landed 
fifth spot from the bottom in Asia Pacific, with a worst performance after Vietnam 
-66%, Shanghai -64.81%, Shenzen -60.65% and Mumbai -53.83%.   73
Figure 1   
Stock Exchange Index in Several 
Countries   
  
Figure 2 
JSX, IPG & Yield 
Government Bond3
  
The stock market recorded overall index gains starting in February 2009.   
Improvement in domestic fundamentals and rising global commodity prices were 
the key impetus boosting share buying by foreign and domestic investors
After  a  period  of  declining  trend,  the  government  bond  yield  started 
to increase significantly in January 2005. The considerable fuel subsidy on the 
back of the soaring global oil price propagated negative market sentiment against 
fiscal sustainability. This unfavorable condition increased government bond yield 
significantly. After the government increased the domestic oil price in October 
2005, which entailed a reduction in fuel subsidy, market confidence toward long-
term fiscal sustainability was gradually restored, thus decreasing the yield of 
government bond. 
  In line with increasing commodity prices at the beginning of 2008 and 
persistent  global  financial  market  volatility,  the  government  bond  market  came 
under severe pressure. The slump in the performance of the government bond market 
bottomed out in October 2008 with the yield close to 20.95%4 (Figure 2). However, 
the yield rebounded following a reduction in global financial market volatility and 
actions taken by the relevant authority. The government bond yield at end of 2008 
was recorded at 11.89%, a slight increase of 187 bps compared to the previous year. 
In 2009, the yield of government bond eased in line with the downward movement 
in the monetary policy rate and resurgent interest of investors. 
3.  The actual yield of government bond is multiplied by 10 in order to make it comparable with the 
other measured variables.  
4.  The yield in the Figure 2 is divided by 10. 74
The index of commercial property (IPG) maintained an upward trend 
starting in 2003 (Figure 2). This was due to increased demand for office space as 
more companies expanded their businesses. The effect of global weakening did 
not influence the index of property (IPG). It was reported in 2008 that commercial 
property supply, especially office space supply, was stagnant, whereas office space 
was still in demand.  The property index kept on rising in 2009. 
The stock performance can be analysed by using the P/E ratio (PER) 
to determine whether they are reasonably priced, and by examining the spread 
between the earning yield and market rate5.  The PER is used to evaluate the fair 
value of stock price in the long term. As Figure 3 indicates, the long-run average 
of PER is about 13%. When the ratio falls below its long-term average, it tends to 
rise subsequently. During the period from mid-1998 to mid-2006, the P/E ratio laid 
below its long-run average (Figure 3).  A low P/E ratio means that price of stocks 
is relatively low compared to its earnings. Therefore, the stock price will tend to 
increase to compensate its earnings. This may explain for the increase of stock 
price during that period.     
Figure 3 
JSX Index, PER & Long-run 
Average PER
Figure 4 
Spread Between Earning Yield and 
SBI6 1-month and JSX  
Another way to analyse stock market performance is to look at the spread 
between the earnings yield7 and market rate.  We take a look at the spread between 
the earning yield and the rate of one-month central bank certificate (SBI rate) and
5.  See Pu Shen , “The P/E Ratio and Stock Market Performance”,  Federal Reserve of Kansas City. 
<http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/ ECONREV/PDF/4Q00Shen pdf.> Earning yield is return for 
each value of money invested in stocks. In this article the market rate is the rate of US Treasury 
Bill.
6.  SBI 1 month = rate of 1-month central bank certificate.
7.  Earning yield = 1/PE ratio.75
compare it with the movement of JSX index (Figure 4). The high spread means 
that stocks are cheaper relative to other money-market instrument (in this case, 
SBI). In this situation investors will tend to buy stocks, thus increasing growth 
in stock price. From Figure 4, we generally find that increasing spread was 
accompanied by increasing JSX, though during the period of October 2004 
to January 2006, a decreasing spread was not accompanied by decreasing 
stock price.
2.2  Trend in Macroeconomic and Financial Variables   
Indonesia experienced resilient growth over the past years (Figure 5) in 
spite of the global economic slowdown and the oil and commodity price surge in 
the first half of 2008. Its economic growth during 2005 to 2008 was above 5% a 
year. The economy had performed generally well in the first half of 2008. However, 
the economic landscape was drastically affected by the downturn in the global 
financial market. Despite a significant slowdown in the fourth quarter of 2008, 
the economy attained a 6.1% growth by the end of 2008, ahead its neighbours 
(Malaysia 5.8%, Thailand 4.7%, and Philippines 4.4%). 
Private consumption and exports were still the main drivers of growth 
(Figure 6). The share of private consumption in GDP declined, while the share of 
export in GDP increased. The increased share of exports in GDP can be explained 
to some extent by the soaring commodity prices in the first half of 2008.
 Private consumption recorded vigorous growth in 2008, as compared 
to the previous year. The higher rate of private consumption was sustained by 
stable public purchasing power and by improvement in consumer confidence. The 
growth of exports was maintained in 2008 amid the weakening of global demand 
in the first half of 2008. The slowdown in global demand was offset by high world 
commodity prices. 
The  economic  growth  declined  in  2009. The  economic  growth  in  the 
first, second, and third quarters of 2009 was recorded at 4.4%, 4.2% and 4.2%, 
respectively. The weakening in economic growth was explained primarily by a 




GDP Growth  & Distribution by 
Expenditure 
After experiencing an inflationary hike in 2005, due to an increase of more 
than 100% in the domestic oil price, the situation started to ease up by the end of 
2006 (Figure 7). The hike in the commodity and oil prices at the beginning of 2008 
fuelled inflation, though not as high as in 2005. Overall, the inflation in 2008 was 
at 11.06% (y-o-y), increasing significantly from 6.59% in the previous year. The 
government decision to raise the subsidised oil price, coupled by problem of supply 
distribution, boosted inflation expectation and put upward pressure on inflation. 
Inflationary pressure eased significantly in Q4 of 2008 as the global commodity 
prices fell and the global economic slowdown deepened.  The declining trend of 
inflation continued in 2009, with Q2 and Q3 of 2009 recording inflation at 3.65% 
(y-o-y) and 2.83% (y-o-y), respectively. This was due to the appreciation of the 
rupiah,  improvement  in  inflation  expectations  and  modest  global  commodity 
prices. On the non-fundamental side, the government also kept minimal hikes in 




Exchange Rate and JSX Index
  
Rupiah movement tended to depreciate during the period of mid-2003 to 
mid-2005 (Figure 8). The depreciation of the rupiah was attributable to several 
factors,  including  strong  demand  for  foreign  currency  to  purchase  imports, 
particularly fuel, and to repay private foreign debt as well as strengthening of 
the US dollar against other hard currencies. Starting from the end of 2005, the 
rupiah strengthened significantly. It maintained its stability up to September 2008, 
supported by the performance of the current account and by prudent macroeconomic 
policy. The rupiah came under pressure in Q4 of 2008. The collapse in commodity 
prices impacted on exports and reduced the supply of foreign currency from export 
earnings.  In  the  meantime,  rising  imports  driven  by  strong  domestic  demand 
increased the need for foreign currency. The drop in foreign currency supply 
that coincided with high demand exerted significant depreciating pressure on the 
exchange rate. 
  Starting in February 2009, the rupiah appreciated, spurred by increasing 
investor-risk appetite due to improvement in global economic recovery outlook. 
Investors’ preference to hold rupiah assets was also supported by higher economic 
growth in 2009, along with the out-performing regional economy. 
The significant increase in the Jakarta Composite Index (JSX)  occurred 
concurrently with the period of capital inflow, which is reflected in the net foreign 
buy-in of domestic securities (stock, government bond and Central Bank certificate) 
(Figure 9). In the second half of 2008, asset disposal and investment unwinding 
in the developed markets led investors to reduce their portfolio holdings in the 
emerging markets, including Indonesia. This resulted in a significant drop in the 
stock exchange index as well as pressure on the domestic currency. 78
Figure 9 
JSX Index vs Foreign Portfolio 
Investment
Figure 10 
Credit, JSX Index, M1 and M2
Economic liquidity (M1 and M2)8 recorded a higher growth during period 
of 2006 to the first half of 2008, as compared to period of 2003 to 2005 (Figure 10). 
This condition was closely linked to continued strong economic growth, especially 
the increasing growth in private consumption (Figure 6). Accelerated growth of 
M1 reached a peak in September 2008 with added support from the government 
in  providing  direct  cash  transfers.    The  escalating  knock-on  effects  from  the 
global crisis on the domestic financial market in the second half of 2008 impacted 
significantly on economic liquidity. This condition resulted in the slow growth 
of M1 in the second half of 2008. The growth of M1 and M2 began to increase 
in 2009. This improvement in economic liquidity was due to renewed growth in 
economic activity, especially during the Q3 of 2009, in spite of the lack of full 
recovery as reflected by M1 growth that remained below the historical level. 
In general, the increase in growth of JSX was followed by the increase 
in credit growth, and vice versa.  The increase in JSX during period 2006 to 
2007 was accompanied by significant growth in credit during October 2006 to 
November 2008. The decrease of growth of JSX starting in the middle of 2008 
was also followed by decrease in credit growth starting at the end of 2008.  During 
2008, credit growth reached 33% (y-o-y). The increase in growth of investment 
credit and working capital credit replaced the dominance of consumption credit 
(Figure 11). Significant increase in investment credit reflected a more conducive 
investment climate. The decline in the BI rate by the end of 2006, which was 
followed by declining average lending rate, also contributed to the increase in 
total bank’s credit during period 2006 to 2008 (Figure 12).  The weak condition of 
the economy in 2009 had considerable influence on credit growth. Credit growth 
dropped significantly starting from the beginning of 2009. 




BI Rate, Average Lending Rate  and 
Deposit rate
3.  The Causes of Asset Price Fluctuations
   
3.1  Cross-correlation Analysis
In this section we examine whether some macroeconomic and financial 
variables  described  in  previous  sections  cause  fluctuation  in  asset  prices.  We 
explore the relationship between asset prices and such variables as real economic 
activities, liquidity measures, credit measures, interest rate, inflation, and exchange 
rates. We verify whether these variables serve as leading indicators of upcoming 
asset price movements through an investigation of cross correlations. We then 
provide an interpretation of asset price changes to determine whether asset price 
movements have been driven by fundamentals in Indonesia.
Using e-views, cross correlation shows correlograms from 0 to 36 leads-
lags for a pair of series, say “a” and “b”. The highest significant correlation at a lag 
greater than 0 or, in other words, the highest correlation between “a” and “b(-i)” 
or “a(+i)” and “b”, where “i” > 0, compared to other lags (lead) indicates that 
“b” is a leading indicator of “a”. The reading changes with respect to ordering of 
variables.
Table  1  (appendix)    indicates  that  the  following  cross-correlation 
coefficients are large in the beginning (no-lag) but becomes smaller as the time lag 
increases: (i) between stock prices and real economic activities (GDP growth, GDP 
gap, and private consumption); (ii) between stock prices and liquidity measures 
(M2, M1, and M0); (iii) between stock prices and credit measures (total bank 
lending and total household debt); (iv) between stock prices and interest rates (BI-
rate and all time deposit with different maturities (1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months); (v) 
between stock prices and exchange rates (nominal exchange rate and real effective 
exchange rates); (vi) between stock prices and house prices; and (vi) between stock 
prices and government bond prices. 80
On  the  other  hand,  Table  1  (appendix)  also  indicates  that  the  cross-
correlation coefficient between stock prices and inflation turns to a positive value 
from a negative one as the time lag increases by more than 11 months. These results 
imply that inflation is the only suitable leading indicator of future fluctuation in 
stock prices. 
However, another cross-correlation coefficient between stock prices and 
policy rate (BI-rate) turns to a positive value from a negative one as the time lag 
increases by more than 21 months. Moreover, the other cross-correlation coefficient 
between stock prices and nominal exchange rates (EXC) become larger as the 
time lag increases by more than 25 months. These results imply that along with 
inflation, the policy rate (BI-rate) and nominal exchange rates could be suitable as 
leading indicators of future fluctuation in stock prices.
We also examine the cross correlation of the potential component series 
with the reference series of house prices at different lead-lag lengths. In the case of 
property prices, as shown in Table 2 (appendix), we find that inflation (INFLASI) 
and real effective exchange rate (REER) are the most potential variables causing 
property price fluctuations. 
In the case of government bond prices, as shown in Table 3 (appendix), we 
find that all real economic activity variables (GDP growth, GDP gap, and private 
consumption), all liquidity measures (M2, M1, and M0), all credit measures (total 
bank lending and total household debt), and stock prices lead the general cyclical 
behavior of the reference series so that they are potentially causing government 
bond price fluctuations. 
3.2  Factor (Principal Component) Analysis     
In this section, we use one of the most valuable results from applied linear 
algebra, principal component analysis (PCA), as a powerful tool for reducing a 
number of observed variables into a smaller number that account for most of the 
variance in the data set. The principal component is particularly useful to provide 
a data reduction procedure that makes no assumptions concerning an underlying 
causal structure that is responsible for covariation in the data. This is because 
PCA is a simple, non-parametric method of extracting relevant information from 
confusing and complex data sets. We then try to derive factors from macro and/or 
financial variables that affect the asset price fluctuations along with estimation of 
the effects of these factors on asset prices.  
The output from running a principal component analysis upon observed 
data for the period of 2002:01 – 2009:03 is shown in Table 4 (appendix). There are 
about 19 variables that may cause stock price fluctuation. The rows of output are 
in the same order as the columns of Table 5 (appendix) so that, for example, Row 1 81
for each principal component gives the weight for inflation and Row 19 gives the 
weight for government bond prices (SUN).
As shown in Table 4 (appendix), the first three components which are 
inflation (inflasi), BI-rate, and nominal exchange rates (EXC) account for about 
86% of the total variation associated with all 19 of the original variables, implying 
that we can capture most of the variability in the data with far less than original 
dimensions in the data. Another advantage of these principal components compared 
to the original data is that they are uncorrelated,9 implying that if we construct 
regression models using these principal components as independent variables we 
will not encounter problems of multicollinearity.
The output from running a principal component analysis upon 19 variables 
that may cause house price fluctuation for the period of 2002:01 – 2009:03 is 
shown in Table 5 (appendix). As shown in this Table, the first two components 
account for more than 80% of the total variation associated with all 19 of the 
original variables. It implies that we can capture most of the variability in the data 
involving only two variables, which are inflation (INFLASI), and real effective 
exchange rate (REER). Constructing regression models using these two principal 
components as independent variables determining house price fluctuation will not 
encounter problems of multicollinearity.
The output from running a principal component analysis upon 18 variables 
that may cause government bond price fluctuations for the period of 2003:01 – 
2009:02 is shown in Table 6 (appendix). As shown in this Table, the first three 
components account for about 90% of the total variation associated with all 19 
of the original variables. It implies that we can capture most of the variability in 
the data involving only three variables, which are GDP growth (GROWTH), M2, 
and total bank lending (CREDIT). Constructing regression models using these 
three principal components as independent variables determining property price 
fluctuation will not encounter problems of multicollinearity. 
4.  The Effects of Asset Price Fluctuations
4.1     Wealth Effects on Consumption Expenditure   
In this section, we attempt to find the wealth effects on consumption 
by testing a model explaining private consumption expenditure as a function of 
income and wealth. We know that income explains a large part of consumption as 
well as wealth, but concerning the effects of the latter, mainly in regard to changes 
in financial asset prices and property asset prices, not much is known for SEACEN 
countries, in particular for Indonesia.
9.  In this case the correlation coefficient is zero.82
Recently, the issue of wealth effects on consumption has been subject to 
renewed research and policy concern following rapid increases in global stock 
prices over the past decade, which was also followed by strong and persistent 
escalation in house prices, in particular in the United States, the United Kingdom 
and some Euro area economies. This is probably the result of a falling trend and a 
historically low level of interest rates and innovations in the financial and mortgage 
markets during 90s and early 2000s that stimulated home owners to borrow money 
from banks against home equity to finance their consumption. It is likely that this 
practice plays a critical role in sustaining consumer expenditure.
However, the recent financial crisis bringing sharp reverses in both stock 
and  house  price  has  raised  the  concern  of  economists  and  policymakers  that 
these developments could contribute to depress consumption and exacerbate the 
economic slowdown.
In the following sub-section we discuss the theoretical background pertinent 
to our research. The subsequent sub-sections present the methodology, the data and 
the empirical results. The last sub-section discusses and draws conclusions from 
the findings.
4.1.1  Theoretical Background and Methodology
Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Modigliani (1971) introduced the “life 
cycle” hypothesis as a seminal paradigm concerning the explanation of consumption 
as a variable depending on wealth beyond income. Following their pioneering 
work, the effects of wealth on consumers´ expenditure have been widely studied. 
They constructed household planned consumption (Ct) as a function of 
total resources, which are net financial wealth at the beginning of the period (Wt-1) 
and human wealth (Ht):
Ct = f(Wt-1, Ht) ...................................................................................................  (1)
As human wealth variable is not observable, it is suggested to use some 
measures of income. In that framework, the wealth effect then has been measured 
by estimating aggregate time-series regressions as follow:
Ct = α+ α1 Ydt + α2 Wt + ut  ............................................................................  (2)
Where C stands for household actual consumer spending, Yd represents 
disposable  income  and  W  is  household  net  worth  or  wealth.  α1 and  α2  are, 
respectively, the marginal propensities to consume out of disposable income and 
wealth. A widespread empirical practice is to introduce lags and separate wealth 
into different categories, as stock market and property wealth.83
Although Modigliani (1971) proposes that there is a significant wealth 
effect on consumption and earlier empirical results established a rule-of-thumb 
that each increase of one dollar in wealth translated to a five cents increase in 
consumption, Boone, et al. (1998, p. 6) provide subsequent evidence showing 
some criticisms of the “life cycle theory” in that the simple theoretical formulation 
of Modigliani ignored several problems that could be crucial in explaining the 
relationship between consumption and wealth. Following the general specification 
adopted by Boone, et al. (1998); Ludvigson and Steindel (1999); Byrne and Davis 
(2001); Case, et al. (2001); and Davis and Palumbo (2001), the model to study 
the impact of stock and property market fluctuations on consumption is posited as 
follow:
PCEt = α+ α1Ydt + α2JSXt+ α3IPGt + α4(Z)  .....................................................  (3)
Where PCE is private consumption expenditure, Yd the disposable income 
and JSX represents a proxy for financial wealth and IPG represents a proxy for 
housing wealth, and Z is other variables. All variables are in logarithms and measured 
in real terms. The coefficient α is a constant term, α1, α2 and α3 are, respectively, the 
elasticities of the private consumption in respect of disposable income, the stock 
prices index, and the property prices index. Beyond those variables, we shall also 
take in account an additional variable such as the short-term interest rate (SBI), as 
a proxy to substitution effects on consumption.
However, Pacheco and Barata (2003) find that there are some drawbacks 
in estimating that equation. Firstly, there are some econometric pitfalls associated 
with the value of estimations such as Equation (2). The conventional analysis 
presented above does not take into account the possibility that the variables are 
non-stationary or that there is reverse causality between, for instance, wealth and 
consumption. Failure to address these problems could lead to inconsistent estimates 
of the wealth effect on consumption. Secondly, due to lags in adjustment, Pacheco 
and Barata (2003) argue that planned consumption does not always equal actual 
consumption. They suggest that we should consider an error-correction approach 
instead.  
4.1.2  Data
In order to meet our objective to find the wealth effects on consumption, 
we should select the data we use carefully, in particular the household wealth data. 
As reliable time series for household financial wealth are more readily available for 
the United States, we need to find proxies to wealth variables, in order to capture 
the likely effects of wealth on consumption in Indonesia. We estimate a set of 
consumption equations that include different variables related to asset prices, such 
as a stock-price index as proxy for financial household wealth and residential-price 
index as a proxy for the house prices wealth effect. 84
We analysed graphically the evolution of the asset price indices used in 
our work, for the period 2000:Q1 to 2009:Q2. We could clearly see that from 
2000 to mid-2008, the nominal equity prices, not in real terms, increased rapidly. 
However, we observed a downturn in the markets recently, which raises concern 
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With the same method, we also examined the evolution of households’ 
consumption and saw an ascendant trend since 2000.
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Figure 17 
Disposable Income (Y) & Private Consumption Expenditure (PCE)
  Moreover,  the  simple  correlations  among  real  private  consumption 
expenditure (PCE), real disposable income (Y), real growth of stock price (JSX), 
real  growth  of  property  prices  indexes  (IPG)  and  interest  rate  (SBI)10    were 
computed and the results are reported in Table 7 (appendix).
4.1.3  Econometric Result
4.1.3.1  Stationarity and Cointegration
We begin by studying the presence of unit roots in the employed variables 
(in  logs).  With  that  purpose,  we  used  the  standard Augmented  Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) procedure (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), and the results are presented in Table 
8 (appendix). The chosen specification includes generally an intercept and in some 
occasions a time trend.
The  results  are  as  expected. According  to  McKinnon’s  critical  values 
(McKinnon, 1991), all variables are I(1) with the exception of the private consumer 
expenditure. The majority of the test statistics fall within the 95% confidence region 
and are therefore consistent with the hypothesis of a unit root in those series.
Since all the above variables (with the mentioned exceptions) are integrated 
of order 1, we should avoid using a static-regression approach as (3) and use instead 
a dynamic error-correction approach. We cannot estimate Equation (3) directly
10.  SBI: interest on 1-month Central Bank Certificate.
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a dynamic error-correction approach. We cannot estimate Equation (3) directly 
because the estimated coefficients would be inconsistent. To take into account the 
non-stationary and endogenous problems in the variables we develop further that 
equation. That is, from the stationary tests we shall infer that the variables are 
generally integrated of order 1, so co-integration analysis is necessary to identify 
the target level defined in Equation (3). The corresponding cointegration vector 
is then embedded in an error-correction model to capture the dynamics of the 
relationship. 
Although it would be tempting to purge nonstationarity by differencing 
and using only differenced variables, it would imply that valuable information 
from economic theory concerning the long-run equilibrium properties of the data 
would be lost. So, the model will feature a common error-correction formulation 
with the long-run relationship nested in a short-run equation.
In  order  to  find  the  cointegrated  variables  and  the  corresponding 
cointegrating vector, we use testing procedures suggested by Johansen (1988, 1991) 
that allow the researcher to estimate the number of cointegrating relationships. 
Cointegrating  tests  were  undertaken  for  five  variables:  private  consumption 
expenditure (PCE), disposable income (Y), short-term interest rate (SBI), real 
growth of share prices index (JSX) and commercial property prices indexes (IPG). 
Our result shows that we only can work with one cointegrating vector without 
putting into account variable BI-rate. 
4.1.3.2  Error-correction Model Specification  
The model we are going to estimate features an error-correction formulation, 
with the long run having terms in the variables for which we found significant 
cointegrating vectors in the last sub-section. The estimated equation is as follows:
 ………………………………...........................    (4)
Where RGJSX = real growth of stock price index (JSX), RGIPG = real 
growth of property price index, Y = real disposable income, PCE = real private 
consumption expenditure.  
  
In that specification, c is constant, Δ represents first-order differences and 
et-1 the corresponding error-correction term. Intuitively, β0 should be negative so 
that when the variable PCE is moving away from equilibrium, it adjusts back in the 
next period. The larger β0, the faster will be the convergence to equilibrium. 87
It should be noted that specifications (4) incorporate Equation (2) but 
consumption and other variables are contemporaneously cointegrated. That is, 
following Davidson, et al. (1978), we derive a short-run model that has a log linear 
approximation of Equation (2) as a cointegrating vector. Next we estimate Equation 
(4) with the results shown in the Figure 18 below.
Figure 18
Estimation Result
We  present  only  the  most  significant  results  obtained  from  different 
specifications  of  Equation  (4)  with  various  lag  lengths.  The  error-correction 
term coefficient is negative and significant. In relation to asset price influence on 
consumption, we found that the stock and property price coefficients have the right 
signs, but they are not significant. 
However, our results do not support the idea that Indonesia’s financial 
liberalisation  and  broadening  of  stock  ownership  have  increased  the  potential 
impact of stock market fluctuations on consumption in the last decade. For this 
immobility, we think that we have the plausible explanations that the domestic 
market players are limited (Figure 19) and much of the households’ stock market 




Composition of Household Assets
Household assets are dominated by property. It is observed that the change 
in property prices does not have a significant impact on consumption. This may 
be related to the composition of the index which is concentrated on residential 
property. In fact, property prices increased. Nonetheless, since most of residential 
property is used as investment assets, the increase in property price is not followed 
by increase in consumption. 
  
So, our results go against the literature, since we found an insignificant 
effect  on  consumption  derived  from  both  stock  and  property  market  wealth.   
The non-appreciable effect of stock and property prices on consumer spending 
is broadly consistent with life cycle saving and a modest wealth effect. That is, 
the life cycle theory predicts only modest effects of wealth gains on consumer 
spending, as spending gains would be distributed over the household’s lifetime.
4.2  The Effects of Asset Price Fluctuations on the Soundness of 
Financial System 
Asset price fluctuations are a serious concern for central banks since they 
may impinge on both price and financial system stability.  The effect of asset price 
fluctuations is believed to be asymmetric and the effect is stronger in the case of 
asset price decline. When the asset prices are rising they influence the economy in a 
favorable way, but the adverse effects are difficult to estimate.  The effect of falling 
asset prices on the financial system, notably on the banking system is indirect and 
non-linear. The impact of falling asset prices passes through the bank’s balance 
sheet. 
The period of increasing asset price is usually characterised by lending 
booms. This phenomenon is also seen in Indonesia (Figures 21 and 22). The 
increase in JSX composite index and commercial property index are followed by 
the increase in credit. During the period of JSX boom (2004-2008), the growth 
of credit was 23.84%, far higher compared to the previous period (2001-2003) of 
18.02%, which was not a boom period. 89
Figure 21 
JSX , Credit, M2, M1
Figure 22 
Commercial Property Price Index , 
Credit
The increase in JSX composite index and commercial property index are 
followed by an increase in credit that supported reasonably high domestic economic 
growth (Figure 23). Overall economic growth reached 6.06% in 2008, slightly 
below the 6.28% recorded in the previous year. In the last quarter of 2008, global 
liquidity conditions tightened up in tandem with mounting perceptions of emerging 
market risks. This, in turn, triggered a slide in the Indonesian Stock Market, and 
Government Securities prices alongside a sharp downturn in the exchange rate 
causing the risk spread on Indonesian securities to widen considerably, prompting 
outflows of foreign capital from the stock market and from Government Securities 
and Bank Indonesia Certificates (SBIs). As shown in Figure 23, on average, the 
JSX composite index decreased to 2087.79 from 2210.48 in the previous year.      
Figure 23
Development of Several Indicators90
With respect to excess liquidity, Fels (2005) defines excess liquidity as the 
ratio of a monetary aggregate to nominal GDP. In other words, it is the inverse of 
the velocity of money. Excess liquidity is liquidity that is not needed to finance real 
economic transactions. It is therefore available or used for financial transactions. 
Excess liquidity does not necessarily refer to fast growth in monetary supply. It is 
the phenomenon where the supply of money exceeds the demand for money for 
real economic transactions. This amount of money would put pressure on inflation 
and asset prices. 
Figure 23 shows that in 1997, 1998, and 2007, both M1 and M2 grew 
faster than GDP. In 2008, M1 grew slower than GDP, but M2 grew faster than 
GDP. The excess growth, represented by EM1 and EM2, was significantly high in 
1997 and 2007. The high EM1 and EM2 indicate that huge amounts of liquidity 
were accumulating. These two periods were both followed by high inflation in the 
following year respectively, including the highest inflation in the last decade of 
77.54% in 1998.11      
With respect to credit, robust credit growth was associated with relatively 
high domestic economic growth and stimulated by Bank Indonesia’s efforts to 
enhance the bank intermediation function. Credit expansion in 2008 far exceeded 
2007, with investment credit experiencing the highest growth. During 2008, credit 
growth reached 32.96%, stimulated by the increase in working capital credit, 
investment credit and consumption credit. The dramatic increase in investment 
credit growth compared to working capital credit and investment credit indicated a 
conducive growth in domestic investment and high expansion in imports of capital 
goods.
In 2008, credit growth surpassed that of deposits, which spurred liquidity 
risks in several banks. However, at the industry level, liquidity remained adequate. 
Rapid credit growth of 32.96% was not balanced by growth in deposits,which 
grew  at  16.1%. To  fulfill  their  credit  commitments,  banks  liquidated  their  BI 
Certificates (SBI). Consequently, the composition of SBI in the banks’ earning 
assets contravened  minimum reserve requirement in order to help commercial 
banks loosen their liquidity.
11.  Inflationary pressure in Indonesia remained strong until Q3/2008, but began to ease in Q4/2008. 
The high inflation until Q3/2008 was fuelled primarily by soaring international commodity 
prices, led by oil and food. This upswing impacted administered prices when the government was 
compelled to raise its prices for subsidised fuels. Early in the second half of 2008, inflationary 
pressure began to subside in line with the downturn in international commodity, food and 
energy prices. Following this, the government acted to reduce prices for automotive diesel 
and gasoline in December 2008. In other developments, Indonesia benefited from a very good 
year of food crop production which, combined with slowing aggregate demand, contributed to 
lower inflationary pressure. In regard to fundamentals, falling inflationary pressure was also 
attributable to success in mitigating expectations of inflation that had mounted sharply in the 
wake of the fuel price hike. Taken together, CPI inflation in 2008 came to 11.06%, with core 
inflation recorded at 8.29%.91
Although bank liquidity remained adequate, it was not evenly spread. This 
was the challenge faced by the monetary authority to stabilise the money markets, 
both  rupiah  and  foreign  exchange.  From  a  micro  perspective,  banks  became 
more vulnerable to liquidity risk after the withdrawal of secondary reserves in 
compliance with their credit extension liabilities. As a result, excess liquidity 
(BI Certificates, Fasbi/FTK and SSB) ebbed to its lowest level in August 2008. 
Increasing pressures, stemming from the global liquidity crisis in the third quarter 
of 2008, affected confidence among the banks. This led to inefficiencies in the 
interbank market. In addition, significant withdrawals of foreign investment from 
the domestic financial market tightened the forex market further.   
The government and Bank Indonesia undertook several policies to ease 
the  pressure  on  liquidity  and  maintain  financial  system  stability. The  policies 
included allocating government funds to certain banks, extending the tenure of 
the repo liquidity facility at BI, loosening the minimum reserve requirement for 
rupiah and foreign currencies, as well as managing the supply and demand of 
foreign currencies. Efforts to free up liquidity as well as reduce speculation in the 
foreign exchange market were taken by issuing several regulations to facilitate the 
availability of foreign exchange for eligible banks and corporations. In addition, 
to raise public confidence in the banking industry and maintain financial stability 
through crisis prevention and management, the government and Bank Indonesia 
promulgated several pertinent regulations related to bank management in handling 
their  liquidity/solvency  problems,  increasing  deposit  guarantee  coverage,  and 
broadening the types of collateral acceptable for the short-term funding facility 
from Bank Indonesia. So far, these policies have succeeded in loosening bank 
liquidity and placating the public in response to the recovery of banks in financial 
difficulty.
Other various performance indicators for commercial banks were relatively 
sound (Figures 24 and 25). The capital ratio of banks was well maintained but 
declined slightly from average 20 before the bust to around 17. The decline in 
CAR is due to strong credit expansion. FSI12 as a measure of financial stability 
decreases during period of boom asset price and increases during period of burst 
asset price. There were two periods during which FSI lay above its safe threshold 
(2) for more than a quarter. At the end of 2004 and early 2005, FSI exceeded its 
12.  Financial Stability Index (FSI) is an indicator to measure financial stability.  FSI in Indonesia 
is  developed  from  three  main  blocks  of  the  financial  system,  namely,  the  banking  sector, 
stock market and bond market. The three blocks are closely related and interaction among 
them influences financial stability. Each block is represented by a set of behavioural equation 
while relation among block is explained by identity equation. Banking block consists of non-
performing loans. Stock market block consists of JSX composite index. Bond market consists of 
government bond.92
safe threshold. This was due to significant increase of domestic oil price that was 
triggered by extremely high world oil price.  Another period was at the end of 2008 
when there was a slide in asset price. However, the increase in FSI is controllable 
and, in general, the financial system remains sound amid sharp decline in asset 
price (especially stock price) (Figures 26 and 27).
Figure 24
JSX Real, IHPG Real , CAR, NPL 
and ROA
Figure 25
JSX Real, IHPG Real and LDR
Figure 26
FSI and  IHPG Real
Figure 27
FSI and JSX Real
In general, the impact of asset price fluctuations on commercial banks 
triggered  by  global  financial  crisis,  was  minimised  by  the  “conservative” 
characteristics of Indonesia’s banks. Their sources of funds primarily stemmed 
from third-party fund (deposit), followed by interbank fund and securities (Figure 
28). Banks’ funds are mostly distributed for credit followed by interbank money 
market  and  securities  (Figure  29).  From  time  to  time,  banks’  distribution  of 93
funds in the form of securities is getting higher. Nonetheless, Bank Indonesia is 
implementing prudential regulations which prohibit banks from investing in high-
risk assets, such as equities, while investment in securities is limited to investment-
grade securities.  Currently most of the securities held by banks are government 
securities. 
Figure 28 
Bank’s Source of Fund
Figure 29 
Bank’s Distribution of Fund
There are some regulations of direct credit controls imposed by Bank 
Indonesia to ensure the practice of prudential bank management: 
Credit to Securities Companies a. 
Banks  are  prohibited  to  provide  credit  for  securities  transaction  to 
individual or companies which are not securities companies. Credit to securities 
companies  is permitted under certain conditions : 1) the maximum amount of 
bank’s credit to each securities company is the smallest amount between 25% 
of capital of securities company or 15% of bank’s capital; 2) the amount of 
total credit to securities company is limited up to 30% of bank’s capital; and 3) 
stocks are permitted as additional collateral as long as their transaction for the 
last three months are active,  the stocks prices above their nominal price and 
amount of stock as collateral are 50% of market price. 
Credit for  Derivative Transaction   b. 
  
Banks  are  prohibited  to  give  credit  and  overdraft  to  their  customers  in 
accordance with the fulfillment of margin deposit for derivative transaction. 
In addition to that, banks are only permitted to conduct derivative transaction 
related to foreign exchange and interest rate. 
4.2.1  Methodology and Data   
In examining the effect of volatility of asset price, we will use banks’ 
balance  sheet  channel  (Mishkin,  2001). When  asset  prices  rise  as  a  result  of 94
monetary expansion, banks’ collateral value will increase. The increase in asset 
price affects the asset side of banks’ balance sheet through increasing in banks’ 
capital. From the borrower side, increase in asset price will increase borrowers’ 
ability to repay their loans. Thus, bank loan losses will decrease and banks’ capital 
will increase. Higher bank capital then allows banks to engage in more lending. 
The excess leverage of financial activities is made possible by the high value of 
collateral. Collateral value is inflated as a result of asset price inflation. Increase in 
bank lending in the boom period will then improve banks’ performance indicator, 
thus improving financial stability measure. 
When there is adjustment in the asset market so that the price of asset 
reverts to its fair value, the collateral value of the borrowers will decline, which 
then places pressure on the repayment ability of borrowers.  The decline in asset 
price affects the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet because of the erosion of 
collateral value. The decline also affects the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheet 
because the decline in stock market indices decreases the value of banks’ net worth.   
Since banks’ assets mostly consist of equity, the decline in equity will require 
banks to increase their capital or depress their assets. 
The impact of asset price volatility on bank performance can be depicted 
in the flow diagram below.   
Figure 30
 Transmission of Asset Price Volatility to Bank’s Performance
We use VAR techniques to estimate the impact of fluctuations in stock 
price and property price on banks’ performance indicator. Model VAR is specified 
by: 
 …………………………………………………………….. (5)
where:  A(L) and B(L) are polinominal matrices with lag L, Yt = vector of endogen 
variable ,  Xt = vector of exogen variable, ut = vector of innovations . We use 
monthly data from 2003:01 to 2009:6. In calculating impulse response functions, 
the ordering of the variables in a VAR test matters. Based on the acknowledgement 
in the referred articles, VAR function variables for iteration will be as follow :  
The impact of fluctuation in asset price on LDR :  {SBI, JSX/IPG/YIELD,  a. 
NPL, BANK_CAP, TOT_KREDIT, LDR }95
The impact of fluctuation in asset price on CAR : {SBI, JSX/IPG/YIELD,  b. 
NPL, BANK_CAP, CAR}
The impact of fluctuation in asset price on NPL Ratio:                                                                                                                                            c. 
{SBI, JSX/IPG/YIELD, NPL_ratio }
Where SBI= the rate of one-month Central Bank certificate, JSX= stock index, 
IPG= index of property price, yield = yield of government bond, bank_cap = 
bank’s capital, tot_kredit = total kredit , LDR = loans-to-deposit ratio, CAR = 
capital adequacy ratio, NPL_ratio = ratio of non-performing loan. 
4.2.2 Econometric Results  
We use 11 variables to conduct VAR estimation and begin by studying 
the presence of unit roots in the employed variables (in difference).  We used 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller procedure and the result is presented in Table 9 
(appendix).  The chosen specification includes generally no intercept and no time 
trend. Table 9 (appendix) shows that all variables are I(1) with the exception of 
variable SBI and Return on Asset (ROA).  The majority of the test statistics of the 
variables fall within the 95% confidence region, and are therefore consistent with 
the hypothesis of a unit root in those series.   
From the empirical result, the fluctuation of JSX composite index does not 
have a significant impact on the banks performance indicator (Graph 1 - appendix). 
The fluctuation of Commercial Property index does not have a significant impact 
on LDR and on NPL ratios. However, it does have a significant impact on CAR 
performance.  Loosening  monetary  policy  that  triggers  increasing  property 
price increases CAR instantly. However, the effect is completely insignificant 
after 1 month (Graph 2 - appendix). Fluctuation of yield of Government Bond 
does not have a significant impact on the banks’ performance indicator (Graph 
3 - appendix).  The result confirms that the condition of the banking system is 
quite resilient to fluctuations in asset prices. This is supported by the practice of 
prudential banking. 
5.  The Policy Responses   
Usually, in setting interest rates, Bank Indonesia reacts to current inflation 
and the current state of the business cycle. As there is no consensus how monetary 
policy  reacts  to  asset  price  fluctuations,  Bank  Indonesia  very  rarely  issues  a 
particular monetary policy in response to asset price movements if asset prices are 
seen to diverge from the levels with which the bank feels comfortable. 
Of course, conducting monetary policy in this way is not easy. In addition 
to the fact that Bank Indonesia must form a view of whether a particular asset 96
price increase is dangerous or not, it requires monetary policy to have predictable 
effects on asset prices. Furthermore, following Bean (2004), Bernanke (2002), and 
Kohn (2006), the size of interest rate movements required to prevent a bubble from 
developing must not be so large as to cause output and inflation to fall substantially 
below the central bank’s objectives for them.
Figure 32
Government Bond Yield and 
BI Rate
Figure 31
JSX and BI Rate
Moreover, Bank Indonesia should consider that the effects of its monetary 
policy on different asset prices must occur at about the same speed, since otherwise 
the Bank will have to choose between which asset price(s) they wish to stabilise.  
In most cases, the Bank lowers interest rates in response to an improvement 
in market fundamentals, thus accommodating productivity gains which essentially 
signal low future inflationary pressures. Bank Indonesia also responds to higher 
stock market volatility by reducing interest rates in order to inject liquidity into 
the market and boost business confidence (Figures 31 and 32). However, the 
magnitude of asset price bubbles in interest rate policy rules is too small to warrant 
any economic policy response. Moreover, recent research shows that monetary 
policy is too costly and too slow to prevent the rise of asset price bubbles.
Nevertheless, we view contemporaneous co-movements between interest 
rates and the price level, and interest rates and real GDP, as reflecting reactions by 
the central bank to these variables, and contemporaneous co-movements in interest 
rates and asset prices as reflecting market reactions to monetary policy news.
Relatively secure macro stability, as indicated by the response of Bank 
Indonesia  in  using  its  BI-Rate  to  control  inflation,  robust  economic  growth, 
burgeoning foreign exchange reserves, as well as optimistic financial reports from 97
share issuers indicating strong profit growth, all helped curb the decline in the 
Jakarta Composite Index after external fluctuations in the financial and commodities 
markets triggered the slide in the Composite Index in September 2008.
However, several domestic risks also influenced the shift in the composite 
index in 2008 and the first half of 2009. These risks, among others, stemmed from 
sentiment regarding bank liquidity and concerns over the shrinking profit of share 
issuers in the mining and agricultural sectors along with the sharp drop in related 
commodity prices.
The policies of the Indonesian Capital Market and Financial Institution 
Supervisory Agency and the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) also played an 
important role in limiting a deeper Composite Index decline. The IDX suspended 
trade on 9th and 10th October 2008 in an attempt to provide time for investors to 
think rationally amidst the financial market turbulence happening at that time. On 
the same day the Indonesian Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory 
Agency  also  issued  regulations  regarding  buy-back.  The  government  also 
encouraged state-owned enterprises (BUMN) to buy back through profit provision. 
The IDX banned short-selling and limited margin trade. These policies successfully 
curbed selling actions amid rapidly declining prices. In addition, the IDX upgraded 
the auto-rejection system to asymmetric rejection and also extended the suspension 
of several issuers that would stress the overall performance of the composite index. 
At the end of 2008, IDX issued another policy that mandated the reporting of stock 
repo transactions and the closing of cash market transactions to reduce huge price 
disparities with the regular market. To restore investor confidence, IDX requested 
a number of issuers to publicly disclose fair information regarding the conditions 
of the issuer.
The panoply of policies instituted were able to restore investor confidence 
in the stock market, which was indicated by an increase in the average daily value 
traded on the stock market, from Rp4.29 trillion per day in 2007 to Rp4.41 trillion 
per day in 2008. Improved investor confidence was also reflected by the activities 
of foreign investors who still recorded net buying of Rp18.65 trillion in 2008, 
which was far below net buying in 2007 of Rp32.92 trillion. However, foreign 
ownership in 2008 increased to 67.8%. Increased foreign activities in 2008 were 
in line with the selective buying of undervalued shares due to financial volatility 
in the fourth quarter of 2008. Share issuances in 2008 reached their target and 
surpassed that in 2007. Capital market volatility and tumbling share prices reduced 
the number of initial public offerings (IPO) and rights issues by the end of 2008.
Annually, the value of share issuances in 2008 increased compared to 
the year before. The value of share issuances through IPOs rose by 38.04% from 
Rp17.18 trillion to Rp23.71 trillion, meanwhile the value of rights issues increased 
by 86.21% from Rp29.8 trillion to Rp55.49 trillion. Therefore, total share issuances 98
in 2008 were valued at Rp79.1 trillion. Most shares (58.3%) were issued in the first 
quarter of 2008, before the rapid decline of many share prices, totaling Rp46.1 
trillion. The issuance of shares plummeted in the last quarter of 2008, with a total 
value of just Rp3.3 trillion (4.1%) because a number of issuers with principle 
permits chose to postpone their share issuances.
In general, the rise in IPOs and rights issues in 2008 was a reflection 
of  stock  market  resilience  against  the  backdrop  of  the  global  financial  crisis. 
This also proved that the stock market continued to perform well in terms of 
financing development. The evidence suggests that policy coordination among 
Bank Indonesia, Ministry of Finance, as well as the Capital Market and Financial 
Institution Supervisory Agency is necessary in taming asset prices. 
In addition, learning from the current crisis, we have to stay alert and be 
watchful of every condition, including stable economic condition. Stable world 
economy  with  contained  inflationary  pressure  during  the  pre-crisis  time,  had 
caused over-optimism toward economic outlook and generate excessive capital 
flows. This expectation had resulted in soaring asset price and created bubbles. 
Amid inadequate regulation and supervision in the financial market, those bubbles 
then became bigger and increased accumulation of risks. The absence of strong 
regulation would trigger crisis when the bubble finally burst. Therefore, proper 
macroeconomic policy to prevent the creation of the bubble in the economy is 
crucial. 
6.  Conclusions  
While inflation, policy rate (BI-rate) and nominal exchange rates are found  1. 
to be the main factors contributing to the variability of stock price index, 
we find that inflation and real effective exchange rates are the main factors 
contributing  to  the  variability  of  property  price  index.  In  addition,  GDP 
growth, M2 and credit are found to be the main factors affecting variability of 
government bond prices. 
Using error-correction model specification, we find that asset prices - stock  2. 
and property prices - do not have significant influence on consumption. What 
the empirical results imply is that they do not support the idea that Indonesia’s 
financial liberalisation and broadening of stock ownership has increased the 
potential impact of stock market fluctuation on consumption. The same result 
also occurred with regard to the property price index.
The volatility of asset prices (stock price, property price and government bond)  3. 
in general has minimal impact on the performance of the banking system (CAR, 
LDR, NPL ratio) and financial system stability, which is measured by financial 
system indicators. This was supported by the “conservative” characteristics 99
of Indonesia’s banks. Their sources of funds primarily stemmed from third-
party funds and bank’s funds are mostly distributed for credit. Bank Indonesia 
also implements prudential regulation which prohibited banks from investing 
in high-risk assets such as equities, while investment in securities is limited 
to investment-grade securities. Currently most of the securities held by banks 
are government securities. 
Examining the effect of asset price fluctuation on consumption and banking  4. 
sector performance, gathering from the empirical result, the central bank 
does not necessarily respond to the volatility of asset price directly. However, 
the central bank should monitor the development of asset price and respond 
accordingly when the movement sends a signal to future higher inflation, 
increasing the probability of banking vulnerability. 100
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Cross-correlation Coefficients: Stock Prices13
13.  Cross-correlation coefficients between the stock prices in period t (JSX) and GDP Growth 
(GROWTH), GDP gap (Log_OGAP), private consumption (CP), M2, M1, M0, total bank lending 
(CREDIT), total household debt (HHD), BI-rate, time deposit rates with 1-month maturity, time 
deposit rates with 3-month maturity, time deposit rates with 6-month maturity, time deposit rates 
with 12-month maturity, time deposit rates with 24-month maturity, inflation (inflasi), nominal 
exchange rate (EXC), real effective exchange rates (REER), house prices (IPG), government 
bond (SUN7).104
Table 2
Cross-correlation Coefficients: Property Prices14
14.  Cross correlation coefficients between the house prices in period t (IPG) and GDP Growth 
(GROWTH), GDP gap (Log_OGAP), private consumption (CP), M2, M1, M0, total bank lending 
(CREDIT), total household debt (HHD), BI-rate, time deposit rates with 1-month maturity, time 
deposit rates with 3-month maturity, time deposit rates with 6-month maturity, time deposit rates 
with 12-month maturity, time deposit rates with 24-month maturity, inflation (inflasi), nominal 
exchange rate (EXC), real effective exchange rates (REER), stock prices (JSX), government 
bond (SUN7).105
Table 3
Cross-correlation Coefficients: Government Bond Prices15
15.  Cross-correlation coefficients between the government bond prices in period t (SUN7) and GDP 
Growth (GROWTH), GDP gap (Log_OGAP), private consumption (CP), M2, M1, M0, total 
bank lending (CREDIT), total household debt (HHD), BI-rate, time deposit rates with 1-month 
maturity, time deposit rates with 3-month maturity, time deposit rates with 6-month maturity, 
time deposit rates with 12-month maturity, time deposit rates with 24-month maturity, inflation 
(inflasi), nominal exchange rate (EXC), real effective exchange rates (REER), stock prices 
(JSX), house prices (IPG).106
Table 4
Principal Component Analysis: Stock Prices
 
Table 5
Principal Component Analysis: Property Prices107
Table 6
Principal Component Analysis: Government Bond Prices108
Table 7
Correlations between Consumption, Disposable Income, 
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Graph 2
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Graph 3
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CHAPTER 4
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND
CHALLENGES OF MONETARY POLICY IN KOREA
By Junhan Kim1
1.   Introduction
There are many asset markets in Korea, but in this research we focus 
mostly on housing markets and stock markets. Before we go on to explain the 
trends and past experiences in Korea, a general introduction to asset markets in 
Korea is warranted as a background. 
Housing in Korea is of 3 different types: single family home, multi-family 
home, and apartment. According to a survey by Statistics Korea in 2005, single 
family homes consist of 32.2%, multi-family home 13.5%, and apartments 52.7%. 
One thing to note from these figures is the share of apartments. It has increased 
dramatically since 1980 when it was only 7.0%. 
The rising share of apartments implies that housing markets become more 
liquid in the sense that apartment owners can sell or rent a unit with ease. It is 
because the attributes such as square-footage, the number of rooms, etc., are fairly 
standardised and variations among units are minimal, if at all. High liquidity in 
housing markets, however, does not necessarily mean that the housing markets are 
efficient. As in other countries, and in a way more so than in other countries, house 
prices in Korea show high persistence and seasonality, which are signs of market 
inefficiency. 
Another noteworthy aspect of Korean housing markets is that the number 
of owner-occupied homes is relatively low. The number of owner-occupied homes 
is 57.9% in 2004, compared to 67.4% of US. (Census Bureau in 2009)
One of the unique features of rental markets in Korea is that more than 
half of rental contract, 66% to be exact, is as a “no monthly payment, deposit 
only” contract, called “chonsae”. Implicit monthly rent is the opportunity cost of 
this refundable deposit. This has to do with a few closely related issues. First, the 
economic interpretation of this deposit is more straightforward than that of the 
monthly rent with respect to the fundamental value of the house. This, in turn, 
implies that identifying bubbles, which can be defined as a difference between 
1.    Author is Director of the Monetary Studies Team of the Institute for Monetary and Economic 
Research of The Bank of Korea and concurrently Visiting Research Economist at The SEACEN 
Centre in OY 2009/10.
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the fundamental value and the non-fundamental value, might be easier. Second, the 
difference has to do with the efficiency of the housing markets. The more efficient 
the housing markets become, the smaller the gap between the purchase price and 
the deposit will be. Finally, this deposit acts as a (partial) funding source when 
purchasing a house. This means, we need to take into account this institutional 
aspect of housing markets when analysing the effect of liquidity measures on the 
asset prices.
Figure 1
Share of Types of Housing
(%) 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Single Family Housing 87.5 77.3 66 47.1 37.1 32.2
Multi-family Housing 3 5.7 8.4 11.6 11.6 13.5
Apartments 7 13.5 22.7 37.5 47.7 52.7
Others 2.5 3.5 2.8 3.7 3.6 1.6
Source: Korea National Statistical Office
Figure 2
Number of Listed Companies and Market Capitalisation115
Figure 3
Average Daily Transaction and KOSPI
There  are  three  major  stock  markets  in  Korea:  Stock  Market,  Korea 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ), and Derivatives Market. 
Accordingly, there are a number of stock price indexes to represent these markets. 
To name a few, KOSPI (Korea Composite Stock Price Index, Jan. 4, 1980 = 100) 
represents Stock Market, and KOSDAQ Composite index (July 1, 1996 = 1000) 
represents KOSDAQ. As of July 2009, 757 companies are listed on the Stock 
Market, average daily trading volume is more than 5 trillion won. 1,018 companies 
are listed on KOSDAQ with average daily trading volume of almost 2 trillion 
won.
1.1   House Prices
House prices2 in Korea exhibit a recurring pattern of a steep rise followed 
by a stable period. During the late 1980s (from 1986 to 1990) house prices rose 
13% on average each year. This trend continued until early-1990. In 1990 and 
1991 house price index rose 14%, and 21%, respectively. However, since 1992 
house prices started to decline for a few years, and then practically remained stable 
during the most of the 1990s. This is said to be due to so called “2 million home 
project” initiated by the government in the late 1980s. Thanks to the project, the 
supply of new homes increased dramatically. The most of these new homes were 
`apartments’, a form of housing comprising individually owned units with shared 
public spaces. Although the population growth was still high in the 1990s3, the 
2.    House prices index is compiled since 1986 for the major urban areas. It is currently complied by 
KB Bank. 2009.12 = 100.
3.    The average population growth in the 1990s was around 0.9%, which is much higher as compared 
to 0.4% in the 2000s.116
increased supply of housing was more than adequate to meet demand, therefore 
house prices remained stable throughout the 1990s. This is also evidenced by the 





This trend continued until the Korean economy was hit by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1998. House prices dropped more than 12% in that year, which is 
the largest drop in a single year since HPI was first compiled in 1986. During the 
crisis the economy shrank (-6.9% in 1998), the unemployment rate soared (7.0% in 
1998 as compared to the average of 3.4% since 1990), and interest rates remained 
4.    The number of unsold apartment complex reached its peak in 1995, and slowly decreased 
thereafter.117
high (the yield on 3-year government bond was 17.1% in April 1998), which led 
house prices to fall. In the aftermath of the crisis the economy bounced back quickly. 
The growth rate was as high as the pre-crisis level, the unemployment rate and 
interest rates also fell significantly. House prices, however, did not show any sign 
of a turn-around immediately. It was not until late 2001 when house prices started 
to move back up. From 2001 to 2008, house prices rose 5.9% on average. During 
this period two separate waves of house price boom were apparent. The first one 
was between 2001 and 2003, and the second between 2005 and 2007. There was a 
brief hiatus between these two periods. During the former period house prices rose 
11.1% on average, while house prices rose 7.3% in the latter period.     
This  trend  has  been  observed  nation-wide,  although  it  was  more 
pronounced in certain regions than others. Especially Seoul, the nation’s capital, 
saw more dramatic fluctuations. The extent of fluctuations in Seoul measured by 
the standard deviation of monthly changes of HPI is 14.1, which is much higher 
than the nation average of 11.1. 
Fluctuations of house prices are accompanied by fast increasing credits 
and liquidity. Loans to households rose 10.7% during the period, and M2 and Lf 
(Financial institution liquidity: M2 plus long-term financial instruments) rose 9.4% 
and 9.0%, respectively. From 1998 and 2001 - 2003 episodes, we can see that house 
prices and loans are closely related. In 1998, loans to households fell 10.3%, as 
house prices slipped. Since 2000 loans increased rapidly until house prices paused 
in 2004. However, this pattern did not apply to 2005 - 2007 episodes, since the 
increase in loans to households were rather modest. This can be interpreted as 
house prices during this period rose without much actual sales of houses, thereby 
the rise in house prices did not spur the demand for loans immediately.118
Figure 6
House Prices and Loans to Households
Figure 7
House Prices and Monetary Aggregates
Although the relationship between house prices and interest rates was not 
readily observed, house prices fell dramatically in 1998 when interest rates spiked 
by higher than 20%. Also during the period from 2001 - 2007 when house prices 
continued to rise, interest rates remained very low. Nevertheless, verifying the 
role of interest rates in house price fluctuations is more challenging than it appears 
since it requires identifying monetary policy shocks, risk appetite of the investors 
and many other institutional aspects, such as financial market efficiencies, legal 
and social traditions and others. More analyses are needed on this front.119
Figure 8
House Prices and Interest Rates
  When  it  comes  to  the  relationship  between  house  prices  and  the  real 
economy, the GDP growth coincides with a rapid house price boom in 2001 - 2003 
as well as collapses in early 1990s, 1998 and 2008. However, high GDP growth 
during 1999 - 2001, and low growth during 2006 - 2007 do not coincide with house 
price fluctuations.
There are ways, despite some arguments to the contrary, of identifying 
bubbles in house prices. Korea can be a unique example in this respect. (For a 
general overview for identification of bubbles in Korea, refer to Lee (2006)) As 
noted earlier, the rental markets in Korea are rather peculiar. Most of the rental 
contracts are of “no monthly payment, refundable deposits only”. So the (implicit) 
rent is the opportunity cost of the deposits. If the markets are efficient, the amount 
of this deposit should not deviate much from the purchase price of the house. For 
example, if the amount of the deposit is significantly lower than the purchase price, 
renting a house would be preferred to buying it, and therefore the purchase price 
should drop. On the other hand, if the amount of the deposit is higher than the 
purchase price, buying it is much preferred. Therefore, the purchase price goes up. 
So the ratio of the deposit and purchase price (“chonsae” ratio) could be used as a 
way to judge whether there are bubbles in house prices, since the gap between the 
two would be at least in part due to speculation on price appreciation.120
Figure 9
House Prices and GDP Growth
Figure 10
House Prices and Business Cycles
In reality, the “chonsae” ratio peaked at 70% in 2002, followed by a 
steady decline. As of July, 2009 it is slightly higher than 50% nation-wide. It is 
40% in Seoul. The lower the ratio, the more likely house prices contain bubbles. 
Since house prices in Seoul rose more rapidly than the rest of the nation, it is not 
surprising that this ratio in Seoul is lower than for the national average.121
Figure 11
“Chonsae” / Purchase Price Ratio
1.2   Stock Prices    
Figure 12
Stock Indices
There have been a few episodes, in which stock prices exhibited ups 
and downs. For KOSPI, right after it peaked in mid-1990s, it continued to fall 
until it rebounded right after the Asian financial crisis in 1998. The rebound was 
sufficiently strong to recover the market high in 1994. Since its introduction in 122
1996, the KOSDAQ composite index moved together with KOPSI quite closely. 
However, the volatility of KOSDAQ composite index in early 2000s exceeded that 
of KOSPI. This was when the so called tech-bubbles formed and burst. Following 
the bust, the KOSDAQ composite index has been less volatile than KOSPI. 
Since around 2004, stock prices, especially KOSPI, more than tripled 
until it peaked in late 2007. Then they began slipping, and the 2008 global financial 
crisis led stock prices further down. 
Although stock prices and macro-financial variables are closely related, 
the degree to which they are related has varied over time. Let’s first take a look 
at the relationship between stock prices and interest rates (Figure 13). There have 
been a few instances where high interest rates, or rising interest rates in some cases, 
push stock prices down. A spectacular example was the 1998 Asian financial crisis, 
when interest rates soared and stock prices plunged. Of course, this alone does not 
confirm the role of interest rates on stock prices, since during these times, not only 
the high interest rates but also decreased aggregate demand, low capital utilisation 
and grim perspectives about the future economy of the country all must have had a 
negative impact on stock prices. Another example in this respect, with a different 
direction, was 2008 when the global financial crisis started to be widespread. In 
the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the financial market turmoil that 
followed, stock prices and interest rates both fell simultaneously. Again, this is 
not to be directly interpreted as interest rates having caused stock prices to fall. 
There could be common causes that made both stock prices and interest rates 
fall. This instance could be more of a substitution effect that investors substituted 
stocks for bonds from flight away from high risks. All in all, further analyses 
are needed to correctly identify the relationship between interest rates and stock 
prices. Nevertheless, at the outset it seems reasonable to assume that interest rates 
have a close link to stock prices. The KOSPI rose fast throughout the late 2000s. 
During 2004 to 2008 when interest rates remained low, stock prices rose 18.7% 
on average.
Real activities, usually summarised in GDP growth, also have shown 
similar patterns. Although real activities and stock prices appear to move quite 
closely together, there are instances where they did not. Figure 14 shows that for 
the most part GDP growth and stock prices have moved in the same direction. 
The most apparent episode was in 1998. The GDP growth rate was in negatives 
and stock prices fell more than 37.4% from the previous year level. When the 
economy recovered in 1999 to 2000, stock prices picked up as well. During 2004 
to 2007, however, this pattern did not seem to hold any longer. The GDP growth 
has been rather sluggish during the period. The average GDP growth, on year-on-
year basis, has been less than 5%, which was considered to be a slow growth, if 
not a recession. 123
Figure 12
Stock Prices and Interest rates
This can be also seen from Figure 15. It matches stock prices and business 
cycle turning points, where gray areas show a period from a peak to a trough. Stock 
prices coincide or preceded economic downturns in 1992 to 1993, 1996 to 1998, 
and 2001 to 2002. Economic downturn in 2003 to 2006, however, did not coincide 
with stock prices. In fact stock prices almost doubled during the period. 
Figure 13
Stock Prices and GDP Growth124
Figure 14
Stock Prices and Business Cycles
In this respect, we may have to look somewhere else for an explanation 
for this episode during 2003 to 2006 period. Figures 15 and 16 depict the balance of 
payment and stock prices. Since 1998, the current account exhibited unprecedented 
surpluses. The first wave of surpluses was from 1999 to 2001, and the second one 
was from 2003 to 2006. Starting in 1999, aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, 
foreign capital poured into the Korean financial markets. This created a stock price 
boom in 1999 and 2000. In this period current account surpluses are more apparent 
than capital account surpluses. Another wave of capital inflow was during 2004 to 
2006, when current account surpluses were on average more than $16 billion and 
capital account surpluses were on average more than $10 billion. In this episode 
stock prices seemed to have been influenced by capital account surpluses than the 
current account surpluses because stock prices have gone up even when the current 
account decreased to $5 billion in 2006, when capital account still showed strong 
surpluses.125
Figure 15
Stock Prices and Current Account
Figure 16
Stock Prices and Capital Account
1.3   Policy Response   
While the government rarely reacts to stock price fluctuations, house price 
movements up and down have drawn a number of policy changes. In a general 
sense, the government should and does work on housing development projects, 
sometimes via agencies, and institutional reforms on housing finances. In 1970s 126
and 1980s when housing supply ratio was still very low (in 1980 it was 71.2%), the 
government tried to spur housing construction. When the construction booms went 
too far, however, some policies had to be reversed. (See Figure 18.1 for the history 




1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Nation-wide 71.2 69.8 72.4 86 96.2 105.9 109.9
Seoul 56.1 55.3 57.9 68 77.4 89.7 93.8
Source: Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs
In reaction to asset price booms and busts, there have been a number of 
policy responses, mostly by the treasury department and the financial supervisory 
service. The asset price related policies come as those that have to do with housing 
developments,  those  on  financial  soundness  with  respect  to  indebtedness  of 
borrowers, or those related to enhancing market efficiency. Whatever they come, 
they have implications on asset prices one way or another. For example, government-
led housing development projects have both positive and negative effects on house 
prices. Increasing the supply of housing would lower house prices, just like it did 
in late 1980s. At the same time it may spur speculative demand for houses, so 
house prices may run up. As mentioned earlier, the “200 million housing project” 
in late 1980s was proposed in the wake of a house price boom in 1980s. It arguably 
did have a negative effect on house prices for the most of early 1990s. 
In early the 2000s house prices started to move upward. It has not been 
until 2003, however, when the government saw rising house prices as a source of 
economic instability. In 2003 regulations regarding the rebuilding projects were 
tightened. Furthermore in December 2003, the general property tax was introduced 
to help lower the demand for high priced apartments. After a brief hiatus, however, 
house prices start to rise again in 2005. This time around more strict regulations 
were imposed with respect to transactions, taxation, and rebuilding projects in 
order to backstop soaring seemingly speculative demands. 
In terms of housing financing, the most frequently used policy measures 
were loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. See Figure 18-2 for changes in regulatory LTV 
ratios. As house prices rose, the LTV ratio was further lowered, which means 
potential buyers should find alternative funding sources other than borrowing from 
commercial banks. 
As far as monetary policy is concerned, there was few direct response of 
monetary policy against house price fluctuations, although the Bank of Korea has 







1978 48.9% Regulations: Installation of permission of land transaction, 
Enlargement of areas for standard land price announcement, 
Reform of land tax for vacant land, Establishment of public 
organisation for land development.
1981 7.5% Deregulations: Relaxation of Transfer income tax, Partial release of 
supply price of new apartment, Abandonment of requirement of at 
least 50% of small-sized apartment supply for private construction 
company.
1983 18.5% Regulations: Installation of housing bond bidding system, 
Reinforcement of transfer tax, Reduction of applicable time for 
flexible transfer tax rate.
1985 7.0% Deregulations: Encouragement of cooperation between private 
sector and public sector for land development, Application of 
different price control for new apartment by region, Relaxation of 
building control, Enlargement of housing finance supply.
1988 27.5% Regulations: Enlargement of 274 new real estate special 
districts(Totally, 599 districts), Investigation of housing finance 
sources for individual housing purchase, Reinforcement of 
qualification for tax exemption, Usage of official real estate 
transaction form, Installation of registration duty, Installation of 
Land development tax.
1989 32.0% Regulations: Development of 5 new towns (Supply of 2 million 
housing units).
1990 20.6% Regulations: Installation of size ceiling of land for housing, land 
excess profit tax, and development tax, Reinforcement of gift tax, 
Promotion of housing supply, Prohibition of new land acquisition 
by large companies.
1992 -1.3% Deregulations: Relaxation of prohibition on new land acquisition 
by large companies.
1993 -7.4% Deregulations: Relaxation of land use control, Establishment of 
5-year plan for land supply and demand.
1994 -0.6% Deregulations: Relaxation of land use control in the Capital Region, 
Rearrangement of requirement of small-sized apartment supply.
1998 -13.6% Deregulations: Abandonment of price ceiling for new apartment, 
Tax exemption for transfer income tax in designated period, 
Abandonment of land excess profit tax, size ceiling of land for 
housing, Liberalisation of real estate acquirement by foreigners.
1999 2.9% Deregulations: Abandonment of participation for new private 
apartment lotteries, Abandonment of giving priority to non-home 
owners.128
2000 0.7% Deregulations: Abandonment of duties for land swap, Relax of 
requirement of rent housing, Relaxation of the qualification for 
joining housing association.
2002 8.7% Regulations: Reinstallation of participation for new private 
apartment lotteries, Reinforcement of transfer income tax, taxes 
related possession, Establishment of new town.
Source: Kim et al. (2006)
Figure 18-2




      Zone
House APT. House APT. House APT.
Before Below 3 years X X X X X X
Sep.6 2002 3~10 years X X X X X X
Above 10 years X X X X X X
Sep.6 2002~ Below 3 years X X 60% 60% X X
Oct.14 2002 3~10 years X X 60% 60% X X
Above 10 years X X 60% 60% X X
Oct.14 
2002~
Below 3 years 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
May 23 
2003
3~10 years 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Above 10 years 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
May 23 
2003~
Below 3 years 50% 50% 50% 50% 60% 60%
Oct.29 2003 3~10 years 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Above 10 years 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Oct.29 
2003~
Below 3 years 50% 40% 50% 50% 60% 60%
Mar.24 2004 3~10 years 60% 40% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Above 10 years 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Mar.24 
2004~
Below 3 years 50% 40% 50% 50% 60% 60%
July 4 2005 3~10 years 60% 40% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Above 10 years
* Balloon payment 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
* Installment 
payment
70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70%129
July 4 2005~ Below 3 years
Present 3~10 years 60% 40% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Above 10 years 50% 40% 50% 50% 60% 60%
* Exceeding 60m.
won(1) 60% 40% 60% 60% 60% 60%
* Within 60m.won(2) 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Installment payments
over 10 yr(3) 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70%
Notes:  1)   Exclude mortgage loans having installment payments on which a      
  prepayment penalty is imposed, and with apartments exceeding the      
  collateral of 60 million won with the grace period less than 1 year.
  2)   Includes the loans excluded from Note (1).
  3)   This is limited to fixed rate mortgages (grace period of less than 1 year,    
  below 40% of DTI) with the plan of self-securitisation and of the      
  disposal to Korea Housing Finance Corporation.
2.   The Causes of Asset Price Fluctuations
2.1   Cross-correlation Analysis   
Figure 19 reports the cross-correlations for Korea. The signs of concurrent 
correlations are roughly matched with the theoretical prediction. For example, 
interest rates have negative correlations with asset prices, but no leads or lags. 
There are some exceptions, however, to the signs of the relationship. GB 1 year 
yields and GB 10 year yields have positive correlations with house prices. This, of 
course, does not necessarily mean that the theoretical relationship does not exist. 
Among the possible explanations, short-term interest rates are heavily influenced 
by short-term money markets, which may not necessarily be related to overall 
market liquidity, and that long-term interest rates are influenced by the future 
prospect of short-term interest rate movements, monetary policy, and/or foreign 
capital inflows or outflows. 
Liquidity measures are positively correlated with asset prices and slightly 
lag the asset prices. The causal relationships between asset prices and liquidity 
measures, such as M2 or Lf, have attracted much attention over the decades. 
Liquidity, or availability of funds in financial markets, has increased extensively 
over the last decade, and the relationship between liquidity and interest rate became 
obscure, which have worried policy makers and regulators alike. However, the 
relationship cannot be readily detected due to the complexity of financial markets 
and lack of theoretical models. Further analyses are needed.130
Figure 19
Cross-correlation between ∆HPI and Xt±i: Korea
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
Call -0.27  -0.29 -0.33 -0.35  -0.49  -0.52  -0.25  -0.18  -0.18  -0.22  -0.25 
CD -0.26  -0.25 -0.30 -0.35  -0.49  -0.50  -0.28  -0.20  -0.22  -0.26  -0.28 
GB(1 year) 0.12  0.29  0.28  0.20  0.00  0.06  0.18  0.04  -0.02  -0.11  -0.27 
GB(3 year) -0.25  -0.23 -0.23 -0.27  -0.36  -0.44  -0.23  -0.16  -0.23  -0.28  -0.23 
GB(5 year) -0.21  -0.19 -0.21 -0.26  -0.36  -0.45  -0.24  -0.19  -0.27  -0.30  -0.24 
GB(10 
year)
-0.09  -0.16  0.02  0.32  0.37  0.30  0.26  0.04  -0.11  -0.11  -0.12 
Ex.Rate 0.31  0.31  0.35  0.37  0.22  -0.05  0.01  0.09  0.08  0.15  0.10 
∆Ex.Rate -0.05  -0.08  0.00  0.00  -0.21  -0.17  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.16  -0.10 
∆CPI -0.16  -0.18 -0.11 -0.07  -0.19  -0.10  0.08  0.22  0.05  0.07  -0.06 
∆HH Loan -0.09  -0.04  0.02  0.00  0.10  0.53  0.36  -0.05  -0.28  -0.31  -0.24 
∆Loan 0.08  0.05 -0.02 -0.05  0.18  0.40  0.38  0.05  -0.12  -0.16  -0.15 
∆M1 0.07  0.00  0.02 -0.18  0.00  0.26  -0.26  -0.32  -0.16  -0.08  0.11 
∆M2 -0.43  -0.51 -0.39 -0.32  -0.22  -0.21  -0.22  -0.14  0.00  -0.05  -0.10 
∆Lf -0.40  -0.48 -0.42 -0.34  -0.19  -0.04  -0.13  -0.16  -0.05  -0.09  -0.15 
∆KOSPI 0.11  0.10  0.07  0.01  0.15  0.18  -0.06  -0.28  -0.07  0.07  0.24 
Source: the Bank of Korea, ECOS
Figure 20
Cross-correlation between ∆KOSPI and Xt±i: Korea
X -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8 +10
Call -0.13  -0.06  0.07  0.09  -0.12  -0.27  -0.14  -0.06  -0.09  -0.05  -0.01 
CD -0.13  -0.04  0.05  0.06  -0.12  -0.27  -0.11  -0.04  -0.09  -0.07  -0.04 
GB(1 year) -0.19  0.03  0.04  -0.02  -0.38  -0.41  0.04  0.04  -0.09  -0.08  0.03 
GB(3 year) -0.22  -0.07  -0.01  0.00  -0.20  -0.34  -0.15  -0.05  -0.15  -0.16  -0.09 
GB(5 year) -0.21  -0.06  0.00  0.00  -0.22  -0.30  -0.14  -0.07  -0.18  -0.18  -0.08 
GB(10 year) -0.02  -0.05  0.00  -0.02  -0.22  -0.18  -0.02  -0.14  -0.22  0.02  0.05 
Ex.Rate -0.02  0.00  0.11  0.25  0.16  0.04  -0.10  -0.11  -0.08  -0.01  0.02 
∆Ex.Rate 0.02  0.03  0.20  0.19  -0.32  -0.29  0.07  -0.12  0.07  0.04  0.00 
∆CPI -0.03  -0.04  0.06  0.14  -0.24  -0.13  -0.04  -0.03  -0.07  -0.08  0.12 
∆HH Loan 0.20  0.16  0.06  -0.36  -0.44  -0.06  0.26  0.06  -0.01  -0.06  0.06 
∆Loan 0.09  0.09  0.08  -0.25  -0.30  0.18  0.19  0.03  -0.10  -0.19  0.13 
∆M1 0.20  0.10  -0.11  -0.24  -0.06  0.20  0.14  -0.23  -0.13  -0.11  -0.13 
∆M2 -0.11  -0.16  -0.07  0.09  0.02  -0.15  -0.17  -0.17  -0.11  -0.07  0.04 
∆Lf -0.02  -0.12  -0.11  -0.05  -0.02  -0.11  -0.10  -0.14  -0.08  -0.06  -0.01 
∆HPI 0.24  0.07  -0.07  -0.28  -0.06  0.18  0.15  0.01  0.07  0.10  0.11 131
2.2   Factor Analysis   
As can be seen from the factor loadings, the first factor represents the 
interest rate movement. The second factor is somewhat unclear, but from the 
loadings of ∆CPI and ∆PPI, it is reasonable to assume that it represents inflation. 
The third factor represents liquidity, the forth factor represents real economic 
activities. We restrict our attention to these four factors since these make up 80% 
of the variance of this group of variables. 
The results of regression of asset prices on these factors are reported 
below. For house prices, except for the third factor the coefficients for the factors 
are all significant at 5%. The signs of the coefficients are all in line with theory. 
That is, the coefficient of interest rate is negative, and others are all positive. For 
stock prices, only two factors the first and the second are significant, and they are 
also in line with theory. 
From these analyses we find that interest rate and inflation may be the 
major driving forces of asset prices. The effects of liquidity and real economic 
activities on asset prices are not clear.
Figure 21
Factor Analysis for House Prices: Korea
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 Communality Uniqueness
∆M1 -0.04 -0.42 -0.15 0.26 0.43 -0.07 0.21 0.50 0.5
∆M2 0.58 0.49 -0.36 0.48 0.02 0.05 -0.15 0.95 0.05
∆Lf 0.49 0.23 -0.21 0.80 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.99 0.01
∆HH 
Loan
-0.05 -0.41 0.54 0.44 0.37 -0.18 0.27 0.90 0.1
∆Loan -0.05 -0.23 0.24 0.13 0.61 0.05 0.10 0.52 0.48
Call 0.92 0.39 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.03 1.00 0.00
GB (3 
year)
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
GB (5 
year)
0.99 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.03 1.00 0.00
CD 0.96 0.27 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.02 1.00 0.00
∆CPI 0.27 0.60 0.17 -0.17 0.45 0.1 -0.36 0.83 0.17
∆PPI 0.23 0.61 0.21 -0.29 0.40 0.15 -0.44 0.93 0.07
∆GDP -0.33 -0.69 -0.02 0.25 -0.07 0.36 0.23 0.84 0.16
GDP gap -0.06 -0.12 0.8 0.45 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.91 0.09
∆IP -0.23 -0.60 -0.19 0.06 0.07 0.53 0.21 0.78 0.22
U 0.22 -0.20 -0.81 -0.46 0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.96 0.04
∆KOSPI -0.38 -0.08 -0.34 -0.08 0.32 0.52 0.33 0.76 0.24
∆Ex.Rate 0.32 0.58 0.25 -0.10 0.46 -0.08 -0.07 0.74 0.26132
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 4.93 4.93 2.06 0.34 34%
F2 2.87 7.79 0.74 0.20 53%
F3 2.13 9.92 0.37 0.15 68%
F4 1.77 11.69 0.33 0.12 80%
F5 1.43 13.12 0.64 0.10 90%
F6 0.79 13.91 0.1 0.05 95%
F7 0.69 14.60 --- 0.05 100%
Total 14.6 75.97 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆HPI
∆HPI(%) = 0.87 -1.11×F1 +0.46×F2 +0.25×F3 +0.89×F4
(P-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.28) (0.00)
Adjusted R-square = 0.43
Figure 22
Factor Analysis for Stock Prices: Korea
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 Communality Uniqueness
∆M1 -0.24  0.19  0.29  -0.01  0.22  0.43  0.32  0.53 0.46
∆M2 0.65  0.43  0.02  0.61  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
∆Lf 0.44  0.27  0.25  0.71  -0.06  0.17  0.19  0.92 0.07
∆HH 
Loan
-0.24  -0.49  0.37  0.18  0.18  0.46  0.42  0.89 0.10
∆Loan -0.14  -0.19  0.14  0.01  0.48  0.34  0.27  0.51 0.48
Call 0.97  0.03  0.19  0.07  -0.02  0.00  -0.08  0.99 0.00
GB (3 
year)
0.88  0.06  0.42  -0.07  -0.02  -0.04  0.17  0.99 0.00
GB (5 
year)
0.88  0.09  0.39  -0.11  0.04  0.01  0.18  0.99 0.00
CD 0.96  0.05  0.24  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
∆CPI 0.53  -0.11  -0.32  0.12  0.59  -0.07  -0.19  0.81 0.18
∆PPI 0.51  -0.16  -0.37  0.05  0.63  -0.22  -0.23  0.95 0.04
∆GDP -0.71  0.09  0.69  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
GDP 
gap
-0.16  -0.72  0.35  0.39  0.18  0.13  0.10  0.90 0.09
∆IP -0.53  0.24  0.49  -0.11  0.09  -0.07  0.08  0.62 0.37
U 0.13  0.80  0.01  -0.57  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.00
∆HPI -0.58  -0.09  0.07  0.28  0.09  0.40  0.12  0.63 0.36
∆Ex.
Rate
0.56  -0.20  -0.24  0.11  0.47  0.24  -0.19  0.76 0.23133
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative
F1 6.27 6.27 4.33 0.43 43%
F2 1.94 8.21 0.04 0.13 56%
F3 1.90 10.11 0.33 0.13 69%
F4 1.56 11.68 0.19 0.10 80%
F5 1.36 13.05 0.51 0.09 89%
F6 0.85 13.90 0.21 0.05 95%
F7 0.64 14.54 --- 0.04 100%
Total 14.54 77.79 1.00
Principal Component Regression on ∆KOSPI
∆KOSPI(%) = 1.12 -6.35×F1 +0.45×F2 +0.12×F3 -1.56×F4
(P-value) (0.53) (0.00) (0.01) (0.49) (0.39)
Adjusted R-square = 0.24134
Figure 23
Factors: Korea
3.   The Effects of Asset Price Fluctuations   
The  effects  of  asset  price  fluctuations  can  be  assess  in  two  different 
directions. One direction is in terms of the effects on real economic activities, 
and the other is on the financial system. When asset prices change, consumption 
and/or investment can also change. There could be many channels through which 
asset prices affect consumption and/or investment, one of which, referenced quite 
often, is the balance sheet effect. That is, changes of values in any one of the 
items in the balance sheets of consumers or investors, in this case those of assets, 
would result in adjustments of the other items in the balance sheet. In the course 
of this adjustment process, whether instantaneous or in time, economic activities 
such as consumption or investment must be adjusted accordingly. Especially for 
consumption, this effect is called wealth effect.
   In the case of Korea, these effects are studied using different methods. 
Figure 24 reports the results from previous research on the issue. As indicated in 
the note, the magnitude of this effect varies by the method it is measured and the 
consumption categories by which this effect is measured. However small or large 
it may be, it is consistently confirmed that there exists wealth effect. It should be, 
however, be noted that this are mostly empirical studies, which may suffer from 
identification issues.135
Figure 24
Estimated Wealth Effects of House (Land) Price and Stock Price in Korea
House (Land) Price Stock Price












Kang (2006) 0.08 -
    Notes:  1) Short-term error correction relationship
  2) Long-term relationship
  3) Non-durable goods consumption
  4) Non-residential goods consumption
  5) Housing and furnishing consumption
If the wealth effect exists, it is quite straightforward to think of asset price 
fluctuations as not just instability in a particular market or even entire financial 
markets, rather it should be thought of as a broader economic instability since 
the real economic activities such as consumption and/or investment could also 
fluctuate along.
As discussed above, there are a few experiences that house prices or stock 
indices and the real economy (GDP growth or business cycles) move in a way 
that these studies identified as the wealth effect. In 1998, when the Asian financial 
crisis was at its peak, house prices as well as stock prices plummeted while the real 
economy suffered in every aspect. It is also apparent that this relationship has been 
apparent in the 2008 global financial turmoil. Nonetheless, it is essential to identify 
deeper the true causal relationship.
Another effect of asset price fluctuations is on financial system. Assets 
are  financed  mostly  through  financial  system  one  way  or  another,  asset  price 
fluctuations are inevitably linked to the soundness of financial system. It is because 
the balance sheets of financial institutions, as well as those of borrowers, feature 
assets in them, although recent experiences show that well developed, or too 
much developed financial instruments such as structured CDOs, together with the 
accounting practice of off- balance sheet contingent obligations, may disguise this 
fact.
While the links between asset prices and real economic activities are 
widely studied and accumulated quite a few tangible results, those between asset 
prices and financial stability did not produce concrete results. One of the reasons is 
the difficulties in measuring financial soundness. However, the common measures 136
for financial soundness, including Loan-deposit ratio, Liquidity ratio, BIS capital 
adequacy ratio, and so forth, do coincide with asset price fluctuations in certain 
occasions, implying that asset price fluctuations contribute significantly to the 
health of the financial system.
Figure 25 
Financial Ratios of Korean Commercial Banks
4.     Conclusion
Asset prices in Korea have shown several episodes of large movements 
over the decades. The patterns of such movements are studied in this chapter. One 
of them is that asset prices are driven by a number of factors. The factors affecting 
asset price fluctuations are both financial and macroeconomic factors. In addition, it 
seems that asset price fluctuations have considerable impact on the macroeconomy 
and/or financial markets in return. 
It should be cautioned, however, that these analyses show only a partial 
picture. The possibility of bubbles should be taken seriously when these factors 
cannot explain the asset price fluctuations with a reasonable degree. 137
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CHAPTER 5
EQUITY PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKS: 
THE CASE OF MALAYSIA
By Muhamad Shukri Abdul Rani1
1.   Introduction
  Historically,  episodes  of  asset  price  bubble  boom  and  bust  are  not 
uncommon in the world economy. Among the notable examples are the collapse 
of equity prices in the U.S. market during the Great Depression of the 1930s and 
Japan’s property market bubble bust of the 1980s and 1990s. In Malaysia, the sharp 
decline in equity prices following the onset of the Asian financial crisis is another 
good example. Clearly, such developments are a challenge to central bankers, who 
carry the heavy responsibility of identifying the bubble ex-ante and subsequently, 
mitigating the deleterious repercussions arising from its bust. 
  Given  such  importance,  it  is  vital  for  us  to  understand  how  equity 
price bubbles can impact on the Malaysian financial system and, in general, the 
domestic economy. To do so, the author aims to investigate the following research 
questions: 
What could be said about the relationship between the Malaysian equity  •	
market and other important macroeconomic variables? 
What are the ramifications of equity price boom-bust episodes on the  •	
domestic business cycle and financial system soundness? 
What were the policy and measures that were undertaken in the past by the  •	
central bank in the wake of these bubbles?
What lessons could be drawn from this study?  •	
It is to be noted the discussion on the existence of house price bubble 
and house price misalignments in Malaysia is excluded from this paper as other 
1.    Senior  Executive  of  the  Monetary  Assessment  and  Strategy  Department  of  Bank  Negara 
Malaysia. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the official position of Bank Negara Malaysia. Special thanks to colleagues from the Monetary 
Assessment and Strategy Department and Financial Surveillance of Bank Negara Malaysia for 
their valuable comments and suggestions. As always, the author is responsible for all remaining 
errors.
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authors, notably Charles and Senhadji (2002), Ng (2006) and Glindro, Subhanji, 
Szeto and Zhu (2008) have covered these topics quite extensively2.  
 
  This paper is organised in the following manner. This section will continue 
with a short discourse on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and its role 
in the development of the domestic economy. It then looks at recent trends in 
macroeconomic and financial variables vis-à-vis the Kuala Lumpur Composite 
Index  (KLCI).  Section  2,  meanwhile,  analyses  the  possible  causes  of  equity 
price fluctuations by analysing the general trends in several key macroeconomic 
variables relative to the stock exchange. It also tries to draw some stylised facts 
from several cross correlation and Granger causality tests and principal component 
analysis  (PCA).  Section  3  discusses  the  effects  of  asset  price  boom-busts  on 
private consumption and how these episodes could amplify the business cycle. 
The effects on financial system soundness are also explored here. Section 4 looks 
at the policy responses taken in the past by the authorities in relation to extreme 
price fluctuations, while the final section concludes this paper.
1.1   The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange – An Introduction
The  Kuala  Lumpur  Stock  Exchange  (KLSE)  was  established  in  1973 
following  the  cessation  of  currency  interchangeability  between  Malaysia  and 
Singapore. Over the course of many years, it has positioned itself as an important 
conduit for investors, both domestic and international, to raise funds for their 
business and investment activities. For comparison, at the end of 1981, there were 
253 listed firms on the KLSE with a total market capitalisation of RM48.2 billion. 
That number rose to 736 companies in 1998 (BNM, 1999) and to date, there are 
957 companies on the KLSE, with a total market capitalisation of RM936.5 billion 
(BNM, 2009). The sheer market size and higher private sector participation in 
the stock market reflect its importance to the domestic economy, in line with the 
Malaysian government drive to diversify the sources of domestic finance away 
from the traditional bank lending channel (Ang, 2009).
In the past, several initiatives to enhance the depth, breadth and efficiency 
of the KLSE were implemented. This included the establishment of the Second 
Board in 1988, the introduction of computerised trading in 1989 replacing the 
2.     For example, Charles and Senhadji (2002) find strong evidence of large commercial real estate 
cycles in Malaysia, where property prices and rent inflation rose steadily prior to 1997. Ng 
(2006) shows that house prices were indeed misaligned from their fundamental values prior to 
the Asian financial crisis. In a study of house price determinants in nine Asia-Pacific economies, 
Glindro, Subhanji, Szeto and Zhu (2008) find significant deviations in Malaysian house prices 
from their predicted fundamental values and the presence of house price bubble preceding the 
Asian financial crisis. However, both papers agree that there is little evidence to support the 
presence of a bubble in the housing market post crisis. Indeed, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
has imposed several monetary and banking measures in 1995 and later in 1997 in order to deal 
with excessive speculation in the housing market. For additional information, see BNM Annual 
Report (1995 & 1997), and BNM (1999).        141
open outcry system, the corporatisation of stockbroking companies in 1990 and the 
setting up of a capital market regulator, the Securities Commission (SC), in 1993 
(Isa and Ahmad, 1996). The latter reflects the urgent need for a market regulator
in view of the growing complexity and sophistication of the market, as well as the 
need to minimise duplication of supervisory oversight among various government 
agencies (BNM, 1999). In addition to the main board, Kuala Lumpur Composite 
Index  (KLCI),  the  Malaysian  Exchange  Securities  Dealing  and  Automated 
Quotation (MESDAQ) was established in 1997 as an avenue for small, high growth 
potential and high technology companies to raise funds (BNM, 1999).
In April 2004, the KLSE was renamed Bursa Malaysia (Bursa) following 
its demutualisation exercise. The demutualisation strategy was pursued by the 
management of the Bursa in order to improve its competitiveness and to respond to 
global demand by making it more market-oriented, efficient and customer driven 
(Bursa Malaysia, 2004). The main Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) was 
later renamed as FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI in July 2009, following the adoption 
of the FTSE global index standards by Bursa (Bursa Malaysia, 2009).
1.2   Trends in Macroeconomic and Financial Variables Relative to    
  the KLCI
Over the years, the evolution of the KLCI has been shaped by a multitude 
of factors.  Following the global economic downturn in the 1980s, the government 
recognised the importance of diversifying the sources of economic growth away 
from the traditional commodity exports and public sector driven towards higher 
private sector participation. This necessitated the creation of an efficient capital 
market, especially the equity and bond markets, to complement the role of the 
banking system as a conduit for financial distribution. 
In  essence  several  financial  liberalisation  measures  were  undertaken 
during the 1980s and early 1990s as part of the measures to create a deep, efficient 
and competitive domestic capital market. Apart from the interest rate liberalisation 
of the late 1970s, other measures included the leveling of the playing field for 
all financial institutions and the introduction of a single financial system act, the 
Banking and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA) to govern all financial institutions 
in Malaysia3. Furthermore, the creation of SC in 1993 as a capital market watchdog 
was  also  an  important  milestone  for  Malaysia.  Collectively,  these  important 
policies marked the starting steps toward positioning the domestic capital market 
on a stronger footing, both regionally and internationally.
3.    For further discussion on financial reforms in Malaysia, see Hussin, Ng and Ahmad (1993), 
Hussein (1994) and Yusof, Hussin, Alowi, Sing and Singh (1994).142
The KLCI has grown in prominence since the early 1990s as an outlet 
for the private sector to raise funds (Figure 1). Mirroring this trend, the market 
capitalisation of the KLCI rose from RM131.7 billion at end-1990 to RM663.8 
billion at end-2008 (peaking at RM1106.2 billion at end-2007). In terms of market 
size relative to nominal GDP, the local bourse has seen its fair share of activity 
(Figure 2). Following the financial liberalisation of the early 1990s, its market 
size grew to over 350% relative to nominal GDP in 1993 and hovered below that 
historical figure over the next few years. The Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, 
however, resulted in a sharp contraction in performance of the local stock market, 
where it declined sharply to below 500 points. In the following decade, the market 
size of the KLCI remained fairly stable at about 100-150% relative to nominal 
GDP. In 2007, it recorded a higher market capitalisation of over RM1,000 billion. 
The decline in the equity market capitalisation in 2008, however, was due to 
external shocks as investors grew anxious following the financial crisis in several 
advanced economies and the higher prospect of a severe global economic downturn 
in 2009.
Figure 1
Source of Private Sector Financing
 Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (various issues)143
Figure 2
KLCI Annual Market Capitalisation & Percent of Nominal GDP
Several macroeconomic variables have also exerted some influence on 
the KLCI (the list of selected macroeconomic variables is provided in Appendix 
1). Among them is the performance of the domestic economy, measured by the 
real GDP. In the following figure, one could clearly see that the KLCI and real 
GDP tend to co-move, especially after the financial liberalisation period of the 
early 1990s (Figure 3). On the basis of a cross-correlation analysis, the KLCI 
seems to lead real GDP by about two quarters. A Granger causality test indicates 
the causality as bi-directional. One could interpret this as saying that the current 
share prices may contain information about future output growth and hence tend 
to be forward looking. On the other hand, higher share prices could also enhance 
consumer and business confidence about the future and contribute towards higher 
aggregate consumption and investment (IMF, 2000). 144
Figure 3
KLCI & Real Output
In Figure 4, indicators of domestic money supply and credit tend to co-move 
with share prices. A potential explanation for this is perhaps that, as equity prices 
increase, they are very likely to create additional wealth effects for investors. Such 
wealth effects could encourage these investors, for instance, to take up new loans 
in order to expand their businesses or even entice them to spend on other goods 
and services. These transactions are then reflected in higher measures of domestic 
credit extended by the financial system and money supply. It could also be due to 
the fact that as equity prices increase over time, investors’ risk appetite may rise 
as well given the higher expected return from riskier assets relative to safer assets. 
This point towards an increase in the ringgit volume of financial transactions and 
hence measures of broad money, a line of argument similar to Friedman (1988).145
Figure 4
KLCI & Monetary Indicators
The  inflows  of  short-term  capital  are  also  another  important  factor 
in determining the movements of the KLCI (Figure 5). To a large extent, the 
presence of foreign funds contributed to the significant increase in the KLCI in 
the early 1990s and 2005-07. In the first episode, given the lower interest rates 
in the advanced economies in the late 1980s, foreign investors were attracted to 
regional stock markets, including Malaysia, as they searched for higher returns. In 
1992-1993, for instance, the cumulative inflow of short-term capital was RM24.5 
billion, with the ‘error and omissions’ component recording large positive flows in 
the latter year (BNM 1993)4. In addition, the presence of foreign investors has also 
spurred more active participation of local investors, who tend to react to fresh news 
and market movements. Their participations further exacerbated price volatility in 
the stock market (BNM, 1994). 
Heightened expectations of an un-pegging of the ringgit from the US 
dollar resulted in a significant inflow of foreign funds in 2005. Since then, the local 
bourse has remained attractive to foreign investors on the back of better economic 
performance. In 2008, the reversal of these flows contributed to the decline in share 
prices as foreign investors existed the market following the global financial crisis. 
As financial conditions slowly improved, the regional equity markets, including 
Malaysia, have witnessed the return of these foreign funds. This is reflected by the 
turn around in equity prices in recent periods. 
4.    Aziz (1994) determines that the inflows for the purchase of stocks in 1993 increased by RM19 
billion, of which two thirds of the inflows came from Singapore. This reflected investment by 
foreign funds made via their offices in the Lion State. 146
Figure 5
KLCI & Portfolio Inflows
In Figure 6, one could observe a dichotomy in the relationship between 
short-term interest rates and share prices before and after the Asian financial crisis. 
Prior to the crisis, a main consideration for monetary policy was the prevalence 
of price pressures, a by-product from strong economic growth, robust demand 
pressures and supply bottlenecks in the production chains. As a result, the statutory 
reserve requirement (SRR) was tightened on several occasions, such as in May 
1992 and January 1994, in order to stem the rising demand pressures. After the 
crisis, a greater deal of attention was paid by the authorities towards supporting the 
economic recovery. As inflationary pressures remained subdued, domestic interest 
rates were kept relatively low and stable to provide support for the restructuring of 
the financial sector. These two contrasting episodes reflect the notion that monetary 
policy was never used as an instrument to buttress the equity market. Instead, it 
was used to steer the economy towards the path of recovery. 147
Figure 6
KLCI & Domestic Interbank Rates
2.   The Causes of Asset Price Fluctuations
2.1   Cross Correlation between Share Prices and Selected        
  Macroeconomic Variables  
In this section, we will look closer at the determinants of equity price 
fluctuations in Malaysia. A series of cross-correlation tests between domestic share 
prices and 13 selected macroeconomic variables were conducted using quarterly 
data, from 1991 to 2007 (see Appendix 1 for data description). One must note 
that these tests do not suggest causality between these variables, as the cross-
correlation analysis only point towards possible lead and lag relationships. This 
exercise, however, is useful as it tends to shed some insights on the dynamics 
governing these variables and their relationships.
The empirical results are presented in Table 1. In general, in terms of cross 
correlation, share prices seem to be leading domestic liquidity indicators, represented 
by measures of money supply (M1 and M3) and total loans outstanding. This is 
also true for real GDP. This affirms our earlier observation that share prices could 
contain information about future output growth and domestic liquidity conditions 
given its ability to better reflect market expectations.
On  the  contrary,  we  find  that  some  exchange  rate  indicators  (NEER 
and  REER)  lead  share  prices,  while  the  ringgit  exchange  rate  indicators  are 
contemporaneously related. The cross correlation results between domestic price 
indicators and share prices are somewhat mixed. The producer price inflation (PPI) 
lags share prices, as opposed to the consumer price inflation (CPI). 148
Finally, one could find a contemporaneous relationship between domestic 
interest  rates  [average  overnight  interbank  rate  (AOIR)  and  average  1-month 
interbank rate (1MIR)]. This suggests to us that the current level of interest rate 
may not be an important determinant to the KLCI. 
2.2   Granger Causality Tests
  Results from the Granger causality tests (see Table 2) seem to indicate 
several interesting results. First, there was a bi-directional causality between the 
KLCI and real GDP over several lags. This supports our earlier discussion on the 
potential for KLCI to contain information about future economic development, 
while higher real GDP could instead result in a greater expansion for the local 
stock market.
  Second, the KLCI was found to be leading the total loan outstanding of 
the banking system. This finding lends support to the existence of a credit channel 
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the Malaysian economy. For 
example, the  wealth  effects  from  higher  share  prices  could  be  translated into 
improved balance sheet positions of local firms. This may in turn entice them into 
taking up additional loans as a mean to either supplement their working capital 
or for other investment purposes, and thus, contribute towards higher aggregate 
demand.
  Third, contrary to results from the cross-correlation analysis, both the 
level and change of the ringgit/US dollar exchange rate seem to Granger cause the 
KLCI. This result seems to contradict Ibrahim’s (2000), who finds bi-directional 
Granger causality relationships between the exchange rate indicators and the stock 
market. My results may perhaps suggest that variations in the ringgit exchange rate 
may have played some role in determining the direction of the KLCI during the 
period of interest. For instance, it is possible that expectations of an exchange rate 
appreciation could have spurred portfolio inflows into the KLCI, as played out in 
the run up to the unpegging of the ringgit in 2005.
  Finally, both measures of short-term interest rates seem to Granger cause 
the KLCI. This result, however, should be interpreted carefully given our earlier 
graphical analysis. As pointed out, monetary policy was never intended as an 
instrument to dictate the movements of the stock market, but was used instead 














































Granger Causality Test Between KLCI and X151
2.3   Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
  Building upon our earlier findings, we move on to the PCA framework 
in  order  to  identify  potential  factors  that  could  be  derived  from  the  above 
macroeconomic variables. In particular, we are interested in the relationship that 
may exist between these factors and share prices. The advantage of the PCA lies 
in its ability to deal with large datasets, without the need to first predetermine a 
theoretical relationship, as well as its capacity to derive common factors that underlie 
these data. We are, in other words, allowing the data to speak for themselves.  
  Results for the PCA are presented in Table 3. In all, there are 13 identified 
factors, with different Eigenvalues. Being parsimonious, we proceed to select 
the most likely factors based on pre-determined thresholds, namely those factors 
with an Eigenvalue close to 1 and a cumulative proportion of no more than 80%. 
This would leave us with four potential factors, named as F1, F2, F3 and F4, 
respectively. We proceed to graph each of these factors (Figures 7-10), in the 
interest of identifying potential trends and patterns that could be associated with 
the various macroeconomic variables. Based on a simple eyeball test, one could 
make out the similarities in trend between F1 and real output, F2 with domestic 
interest rates, F3 with consumer and producer price inflation and F4 with domestic 
liquidity conditions.  It must be mentioned that the first factor, F1, accounts for 
31% of the variability in the data and should prove to be an important factor for 
this exercise.
We then move on to regress these factors (F1, F2, F3 and F4) on domestic 
share prices over a sample period from 1985 to 2009. An AR (1) term is added to 
take into account the possibility of serial correlation in the series. Results from this 
exercise are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The regression results from the model 
suggest that only factor F1 is positive and significant at the 5% critical level. 
Indeed, F1, which encapsulates all economic shocks that are reflected in the real 
economy, remains relevant to the equity market and any significant shift in it could 
have a profound repercussion on the latter. In the whole scheme of things, these 
results support our earlier discussion on the interaction between the real GDP and 
KLCI.  152









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.  The Effects of Equity Price Boom and Bust
3.1   How do Equity Prices Amplify Private Consumption and      
  Aggregate Investment? 
  In  general,  the  booms  and  busts  of  asset  prices  do  have  significant 
repercussions on the economy. The large decline in equity and housing prices in the 
advanced economies, for example, has led to further deterioration in households’ 
and firms’ balance sheet and resulted in a deep global economic recession in 
2009. Likewise, it also contributed to financial fragility among major financial 
institutions and has had some impact on domestic demand conditions in these 
economies. Hence, it is vital for us to understand how and to what extent do local 
equity prices affect private consumption and aggregate investment in Malaysia. 
To provide support for the discussion, the author draws some observations from 
studies that have been conducted for (of) several advanced and emerging market 
economies, including Malaysia.
3.1.1   Impact on Private Consumption
  There are several channels through which asset prices could affect private 
consumption. The permanent income hypothesis, in its simplest form, suggests that 
household consumption behaviors are dependent on their expected long-term income 
and little on transitory or short-term changes to income (Mankiw, 1992). Given the 
fact that the returns from financial and real assets are part of households’ income, 
permanent changes in the price of these assets would have a material impact on 
the consumption pattern of an individual person. The second channel, meanwhile, 
suggests that private consumption is a function of individuals’ expectations of their 
future income. Given that real asset prices could contain information about the 
future, e.g. higher output growth could lead to higher disposable income, they 
would exert some influence on current consumption (Otoo, 1999). 
  Moving on, some empirical studies on advanced economies have shown 
that the wealth effects on private consumption from a 10% change in equity prices 
range from 0.1-0.7% (IMF, 2002; Ludwig and Slok, 2004; and Slacek, 2006). 
The magnitude is highest for the US economy, given the higher equity holding 
by household as a percent of net wealth compared to Japan and several other 
European countries (excluding the UK). For developing economies, including 
Malaysia, research by Funke (2004) and IMF (2008) have shown that the wealth 
effects on private consumption from a 10% increase in stock prices are smaller, on 
average, from 0.2% to 0.4%.   This result is hardly surprising and could be due to 
the fact that the equity holding among Malaysian households is smaller compared 
to other developed economies. Another possible explanation is that the distribution 
of equity holding and the income derived from such holding may be concentrated 
among certain income groups and hence, could be insignificant to the majority of 156
the population. In such cases, holding of other assets such as property could be an 
alternative option for the local populace.  
3.1.2  Impact on Aggregate Investment  
  According to the IMF (2000), there are at least three channels through 
which the stock markets could affect aggregate investment. The first channel for 
which this to take place is via the equity price channel (Tobin-Q), where higher 
equity prices tend to increase the net worth of firms. This helps to lower the cost of 
acquiring new capital for firms and could result in higher aggregate investment. A 
second channel is called the ‘flexible accelerator” channel, where the information 
content of current equity prices about future output could impact current investment 
(Jorgansen, 1963). The final channel, meanwhile, works through the credit channel 
of the monetary transmission mechanism. Increasing share prices tends to improve 
firms’ balance sheet, inducing banks to lower the cost of borrowing, as the value of 
collaterals pledged to them increase. 
  As mentioned earlier, the observations in this sub-section are largely drawn 
from the large body of literature currently available to the author. In particular, the 
author draws the reader’s attention towards three research papers that are relevant 
to Malaysia. To begin with, empirical evidence on the effects of stock market 
on  aggregate  investment  is  somewhat  mixed.  In  certain  advanced  economies, 
notably in the US, Australia and the United Kingdom, the effects are much more 
pronounced (IMF, 2000). For emerging market economies, both IMF (2000) and 
Hesse (2008) conclude that a 10% change in equity prices would lead to a 1% 
change in private investment. Similarly, for a pool of 31 countries, including 
Malaysia, Peltonen, Sousa and Vansteenkiste (2009) conclude that equity prices 
have a positive and significant impact on investment. According to them, for every 
10% increase in share prices, investment would increase by 0.1-0.5%. Meanwhile, 
Ibrahim (2008) employs a neoclassical investment theory in order to determine 
the dynamic interaction between the stock market and aggregate investment in 
Malaysia. He defines the aggregate investment as a function of real output, real 
rental cost of capital and real stock prices. Empirical evidences based on a vector-
error correction model (VECM) suggest that the stock market has a significant and 
positive impact on the aggregate investment over the long run. 
As a comparison, the effect of property prices on both private consumption 
and aggregate investment in continental Europe, Australia and Japan is somewhat 
larger relative to the equity market. This could be due to the more widespread 
usage of property as collaterals against loans and the important role played by the 
banking system in financial intermediation process (IMF, 2000; Kent and Lowe, 
1998; and De Bondt, 1999). With regard to Malaysia, Hui (2009) finds the effect 
from property prices to aggregate investment to be larger than the effect from the 
equity market.   157
  In sum, the above sub-sections demonstrate that equity prices do have a 
role in influencing both private consumption and aggregate investment. However, 
the magnitude and size of the impact are believed to be somewhat smaller relative 
to property prices. This could be due to the smaller holding of equity among the 
local population and the heavier reliance of households and businesses on the 
banking system for loans. Finally, property prices tend to be more stable when 
compared to share prices, resulting in stable return on investment. 
3.2   What are the Effects of Equity Price Fluctuations on the Soundness 
of Financial System?
The channeling of large short-term capital flows to the equity market, 
for instance, had contributed to the build-up of an equity price bubble in 19935. 
Furthermore, the sustained increase in domestic credit for the purchase of shares 
extended by the banking system in the mid-1990s, where it reached over 9% of 
total banking system loans in 1997 (1988: 1.9%)6, could have potentially fueled 
the equity bubble itself. 
The effects of equity price fluctuations on the financial system, however, 
were most pronounced during the Asian financial crisis. As the crisis unfolded in 
the second half of 1997, several important developments came to bear. Foreign 
investors  began  to  exit  from  the  equity  market  following  the  panic  over  the 
deteriorating  economic  conditions.  This  contributed  to  the  poor  performance 
of the KLCI, which stood at 610.8 points at end-December 1997 (June 1997: 
1053.9 points). As a consequence, this contributed to financial stress among listed 
companies and weakened their financial position. Following the crisis, the banking 
system NPL for the purchase of shares and securities swelled to RM2.8 billion or 
7.1% of total loan outstanding to the sector at end-December 1997 (RM0.3 billion 
or 0.9% as at end-June 1997). Reflecting the severity of the impact of the crisis on 
equity prices, the NPL for this type of loan later increased to 23.2% as the end of 
1998.
Furthermore,  there  were  concerns  over  the  disruption  to  the  financial 
intermediation process arising from the financial crisis. This was attributed to the 
tighter liquidity conditions (reflected by the higher deposit rates) due to funds 
leaving the financial markets and the flight to safety by some depositors toward 
larger  domestic  banking  institutions.  Finally,  the  decline  in  asset  prices  and
5.    Rangle and Pillay (2009) state there were at least seven identified boom-bust cycles since the 
inception of the KLSE, including 1993, 1994 and 1997. Meanwhile, Mokhtar, Md. Nassir and 
Hassan (2006) suggest at least two episodes of equity price bubble in the local stock market, 
namely during 1994-1996 and 1999-2003. Their results also suggest that the size of the equity 
price bubble before the Asian financial crisis was much bigger when compared to the post-
crisis period. Finally, Sarno and Taylor (1999) find evidences of a bubble bust in several equity 
markets, including Malaysia, during the East Asian financial crisis
6.    See Table 6 for more details.158
subsequent depreciation in collateral values, coupled with the deterioration in 
loan quality and adverse selection problems, had forced financial institutions to 
safeguard their balance sheet. This could be inferred from Table 6, which shows 
the total loan growth for the banking system had declined sharply from 26.6% in 
1996 to -5.3% in 1999. 
Table 6 
Banking System (BS) Indicators and KLCI
4.   The Policy Response
As highlighted throughout this paper, it is imperative for central banks to 
pay close attention to the development in asset prices, since large and violent swings 
in asset prices could have substantial bearing on the final outcome for inflation and 
economic growth. Furthermore, as equity prices deviate too much and too long 
from their perceived fundamental values, the risk of a bubble builds up and the 
probability of it going bust increases. Given the detrimental effects to the financial 
system and the wider economy, the monetary authority has the responsibility to 
address such imbalances in order to realign the economy to its long-run potential. 
The question is how? Two schools of thought have emerged from this debate. The 
“Jackson Hole Consensus7” promotes policy responses to asset prices only to the 
7.    See Blinder and Reis (2005), Mishkin (2008).159
extent that they signal current and future changes to inflation or the output gap 
(Bernanke and Getler, 1999; and Gruen, Plumb and Stone, 2005). Here, central 
banks should not attempt to prick the bubble or lean against it, but instead should 
follow a ‘mop-up’ strategy after the bubble has burst. The basis for this argument 
lies on three conditions: (1) asset price bubbles are hard to identify, (2) even if 
policymakers are able to identify a bubble, the effect of monetary policy on asset 
price bubbles is highly uncertain and (3) monetary policy is a blunt instrument that 
does not differentiate between asset classes (Mishkin, 2008).
On the contrary, there is support for an active role for central banks in 
dealing with asset price bubble, the so-called ‘leaning against the wind’ school 
(Bordo and Jeanne, 2002; Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio, English and Filardo, 
2003; Cecchetti, Gernberg and Wadhani, 2002; Issing, 2009; and White, 2009). 
These authors stress the need for monetary policy to be forward looking and to 
mitigate the risk of an asset price bubble. Responding asymmetrically to asset price 
bubble, as proposed by the Jackson Hole Consensus, could instead lay the seed for 
future asset price bubbles (Issing, 2009). Second, there is a strong basis for actions, 
especially in cases where there are signs of overheating or overvaluation across 
several classes of assets. Finally, the welfare losses to the economy following 
a bubble bust are large, which could affect the financial system soundness and 
private sector solvency (IMF, 2000). 
Given the above discussion, the Malaysian authorities have always viewed 
that the existence of an equity price bubble and the risks that are associated with 
it as a source of great concern, with the potential to destabilise the domestic 
economy. Past experiences in the 1980s and 1990s have shown that the impact of 
a stock market boom and bust was not confined to the financial market alone, but 
also affected a large segment of the financial system and the economy. Back then, 
the authorities had to contend not only with restoring the health of several banking 
institutions, but also regaining consumer confidence in the financial system (BNM, 
1994). In addition, the authorities also recognised the limitation of using interest 
rates as a tool to combat asset price bubbles, a line of reasoning shared by Mishkin 
(2008). If domestic interest rates were raised above international levels, it could 
lead to further inflows of short-term capital and add fuel to asset price inflation. 
Being a blunt instrument, raising interest rates may instead be detrimental to the 
economy and could result in output losses and higher unemployment down the 
road8. 
The Central Bank, on its part, was clearly concerned about this development. 
In response, the Central Bank undertook several important policy measures in an
attempt to assuage the effects of the equity price bubble on the domestic banking 
system. In April 1997, the Central Bank imposed credit controls in order to limit 
the proportion of loans extended for the purchase of stocks and shares. Specifically, 
8.    Aziz (1994) talks about a similar line of argument for not using exchange rate to address 
imbalances arising from short-term capital flows.160
credit ceilings of 15% of total outstanding loans for commercial banks and 30% 
for merchant banks were imposed for credit facilities secured by stocks and shares. 
These limits were defined to cover credit facilities granted for the purchase of stocks 
and shares and units of unit trust funds, including loans to holding and investment 
companies (BNM, 1997). These ceilings were later raised to 20% for commercial 
banks, while the limit for merchant banks remained unchanged (BNM, 1998). As 
a result of these measures, banking system loan growth for the purchase of shares 
declined sharply to 16.7% in 1998 (1997: 59.1%, 1996: 30.5%).
Table 7
Summary of Stock Market Measures
In addition, these measures were complemented by other policies taken 
by the SC and Bursa. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, for instance, Bursa 
had announced a set of rules to ensure orderly and fair market trading of Malaysian 
securities in August 1998 in a move to enhance investor protection and improving 
overall efficiency in the local bourse (see Table 7). The SC has also introduced 
several measures in an attempt to maintain systemic stability during the burst of 
the bubble. This was done to allay investor fears of losses in view of the financial 
stress that some stockbroking firms had faced during the Asian financial crisis 
(BNM, 1999). 
These initiatives have helped to position the financial system on a stronger 
footing to cushion the impact from external shocks and meet future challenges. 
The current global financial crisis has demonstrated the resilience and soundness 
of the Malaysian banking system, where financial intermediation has continued 
unhindered.  Indeed,  measures  of  financial  system  soundness  suggest  that  the 
banking system is much more fundamentally stronger than it was a decade ago 
(see Table 8)9. 
9.    As at end-November 2009, the RWCR for the overall financial system stood at 14.6%, while the 
net NPL ratio (3-month classification) was at 1.9%.161
Table 8
Financial Position of Financial Sector Pre- and Post-Crisis
In summary, the Malaysian experience has shown that the collective effort 
of various organisations, such as the Central Bank and SC, have paved the way 
for a more effective mechanism in dealing with equity price bubbles. The crux of 
the matter is the recognition that all supervisory, prudential and risk management 
initiatives should be coherent and tailored in a way that they not only tackle the 
issue at hand, but also support the overall policy objective of promoting a sound 
financial system and sustainable economic growth over the long run. 
5.   Conclusion
  This paper has attempted to highlight the deleterious effects of equity price 
bubbles on the Malaysian financial sector and, in general, the economy. It has also 
brought to the front the responses of the authorities in dealing with the matter and 
how such episodes could be mitigated in the future. In short, despite the difficulty 
in identifying asset price bubbles ex-ante, the Central Bank continues to carry the 
heavy responsibility in finding ways and means to address and mitigate the issue.
  In sum, the following points conclude this paper. First, the equity market 
serves as an important conduit for the channeling of funds in the economy, besides 
serving as a benchmark for the level of financial efficiency and deepening in
Malaysia. While these positive attributes of a deep and well functioning equity 
market  are  welcome,  the  potential  for  equity  prices  to  be  out  of  touch  with 
economic fundamentals and driven by irrational expectations are real and high. 
In such an environment, the risk of large and extreme swings in equity prices 
could result in significant losses to both firms and the financial sector. This could 
affect both consumers and businesses confidence, resulting in lower aggregate 
spending and investment and, ultimately, real output. Herein lies the true purpose 
of financial regulations and sound supervisory frameworks as guardians of the 
financial system. Finally, the Malaysian approach towards emphasising a more 162
prudent approach towards the stock market is worth noting. Besides introducing 
more robust supervisory and regulatory frameworks to govern the banking system, 
the Central Bank has strived to ensure both consumers and investors are protected 
and well informed of the inherent risks that are associated with the equity market. 
This reflects the Central Bank’s recognition of the importance of the equity market 
to  the  economy  and  its  contribution  towards  promoting  sustainable  economic 
growth.163
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: List of Macroeconomic Variables
Series Variable Source
Ser01 Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) BNM, MSB
Ser02 M1, Monetary aggregate BNM, MSB
Ser03 M3, Monetary aggregate BNM, MSB
Ser04 Real gross domestic product (GDP) BNM, MSB
Ser05 Banking system total loan outstanding BNM, MSB
Ser06 Nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)
International Financial 
Statistics, CD-ROM
Ser07 Real effective exchange rate (REER)
International Financial 
Statistics, CD-ROM
Ser08 Change ringgit/US dollar exchange rate BNM, MSB
Ser09 Ringgit/US dollar exchange rate (level) BNM, USD
Ser10 Producer Price Index (PPI)
Department of Statistics 
Malaysia
Ser11 Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia
Ser12 Average overnight interbank rate (AOIR) BNM, MSB
Ser13 Average one-month interbank rate (1MIR)  BNM, MSB
Ser14 Output gap
Author’s calculation (Hodrick 
Prescott filter)169
CHAPTER 6
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKS: 
THE CASE OF MONGOLIA 
by Batnyam Damdinsuren1
1.   Introduction
  The Mongolian economy is adversely impacted by supply-side shocks. 
Capital inflows and aggregate demand of Mongolian economy increased due to the 
relatively stable economic environment over the past several years. The large capital 
inflows contributed in promoting economic growth and export performance. It also 
led to rapid monetary expansion, accelerating inflation, loss of competitiveness, 
and a rapid increase in securities and house prices.
  The initial conditions of asset price bubble that formed in Mongolia are 
fully consistent with the yardstick of Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2000)2 
who define ‘bubble period’ from the viewpoint of the co-existence of three factors, 
notably, a marked increase in asset prices; an expansion of monetary aggregates 
and credit; and over-heating of economic activity.
  The turbulence that originated in the United States subprime mortgage 
market triggered a full-blown global financial crisis from the second half of 2008 
and caused complications in the Mongolian financial sector. Due to the rapid 
falling price of mining products, the foreign trade deficit of Mongolia increased, 
just like the rest of the other economies which are dependent on this sector. It 
resulted in a decrease of foreign currency reserve and weakening of the domestic 
currency  against  foreign  currencies. Also  the  domestic  banking  sector  lacked 
financial resources as a result of the retraction of loans from banks and enterprises 
by foreign institutions, delay in investment proposals, and decrease in workers’ 
remittances from overseas.  Thus, a lack of capital caused a shortage of resources 
within the banking sector, and it interrupted the issuance of loans. As a result of 
these developments, asset price decreased dramatically within a short period of 
time due to a decline in the demand for all kinds of assets, such as house, equity 
and land.
 
1.     Economist attached to the Monetary Policy and Research Department, Bank of Mongolia. The 
opinions expressed in this paper are that of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of 
the Bank of Mongolia. This paper was written as part of the research study project of the South 
East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre.
2.    Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, and Shigenori Shiratsuka, “The Asset Price Bubble and 
Monetary Policy: Experience of Japan’s Economy in the Late 1980s and its Lessons”.
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All these developments have been carefully observed by the Bank of Mongolia. 
Due to the negative impact of asset price bust, the response of the monetary 
authority is the focus of much attention. This research is a preliminary study of the 
phenomenon of the asset price bubble in Mongolia.
Trends in Asset Prices and Macroeconomic Variables 1.1 
In recent years up until 2008, the mining and construction sectors saw 
an economic boom. Investment and consumption of both the private and public 
sectors increased dramatically, with improvement in the country’s current account 
and fiscal position. The economic growth of Mongolia, however, was adversely 
impacted by the slump in global prices for copper and other export commodities.
Figure 1 
Real GDP Growth and Output GAP
  As shown in Figure 1, the output gap increased progressively until Q2 
of 2008. It was one of the signs of economic over-heating. The annual real GDP 
growth averaged about 9.1% from 2003 to 2008 due to high copper and gold 
prices on the international markets. But the prices of these two products have 
been declining since, and the Mongolian economy followed the fall and slowed 
down in last three quarters. The authorities expected the economic growth to be 
at 9.8% at the end of 2008, whereas the real performance turned in was 8.9%, a 
creditable result. In terms of contribution by sector, the agriculture sector grew by 
5.0%, aided by favorable weather and fiscal incentives to produce wheat; services 
increased by 15.9%, being the most important source of the GDP growth last year; 
and industrial output fell by 1% to its lowest rate in a decade.         171
  The rapid growth of monetary aggregates provided the impetus for price 
increase in the economy. In addition, the sudden supply-side shocks attributed to 
oil and food price increases in 2007 had an adverse impact on inflation in the last 
quarter of 2007 and first three quarters of 2008. 
  Inflation in 2007 and 2008 was 14.0% and 23.2%, respectively. The rapid 
increase of inflation was attributed to both external and internal economic factors 
(Figure 2). The supply-side factors included factors such as imported goods, oil 
and food price increase; inefficient system of food supply; and unstable exchange 
rate. The demand-side factors included factors such as increase of both public and 
private sector salaries; expenditure of social assistance; and persistent increase of 
monetary aggregates and credits over the past five years; and structural factors 
such as increase of administrative price, lack of competition in some sectors, such 













2006Q1 7.3% 22.1% 2.8% 5.0% 2006Q1
2006Q2 3.4% 7.5% 1.0% 2.1% 2006Q2
2006Q3 3.9% 17.8% 4.3% 4.4% 2006Q3
2006Q4 2.2% 10.2% 6.4% 4.8% 2006Q4
2007Q1 6.9% 3.7% 4.2% 5.3% 2007Q1
2007Q2 8.6% 1.1% 3.4% 5.5% 2007Q2
2007Q3 22.1% -1.0% 5.3% 12.1% 2007Q3
2007Q4 24.6% 23.2% 6.3% 14.0% 2007Q4
2008Q1 33.3% 44.6% 10.7% 20.6% 2008Q1
2008Q2 51.8% 40.3% 18.3% 32.4% 2008Q2
2008Q3 36.9% 79.3% 26.5% 31.7% 2008Q3
2008Q4 24.5% 13.2% 22.7% 23.2% 2008Q4
2009Q1 15.2% -3.0% 19.5% 17.2% 2009Q1
  Inflation, driven by the shortage of food, began to soar from the second 
half of 2007 and continued through the first three quarters of 2008. That increase 
was triggered by the world oil-price shock and continued with the exchange-rate 
movement and import-price rise due to the food shortage. The first sign of a fall in 
annual inflation was observed in September 2008, when a slight decrease of food 
price occurred due to fuel price decline (Figure 3).
  As mentioned, one of the factors affecting inflation in Mongolia is the fact 
that our prices are heavily dependent on import prices. Thus, 30% of CPI basket 
constitutes imported goods and exchange rate pass-through coefficient is estimated 
to be around 50% in 2008. Therefore the exchange rate plays a crucial role in the 
Mongolian economy. 
3.  Net inflation is calculated by excluding food items and fuel prices from CPI basket.173
Figure 4
Net International Reserve and Exchange Rate
 
  In August 2007, the first sharp depreciation of MNT against US dollar 
was  observed.  Rumours  that  MNT  would  depreciate  dramatically  influenced 
public expectation significantly. In the meantime, driven by the oil price increase, 
inflationary pressure mounted up in the domestic market. At that time, the Bank 
of Mongolia acted to lower the inflationary pressure by stabilising the exchange-
rate fluctuation. The central bank injected a huge amount of US dollars into the 
domestic market and stabilised the nominal exchange rate till Q3 of 2008. 
  But with the international financial crisis and rapid deterioration of the 
terms of trade, the current account ran into deficit. Consequently, it increased 
the net demand of foreign currency in the domestic market, and resulted in a 
depreciation of the MNT against the US dollar. As shown in the Figure 4, a sharp 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate took place from the Q4 of 2008 to the 
Q1 of 2009, a drop by 33.5%, compared with same period of the previous year. 
Weak domestic foreign-exchange-market infrastructure, environment with limited 
information, domestic trade preference in US dollar, and public expectation was 
fuelled by rumours, all contributed to MNT rate depreciation. 174
Figure 5
Liquidity and Credit Measures
 
  Monetary aggregates increased significantly over the last eight years and 
averaged  32.7%  between  2001  and  2008  (Figure  5). This  significant  increase 
was driven not only by capital inflows from other countries, but also by dramatic 
fiscal expansion. The increase in money supply heated up economic activities and 
increased inflationary pressure. As a result, credit grew by more than 60%, GDP 
gap reached 10% and the inflation rate rose. Starting from the second half of 2007, 
the supply-side factors such as oil price shock and exchange rate depreciation 
began to exert inflationary pressure on the economy towards the end of 2007. 
  The Bank of Mongolia (BOM) initiated measures to bring down inflation, 
caused by the supply factors. The central bank restricted further a tight monetary 
policy through a series of step-by-step measures taken against the rising inflation. 
A significant capital-run due to the world economic crisis and shortage of resources 
within the banking system also contributed to the annual growth of M2 which 
declined to -3.4% for the first time ever.
  Furthermore, the banking sector also showed signs of stress. High inflation 
resulted  in  negative  deposit  real-interest  rates  and  combined  with  currency 
depreciation and a significant amount of capital-run led to MNT-deposit flight 
and a liquidity squeeze among the banks. The BOM imposed a conservatorship 
and appointed a conservator to manage the problematic Anod Bank. In order to 
stabilise the banking sector, the authorities issued a blanket guarantee. 
1.1.1  Trends in Asset Prices 
  As a result of an increase in capital inflow and trade balance surplus, 
domestic investment and money supply in recent years, the private sector saw a 
dramatic increase in income level. The challenge for people at that time was in 175
choosing from several possibilities, such as buying house, participating in equity 





  Figure 6 illustrates that stock market capitalisation had increased 3.5 times 
in just one year (from 2007Q1 to 2008Q1) and declined 60% in next year (from 
2008Q1 to 2009Q1). As mentioned, the stock market movement was driven by the 
increasing income of the private sector. Moreover, a large portion of that growth is 
explained by the activity of some large- and medium-sized banks (Anod and Zoos 
Banks, for instance) in financing stock market activities 
  Of the asset markets, the housing and construction sector was impacted 
the most. The output of the construction sector almost doubled and house prices 
boomed in the last three years. The growth in public and private sector incomes 
and in remittances from migrants, coupled with increased migration from rural 
areas to urban areas, escalated house prices and apartment demand. In response 
to  the  increased  demand,  many  large-  and  medium-sized  enterprises  invested 
substantially in the construction sector.
  As shown in Figure 7, house prices increased dramatically from Q2 of 
2007. At the same time, banks eased their mortgage loan criteria. Moreover, the 
expectation of further house price increase exerted upward pressure on housing. 
Following the surge in house prices, raw material prices started to rise. The house 
price bubble burst in the beginning of Q3 of 2008 when banks encountered a 
liquidity squeeze, which caused delays in housing construction projects and a 
slowdown in mortgage loans. It tapered housing demand and caused it to decline. 176
Figure 7
House Price (in thousand of US $)
  The  construction  sector  faced  a  shortage  of  demand  and  loan  supply. 
Nevertheless, the construction companies continued to maintain their prices at 
boom-time high, expecting the market to recover. With increasing non-performing 
construction and mortgage loans, banks ran into a liquidity problem. Banks, in 
trying to resolve the problem, started applying pressure on construction companies 
to lower their prices and for them to offer discounts to customers buying their 
property with bank loans.
Figure 8
Mortgage and Construction Loan (in billions of MNT)
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  Figure 8 shows the trend of mortgage and construction loans for the period 
of 2006Q1 to 2009Q1. As can be seen, both construction and mortgage loans almost 
doubled and even tripled during that time. However, their growth decelerated from 
Q3 of 2008. 
Regulations and Policy Responses to Asset Price Fluctuations   1.2 
  “Many, perhaps most, economists believe in rules ... But when speculation 
threatens substantial rises in asset prices, with a possible collapse in asset markets 
later, and harm to the financial system ... monetary authorities confront a dilemma 
calling for judgment, not cookbook rules of the game. Such a conclusion may be 
uncomfortable. It is, I believe, realistic”. (Kindleberger, 1995) 
  Monetary authorities face a problem when asset price fluctuations are 
observed. Fluctuations in asset prices may lead not only to financial instability, but 
also some of the economic institutions may be harmed and burdened with financial 
losses. 
  In recent years, the BOM preferred the use of non-direct instruments, such 
as policy rate, reserve requirements and open-market operation, etc. The BOM 
avoided applying direct credit control on both credit volume and interest rate. The 
purpose is not to decrease the effectiveness of its credit control instruments, the 
implementation of which may give rise to evasion as the financial market develops 
and as economic agents learn how to circumvent them, lower efficiency in resource 
allocation, and avoid potential inequity during implementation.  
  With regard to the law and regulations related to assets in Mongolia, there 
is no restriction or limit imposed on purchasing and renting of houses. The only 
requirement is that a house buyer must pay a tax of 2% based on the value of 
the house. A person is free to own any number of houses which stimulates house 
demand and speculative activity. 
  During a period of escalation in asset price, the BOM implemented a 
number of policy actions. The policy measures were initiated not only in direct 
response to asset price fluctuations, they were also aimed at protecting financial 
and economic stability. Below are some of the policy measures:  
In  light  of  some  clear  signs  of  economic  over-heating,  such  as  high  •	
inflation,  persistent  increase  in  monetary  aggregates,  positive  output 
gap and asset price rise, the BOM started tightening monetary policy 
by increasing its policy rate several times from Q3 of 2007. Moreover, 
the BOM increased the reserve requirement ratio and some of prudential 
ratios for the commercial banks. Those policy measures were to cool the 
economy and prevent inflation expectation. 178
The BOM also advised commercial banks about tightening their credit  •	
requirements, alerting them to the risk of over-lending and abiding strictly 
to the regulations and ratios.
The BOM introduced a minimum standard requirement for home mortgage  •	
loans. This regulation must be complied by banks and is exemplary for 
other lending institutions. Among other benefits, this regulation tightened 
bank lending to house buyers so as not to transfer the problem of non-
performing loans in the construction sector to the household. 
During the period of declining asset prices, the BOM introduced new  •	
facility for commercial banks. The central bank started granting loans 
to construction companies through banks to help them complete their 
construction projects with at least 80% of the work done. In the reporting 
year, the BOM extended to the construction sector loan refinancing worth 
MNT 55.7 billion channelled through two banks. The BOM conducted a 
survey to ascertain how much refinancing was needed to complete the on-
going apartment building projects. By an agreement between the BOM and 
the banks, the BOM provided up to 70% of the total required financing, 
and with the banks providing the rest by themselves.
The BOM initiated improvements in the institutional framework, such as  •	
the “Law of Mongolia of Real Estate Collateral” for the mortgage market 
development. The legal framework was established to provide a healthy 
environment for the operation of the mortgage-loan market to prevent 
customers and banks from failing.
2.   The Causes of Asset Price Fluctuations 
2.1   Cross-correlation Analysis
Cross correlation is a standard method of estimating the degree to which 
two series are correlated. By using that method we will check how asset prices are 
correlated with economic and financial indicators. 
  As shown in Figure 9, the correlation signs are roughly consistent with 
the  theoretical  literature.  For  example,  only  mortgage  loan  and  GDP  growth 
have positive and contemporaneous correlation with house price. Broad money, 
construction  loan  and  remittances  from  abroad  have  positive  correlation  with 
housing price and lie behind one quarter (lag). This result shows that the house price 
increase in the recent years has been driven by the continuously rising demand for 
houses. Another interesting result is that house price has negative correlation with 
interest rates and lies ahead one quarter or is explained by house-price movement. 
It says that in the beginning of the house-price boom, banks tended to increase 179
mortgage  loan  and  support  for  the  construction  sector.  In  other  words,  banks 
supported the construction sector boom not only with liquidity supply, but also by 
lowering the interest rate.
Figure 9
Cross Correlation of House Price with Various Economic Indicators*
Economic 
Indicators t-8 t-6 t-4 t-2 t t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8
Mortgage Loan -0.12 0.13 -0.18 -0.02 0.63 -0.06 -0.38 -0.01 0.09
Inflation 0.08 -0.11 -0.16 -0.34 -0.01 0.50 0.39 0.10 0.03
Stock Price -0.02 -0.13 0.03 0.37 0.29 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.16
GDP Growth -0.02 -0.21 -0.21 0.20 0.36 0.27 0.13 -0.08 0.00
Deposit Rate -0.07 -0.06 0.19 0.34 0.24 -0.36 -0.34 -0.22 -0.01
GDP Gap -0.17 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.14 0.35 0.06 0.09 -0.10
Broad Money -0.01 -0.07 -0.19 0.34 0.06 -0.25 -0.52 0.00 -0.21
Exchange Rate -0.05 0.11 -0.04 0.03 0.17 0.34 -0.34 -0.29 -0.02
Loan Rate 0.08 0.11 0.06 -0.13 -0.18 -0.25 -0.26 -0.12 -0.01
Total Loan -0.11 -0.01 -0.16 -0.03 0.09 -0.13 -0.21 0.02 0.02
Construction 
Loan -0.26 -0.08 -0.16 0.20 -0.11 -0.10 -0.26 -0.05 -0.09
Remittance 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.12 0.08 -0.09 -0.24 0.26 -0.05
* Numbers in bold correspond to the peak quarter.
  
  Similar analysis for the stock-price movement is illustrated in Figure 10. 
The cross-correlogram shows that the highest correlation coefficients are those 
corresponding to GDP growth, inflation, loan interest rate and GDP gap. In all 
these cases, the leads of coefficients appear to be the highest (except in the case 
of GDP growth, which appears coincide with stock price. When we look at the 
economic indicators individually, boost in broad money and real economic growth 
increase stock price simultaneously. But increasing stock price tends to affect 
inflation and GDP gap positively and loan interest rate negatively. Theoretically, 
since loan and stock are substitutable, it is a reasonable result. This result is also 
show the negative correlation of stock-price movement and amount of total loan. 180
Figure 10
Cross-correlation of Stock Price and Economic Indicators*
Economic 
Indicators t-8 t-6 t-4 t-2 t t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8
GDP 
Growth
-0.07 -0.19 -0.16 0.04 0.50 0.42 0.17 -0.06 -0.02
Inflation 0.20 0.06 -0.14 -0.28 -0.22 0.07 0.47 0.39 0.14
Loan Rate 0.26 0.22 0.08 -0.12 -0.23 -0.36 -0.41 -0.44 -0.21
GDP Gap -0.15 -0.18 -0.33 -0.08 0.03 0.23 0.40 0.19 0.09
Housing 
Price
0.16 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.29 0.37 0.03 -0.13 -0.02
Broad 
Money
0.02 -0.20 -0.04 0.08 0.25 0.06 -0.17 -0.26 -0.12
Exchange 
Rate
-0.01 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.15 0.24 0.05 -0.66 -0.26
Deposit 
Rate
0.01 -0.11 -0.04 0.24 0.24 -0.16 -0.49 -0.52 -0.18
Total Loan -0.12 -0.16 -0.05 0.05 0.14 0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.03
*Numbers in bold correspond to the peak quarter.
2.2   Factor Analysis
  Factor analysis attempts to identify underlying variables or factors that 
explain the pattern of correlations within a set of observed variables. Factor analysis 
is often used in data reduction to identify a small number of factors that explain 
most of the variance observed in a much larger number of manifest variables. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is the most common form of factor analysis. 
The end result of the principal component analysis will tell us which variables can 
be represented by which components, and which variables should be retained as 
individual variables because the factor solution does not adequately represent their 
information. In our case, we shall analyse which macroeconomic variables can be 
in one component with house price or stock market price. 181
Figure 11
Principle Component Analysis of House Price
Variables F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 Communality
Inflation -0.35 0.29 0.18 -0.11 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.48 1.00
Deposit rate 0.39 -0.10 -0.07 0.15 -0.12 -0.47 -0.44 0.16 0.40 0.65
Loan rate 0.13 -0.45 0.17 0.54 -0.01 0.04 0.50 0.01 -0.08 1.00
GDP gap -0.17 0.46 0.15 0.51 -0.14 -0.11 -0.21 0.14 0.13 0.35
GDP growth 0.22 0.48 0.20 -0.29 0.07 -0.24 0.07 -0.14 -0.45 0.57
Broad money 0.36 -0.09 -0.26 -0.09 0.27 0.43 -0.19 -0.33 0.12 0.53
Mortgage loan 0.30 -0.08 0.37 -0.15 -0.30 0.44 -0.19 0.60 -0.22 0.83
Construction 
loan
0.29 0.09 -0.36 0.00 0.54 -0.21 0.25 0.56 -0.07 0.69
Total loan 0.38 0.27 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.33 0.05 -0.15 0.40 0.91
Remittance 0.03 0.36 -0.50 0.43 -0.19 0.30 0.01 0.02 -0.31 0.60
Exchange rate 0.23 0.10 0.53 0.31 0.44 -0.04 -0.07 -0.23 -0.14 1.00
Stock price 0.35 0.19 0.00 -0.15 -0.46 -0.18 0.55 -0.12 0.20 0.24
Factor Value Cum. Value Difference Proportion Cum. Proportion
F1 4.74 4.74 2.20 0.39 39%
F2 2.54 7.27 0.95 0.21 61%
F3 1.58 8.86 0.62 0.13 74%
F4 0.97 9.82 0.12 0.08 82%
F5 0.85 10.68 0.20 0.07 89%
F6 0.65 11.32 0.32 0.05 94%
F7 0.33 11.65 0.07 0.03 97%
F8 0.25 11.90 0.20 0.02 99%
F9 0.05 11.95 - 0.00 100%
Total 11.95 88.20 1.00 -
F indicates factors corresponded - 
  Figure  11  shows  both  the  Eigen  value  and  the  raw  and  cumulative 
percentage of variance explained by the extracted PCAs that account for 100% of 
the total variation. From this result, we can extract at least two possible factors. 
The first factor represents liquidity and the second factor represents real economic 
activities. But, we want to try the third and fourth factors, such as exchange rate 
and interest rate factors. From the findings presented in Figure 11, four factors 
we separated explain 82% of the variation. Hence, these four are retained as 
explanatory variables for further analysis. 
  The key opportunity and challenge of PCA is determining which dependent 
variable can be explained by factors and whether their signs are theoretically 
consistent. 182
 
  From the simple OLS estimation illustrated above, only real economic 
activity is significant at 10% and its sign is theoretically consistent. Other factors 
are not significant. From these analyses, we find that real economic activity is a 
main factor explaining house-price movement.
Figure 12
Principle Component Analysis of Stock Price
Variables F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 Communality
Inflation -0.43 -0.11 0.15 0.05 0.23 -0.12 0.01 0.48 0.35 0.96
Construction 
loan
0.29 0.24 0.41 -0.28 0.18 -0.11 -0.05 -0.05 0.39 1.00
Broad money 0.31 0.25 -0.12 -0.45 -0.08 0.48 -0.04 0.36 0.29 0.90
Mortgage loan  -0.18 0.45 -0.30 -0.28 -0.13 0.03 0.38 -0.15 -0.28 0.42
Total loan 0.19 0.30 0.45 -0.03 0.15 -0.49 0.33 -0.04 -0.15 0.52
GDP gap -0.36 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.05 0.42 0.30 -0.33 0.39 1.00
GDP growth -0.27 0.41 0.01 -0.02 0.15 -0.11 -0.78 -0.12 -0.08 0.47
Loan rate 0.43 -0.21 -0.04 0.33 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.24 -0.06 1.00
Deposit rate 0.38 0.15 -0.22 0.35 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.43 0.38 0.23
Remittance 0.09 0.15 0.55 0.26 -0.36 0.41 -0.14 0.14 -0.40 0.72
Exchange rate 0.12 0.30 -0.20 0.31 0.73 0.27 0.10 0.12 -0.21 1.00
House price -0.07 0.45 -0.20 0.39 -0.39 -0.27 0.08 0.46 0.18 0.36
Factor Value Cum. Value Difference Proportion Cum. Proportion
F1 3.69 3.69 1.47 0.31 0.31
F2 2.22 5.91 0.45 0.19 0.49
F3 1.77 7.68 0.77 0.15 0.64
F4 1.00 8.68 0.07 0.08 0.72
F5 0.93 9.61 0.28 0.08 0.80
F6 0.65 10.26 0.13 0.05 0.85
F7 0.52 10.78 0.08 0.04 0.90
F8 0.43 11.21 0.10 0.04 0.93
F9 0.33 11.54 0.11 0.03 0.96
Total 11.54 79.37 1.00 -
F indicates factors corresponded - 
  As can be seen from Figure 12, we extracted five possible factors from our 
principal component analysis of stock price, because they explained 80% of the 
total variance cumulatively. The first is interest rate factor, the second is liquidity 183
factor, the third is real economic activity, the fourth is exchange rate and the fifth 
is house price independently. 
  But from regression analysis using these factors, we find that only two 
of them can be consistent both theoretically and econometrically. The estimated 




  The  regression  result  shows  that  recent  stock-price  boom  was  mainly 
driven by market interest rate downturn and liquidity increase. Other factors are 
not statistically significant. Drawing from the finding, we can conclude that if 




3.   The Effects of Asset Price Fluctuations   
3.1   How Do Asset Prices Amplify Business Cycle (Wealth Effect)? 
This  section  examines  the  wealth  effect  by  measuring  the  effects  of 
housing wealth on household spending. We used a simple method to estimate 
wealth effect as shown in Case and Quigley (2001). However, as this method has 
many weaknesses, we tried to determine the linkage between stock-market wealth, 
housing wealth and household consumption. 
All the variables in the analysis are expressed in per capita in real terms 
using  GDP  deflator  and  based  on  the  quarterly  time  series  from  2002:Q1  to 
2009:Q1. 
Figure 14 shows the simple correlation among variables of consumption, 
housing wealth and financial wealth. The result of our analysis indicates that 
housing wealth is more correlated with household consumption than with stock 






STOWEA_L 0.566111 0.800183 1.000000
The estimation of wealth effect on household spending is presented in 
Figure 15. The table below reports the estimation of two different specification 
variables. The first part presents the estimation result with log linear variables and 
the second part reports the result with variables expressed as first differences. From 
the estimation, we found a housing-wealth effect that is substantially larger than 
the stock-wealth effect on household spending. 185
Figure 15
Simple Estimation of Wealth Effect
Dependent Variable: CONSUM_L Dependent Variable: D_CONSUM
Method: Least Squares Method: Least Squares
Sample: 2002Q1 2009Q1 Sample: 2002Q2 2009Q1
Included observations: 29 Included observations: 28 after 
adjustments
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
INCOME_L 0.572 3.612 D_INCOME 0.540 2.036
HOUWEA_L 0.421 3.263 D_HOUWEA 0.661 2.398
STOWEA_L -0.086 2.727 D_STOWEA -0.057 -0.647
R-squared 0.490 R-squared 0.441
Adjusted R-squared 0.451 Adjusted 
R-squared 0.396
S.E. of regression 0.122 S.E. of regression 0.129
Durbin-Watson stat 1.13 Durbin-Watson 
stat 2.403
As  Figure  15  indicates,  the  estimated  effect  of  housing  wealth  on 
consumption is significant and  large in magnitude in log linear estimation. It 
says that the elasticity of housing wealth is 0.42 and is higher than other country 
experience4. But the elasticity of stock market wealth is rather small and its sign is 
in the opposite direction. It says that if stock market wealth increases, consumption 
will drop. For estimation with all variables in first difference, the coefficient on 
housing market wealth is greater than the previous estimation. But it is still greater 
than stock market wealth, while the elasticity of financial wealth is near to zero 
with a negative sign. We can conclude from the findings of the analysis that housing 
wealth is a more important factor than stock-market wealth on the consumption of 
households in Mongolia.
3.2   What are the Effects of Asset Price Fluctuations on the Soundness of 
the Financial System?
The recent economic downturn in Mongolia is caused not only by asset- 
market boom and bust, but also by other economic sectors. For instance, the decline 
of  the  wholesale,  retail  and  manufacturing  sectors  contributed  to  the  banking 
sector’s liquidity problem. Below is a review of the condition of the banking sector 
last year.
3.2.1   Diversification of Banking Sector
  As of the end of year 2008, 16 banks and one foreign representative office 
were operating their financial intermediation in Mongolia through 1,080 branches. 
4.  Compared with results showed in Case and Quigley (2001).186
Currently, the total number of customers, including companies and individuals, 
reached 2.4 million. The number of borrowers is 516.8 thousand and the number 
of depositors is 1.3 million in the banking sector. 
  Diversification plays an important role in the banking sector, as in the 
economy. If banks are able to diversify their operation in several markets with a 
variety of products, they can reduce their vulnerability and assure a better business 
performance. A bank which is well diversified is better positioned to survive difficult 
times. Figure 16 shows the diversification of the banking sector in Mongolia. 
Figure 16
Banking Loan Distribution to Economic Sectors (as end of 2008)
 
  As shown in Figure 16, the banking loans are highly concentrated in the 
wholesale and retail trade, construction and manufacturing sectors, followed by 
the newly developed mining and real estate sectors. The Mongolian economy is 
heavily dependent on foreign trade. Exports are not well diversified, comprising 
commodity goods, including copper, gold and cashmere. Wholesale and retail 
trade involves mostly imported goods. Many of the businesses have good loan 
track records with commercial banks.   
  Over the past three to four years, construction and mining, especially 
the gold mining sector, saw a boom, and with loans to these sectors increasing 
dramatically.  Bank loans generally follow economic cycles and activities. For 
example, the economic sectors that developed rapidly in recent years have larger 
loan demands, and bank loans tend to flow into these sectors. Of late, due to 
the recent economic recession and liquidity squeeze in the banking sector, all 
economic activities have been frozen and commercial banks are now faced with 
huge challenges.187
  Banks are facing challenges not only with loan supply and repayment, 
but also with liquidity and liabilities. Banks liabilities consist mostly of customer 
deposits, and both the deposit rate and loan rate are relatively higher than that of the 
developing countries. As can be seen from Figure 17, 74.7% of total funds of banks 
came from customer deposits in 2004. There are significant changes in the funding 
profile in recent years. As of 2008, foreign investment to the banking sector and 
interbank transactions increased and the share of customer deposit in bank funds 
decreased. This is a positive sign of diversification for banks with regard to their 
source of liquidity, improving their flexibility for funds. There is still room for 
the development of the money market and for banks to diversify their sources of 





  In a mere span of two years, the global financial and economic crisis 
adversely affected the domestic market through a decline in the prices of our main 
export goods, reversal of foreign direct investment and an increase in the prices 
of the main imported goods. Associated with the collapse of mineral prices in the 
world market, the global financial downturn and slowdown of domestic economy, 
the credit risk increased significantly for the banking sector. During the past five 
years, non-performing loans to the total loan ratio had been steadily declining. 
With the global downtown, the trend reversed. The ratio shot up to 7.2% and the 
non-performing loans doubled in 2008, as compared to the previous year. 
3.2.2  Financial Stability Measures
  Loan-to-deposit Ratio: As economic growth intensified, money demand 
increased  dramatically  in  the  past  years.  Banks  reacted  to  that.  On  average, 
the annual loan growth between 2004 and 2007 recorded around 47.3%. In the 188
meantime, the average annual growth of broad money was 36.5%. Gathering from 
the figures, we can clearly see that the loan-to-deposit ratio increased steadily till 
2007. We observed that during these years both broad money and loan growth 
were high, but loans increased more quickly than broad money. Banks funded this 
gap from another financial source, notably foreign investment and government 
deposits. 
  As  shown  in  Figure  18,  the  loan-to-deposit  ratio  decreased  from  the 
beginning of 2009 due to fewer new loans being issued following the economic 
slowdown. In the meantime, because of the problem of Anod Bank, a sudden 
deposit-run occurred in the banking sector and confidence in banking sector fell in 
December 2008.  The BOM responded by implementing some policy measures. 
Figure 18
Loan-to-deposit Ratio
  Capital  Adequacy  Ratio  (CAR):  The  current  economic  uncertainty     
hindered the decision-making process of banks with the effect of decreasing the 
supply of loans. The accelerated inflation rate caused deposits and transactional 
accounts  to  decline.  The  capital  adequacy  ratio  declined  due  to  rising  non-
performing loans and heightened market risk. The economic slowdown, in turn, 
worsened bank loan repayments. The loans outstanding fell largely by increased 
provisioning which seriously eroded the capital base of banks. The higher market 
risk dampened the risk appetite of lending institutions. As a result, the capital 
adequacy ratio remained at the level above Basel standard of 8%.   
  Moreover, in response to the declining capital adequacy ratio in the banking 
sector, the BOM revised its regulation of prudential ratio and increased CAR to 
12%. This measure is meant to help deal with pro-cyclicality in the banking sector 
and to enhance the resilience of both the individual banks and the banking system 189
as a whole. This kind of dynamic provisioning can be an important prudential tool 
for emerging economies, where banks dominate financial intermediation.
Figure 19
Capital Adequacy Ratio
Loan-to-value Ratio (LTV): Loan-to-value ratio is one of the key risk 
factors that lenders assess when qualifying borrowers for a loan. As the loan-
to-value ratio of a loan increases, the qualification guidelines for certain loan 
programmes become stricter.  However, we do not have the database to calculate 
the LTV ratio of the whole sector. We could only calculate the LTV of the mortgage 




  As shown in Figure 20, the loan-to-value ratio for mortgage loans decreased 
steadily over the last two years. Because housing price decreased at the end of 
2008, the banks’ LTV ratio increased sharply. Thus, banks could decrease their 
LTV ratio by reducing their mortgage loans. 
4.   The Policy Response
4.1   What Were the Policy Responses?   
  The Mongolian authorities did not respond appropriately in dealing with 
the asset price escalation. The extension of government support to construction and 
mining projects in the times of high economic growth and, perhaps, its generous 
social programmes stimulated the economy. Bank lending additionally fuelled 
credit growth. All these factors acted in tandem to drive the momentum of asset 
price escalation.   
  From  the  standpoint  of  monetary  policy,  the  Bank  of  Mongolia  was 
cognizant of the prevailing economic and monetary conditions. Observing the 
signs of accelerating inflation, money growth and over-heating of the economy, the 
BOM started tightening its monetary policy. In this regard, the BOM implemented 
such measures as raising its policy rate twice from 6.4% to 7.4% in October and to 
8.4% in November 2007, and increasing the required reserve ratio by 0.5 percentage 
point. Moreover, the BOM increased the capital adequacy ratio of some banks that 
faced liquidity problem at the beginning of 2008. All these policy actions directed 
against high inflation continued throughout 2008. As a result, the growth of the 
monetary aggregates started slowing down.
  The only direct measure implemented by the Bank of Mongolia was a 
construction loan refinancing facility extended to the construction sector. The BOM 
granted loans to construction companies through banks, who lent to the construction 
sector in order to starve off bank failures. Banks extended loans to construction 
companies for apartment projects where at least 80% of the construction work was 
completed. However, the result of this measure was not as satisfactory as expected. 
The construction companies widely misused the financing. The banks were also at 
fault for not monitoring the use of the funds.
4.2   What is Most Appropriate Monetary Policy Instrument in Dealing 
with Asset Price Fluctuations?
  The principal objective of most central banks is to achieve price stability.   
Within this main objective, the aim is to promote balanced and sustainable economic 
development through the maintenance of financial market stability. However, the 
research studies conducted to date have not reached a consensus as to whether 
the monetary authorities should respond to asset price fluctuations. Obviously 
the response of the authorities would depend on whether the asset markets play a 
considerable role in the economy and how the asset markets affect the economy. 191
  As we determined in the analysis section, the asset markets in Mongolia 
are mainly stock market and housing sector. In boom times, the stock market and 
housing sector followed the movement of the economy. But when the boom burst, 
these sectors are faced with significant problems. Hence, the issues to address are: 
Do asset prices contain reliable information about inflation and output? How does 
asset price decline affect the banking sector? As we saw in the cross-correlation 
analysis, the housing market has a positive effect on inflation within two quarters. 
It means that, if house price goes up, inflation will increase within two quarters. 
It is also possible that inflation co-moves with house price, implying that both 
inflation and house price are caused by excess demand.
  Moreover, we saw from Section 3, asset markets did influence the banking 
sector. The construction sector slowdown weakened the loan quality of banks. Some 
medium-sized banks which financed the construction sector ran into difficulty. 
Lacking liquid assets, their prudential financial ratios deteriorated quickly. In this 
case, the monetary authorities should be aware that the problem of the construction 
sector has a direct bearing on the banking sector. 
  Another important aspect in responding to asset price bubble is whether or 
not the monetary authorities is capable of distinguishing between fundamental and 
asset-price-bubble behaviour? If the monetary authorities is unable to distinguish 
between  fundamental  and  bubble  behaviour,  they  should  not  respond  against 
price fluctuations. It is to be noted that determining price boom itself is already 
difficult. 
  If we are cannot reach consensus whether monetary authorities should 
respond to asset price movement, how are we to determine which is the most 
appropriate  instrument  to  use?  Current  global  economic  conditions  show  that 
conventional monetary instruments are not capable of dealing adequately with 
asset price boom and bust. 
  Currently, major central banks have introduced “unconventional monetary 
policy measures” to deal with the economic and financial crisis in the aftermath of 
the bursting of the global credit bubble.  The reasons for choosing the unconventional 
policies are:
The  risk-taking  capacity  of  the  various  economic  entities  is  severely  •	
damaged  during  crisis  time,  and,  as  a  result,  the  effectiveness  of 
conventional monetary policy is seriously hampered. 
It takes time to recapitalise the banking system, which is most effective  •	
and vital task in revitalising the economy. The injection of public capital 
into the weakened financial institutions is indispensable in stabilising the 
financial system, but it is politically unpopular. 192
The  element  of  uncertainty  regarding  the  transmission  mechanism  of  •	
monetary policy is much greater than in normal times. Therefore, regardless 
of whether experimental types of monetary policy measures are introduced 
or not, the issue of explaining the intentions of monetary-policy decisions 
to markets and to the public will be the key challenge. 
  Nowadays,  the  BOM  is  seeking  some  room  to  support  asset  markets 
by issuing its treasury bills to the public through the stock market. The Bank of 
Mongolia believes that this policy measure can encourage the stock market and 
restore public confidence in the stock market. 
5.   Conclusion  
  Asset prices have increased significantly over the recent years. Due to the 
monetisation of the economy and increases in capital inflows, economic agents 
tended to increase their demand for durable goods and they seek to store their 
wealth not only in bank deposits, but also in other high revenue assets. 
  The result of simple analysis indicates that housing price has been mainly 
driven by liquidity and real economic activity and another interesting result is a 
negative correlation between house price and domestic-currency loan rate. Loan 
rate lies ahead one quarter or explained by a house-price movement. The stock-price 
movement is highly and positively correlated with broad money and real economic 
growth. But increasing stock price tends to affect inflation and GDP gap positively 
and loan interest rate negatively. From this result, we can conclude that economic 
agents make decision to store their wealth depending on their liquidity condition. 
Moreover, the result shows that economic agents mostly are not interested in 
holding their wealth as foreign exchange, because of the volatility of the exchange 
rate. This relationship is also proved by principal component analysis.
 
  From the indicators of financial-sector soundness, the vulnerability of the 
banking sector is worsening over time. The loans to the construction companies 
are deteriorating. But it is not just due to the downturn of the construction sector 
following from a sharp decrease in housing prices. The banking sector is faced with 
a liquidity problem due to exchange rate depreciation. With the stabilisation of the 
exchange rate, the banking problem persists due to the economic downturn. 
  The following policies may be recommended for implementation to avoid 
the adverse impact of asset price fluctuations on the banking sector: 
Enhance bank supervision and undertake institutional improvements as  •	
the best responses to an asset price bubble episode.193
Implement dynamic provisioning measures to deal with pro-cyclicality  •	
in the banking sector. Sometimes, it may be the best way to avoid asset 
price bubble, especially in the economy where bank dominate in financial 
intermediation.
Support the demand side of the construction sector is one way to avoid  •	
shifting the problem of the construction sector to the banking sector in the 
short run. 
In  the  long  run,  policymakers  should  consider  dealing  with  inflation  •	
pressure after the crisis and implement the appropriate policy.194
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2002Q1 14.23 1 127.0 - 1.9 88.7 13.2% 0.087
2002Q2 12.76 1 226.5 - 4.2 124.0 12.2% -0.018
2002Q3 14.03 1 154.1 - 6.1 105.9 14.0% -0.033
2002Q4 14.80 1 025.8 - 6.7 151.3 14.0% -0.022
2003Q1 15.15 839.6 - 8.1 151.0 14.0% 0.022
2003Q2 14.20 800.4 - 11.3 183.8 14.0% 0.009
2003Q3 15.00 737.9 - 10.1 163.8 14.1% 0.002
2003Q4 15.73 740.7 - 15.1 217.2 14.0% -0.057
2004Q1 17.91 774.9 - 33.8 498.5 14.0% 0.029
2004Q2 17.90 609.2 - 41.6 525.5 13.2% 0.068
2004Q3 19.21 707.4 - 45.1 565.8 15.0% 0.010
2004Q4 19.73 590.7 - 51.9 606.2 13.2% -0.035
2005Q1 20.42 706.0 - 58.6 640.3 13.2% -0.004
2005Q2 19.26 802.3 - 71.5 719.7 13.2% 0.021
2005Q3 22.23 813.6 - 74.8 774.6 12.6% 0.009
2005Q4 22.63 995.3 - 76.8 859.4 12.6% 0.012
2006Q1 23.87 1 083.9 38.6 77.2 955.1 12.6% -0.019
2006Q2 23.32 1 176.6 46.0 88.3 1 051.1 12.6% -0.017
2006Q3 26.44 1 351.0 65.5 100.7 1 121.1 13.4% -0.024
2006Q4 27.60 1 868.0 72.1 111.1 1 222.3 13.5% 0.101
2007Q1 28.37 2 770.7 78.2 141.4 1 403.8 13.5% 0.017
















200.2 349.0 2 558.9 10.5% 0.076
2008Q3 56.56 8 393.6 219.2 400.9 2 714.6 10.5% 0.075
2008Q4 50.90 5 777.7 201.8 383.2 2 635.1 10.9% 0.041
2009Q1 45.00 4 953.7 205.0 419.6 2 671.7 10.9% 0.022198























2002Q1 5.2% -1.6% 1 104.0 345.9 39.3% 160.4 2.7
2002Q2 6.7% -0.2% 1 104.0 401.0 33.4% 169.5 9.8
2002Q3 6.3% 3.4% 1 116.0 437.4 35.0% 199.4 15.3
2002Q4 4.7% 1.7% 1 124.0 470.1 33.4% 225.9 36.5
2003Q1 1.6% 4.9% 1 140.0 504.2 32.6% 213.0 16.7
2003Q2 3.0% 6.5% 1 134.0 557.7 32.4% 234.8 20.1
2003Q3 5.8% 5.4% 1 157.0 609.3 32.0% 259.8 31.6
2003Q4 7.0% 4.7% 1 170.0 703.3 32.0% 129.0 5.9
2004Q1 8.4% 6.2% 1 178.0 740.2 30.0% 149.8 36
2004Q2 9.5% 5.4% 1 167.0 812.2 30.0% 155.9 38.5
2004Q3 8.9% 12.5% 1 199.0 827.3 32.0% 154.0 42.4
2004Q4 10.6% 10.9% 1 212.0 847.0 30.0% 163.6 29.5
2005Q1 9.7% 12.5% 1 203.0 893.0 33.0% 186.5 35.1
2005Q2 6.4% 17.7% 1 191.0 1 009.6 30.0% 212.2 27.1
2005Q3 6.2% 11.5% 1 212.0 1 112.4 31.0% 255.0 41.3
2005Q4 7.3% 9.5% 1 227.0 1 140.1 28.0% 298.0 30.2
2006Q1 7.5% 5.0% 1 183.0 1 191.2 28.0% 350.1 33.9
2006Q2 7.8% 2.1% 1 171.5 1 449.5 24.2% 384.4 25.5
2006Q3 6.9% 4.4% 1 167.7 1 539.4 26.1% 510.5 4.6
2006Q4 8.6% 4.8% 1 164.8 1 536.5 24.5% 687.3 13.0
2007Q1 9.5% 5.3% 1 164.6 1 746.7 22.5% 852.8 14.0
2007Q2 12.2% 5.5% 1 164.1 2 016.1 21.0% 975.7 21.4
2007Q3 14.6% 12.1% 1 187.6 2 191.9 19.7% 1 045.5 24.1
2007Q4 10.2% 14.1% 1 170.2 2 401.1 19.9% 975.3 24.4
2008Q1 11.0% 20.6% 1 170.8 2 455.0 20.8% 981.0 23.1
2008Q2 10.2% 32.4% 1 159.2 2 564.5 21.7% 952.9 36.7
2008Q3 8.9% 31.7% 1 148.2 2 524.2 21.5% 859.2 31.8
2008Q4 8.9% 23.3% 1 229.0 2 318.9 20.4% 637.2 8.4
2009Q1 5.4% 17.3% 1 563.0 2 413.3 20.4% 504.1 22.5199
CHAPTER 7
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKS: 
THE CASE OF THE PHILIPPINES
by Lucia C. Laquindanum1
1.   Introduction
The global financial turmoil raised anew the issue on how central banks 
should respond to asset price bubbles.2 The collapse of the U.S. housing market 
in 2007 resulted in a severe dislocation of financial systems and economies of 
advanced and emerging countries. Huge losses from soured loans and investments 
related to the U.S. subprime mortgages eroded the balance sheets of systemically 
important financial institutions in the U.S. and Europe, causing a worldwide credit 
crunch. The drying up of credit supply, in turn, took its toll on the output and 
employment of major and developing countries. The unwinding of the U.S. housing 
market saw the free fall in real estate prices. Selling pressures in the property sector 
quickly spread to other asset classes, causing a steep drop in the prices of assets 
such as equities and bonds.
Asset prices have played a more prominent role in monetary and financial 
stability  frameworks.  They  have  acted  as  sources  of  information  on  market 
expectations and markets’ risk attitudes; leading indicators of output, inflation 
and financial distress; and indicators of shocks that hit the economy (Hordahl 
and Packer, 2007). They also provide signals to profitable investments, affect the 
wealth of households, and influence the cost of capital to firms and households 
(Mishkin, 2008).
Thus, asset prices are useful in that they provide policymakers forward-
looking information. However, once asset price bubbles develop and eventually 
burst, they can lead to widespread financial and economic disruptions. Mishkin 
describes this process as follows:
At some point, however, the bubble bursts…lenders cut back on credit supply, 
the demand for the assets declines further, and prices drop even more. The 
resulting loan losses and declines in asset prices erode the balance sheets at 
financial institutions, further diminishing credit and investment across a broad 
range of assets. The decline in lending depresses business and household 
1.     Ms. Laquindanum is a Bank Officer V at the Department of Economic Research. The author 
would like to thank Dennis D. Lapid,  Diwata E. Samarita, Elinore S. Genuino, Racquel A. 
Claveria,  Rhea M. Maloto,  Bernardo J. Barrientos, Jr., Mary May L. Agcaoili and colleagues 
at the Department of Statistics for their valuable comments and assistance.
2.    An asset bubble is a sharp rise in the price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, 
with the initial rise generating expectations of further increases in asset prices  and attracting 
new buyers–generally speculators who are more interested in profits from trading in the asset 
rather than its use or earning capacity (Kindleberger, 1987).
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spending, which weakens economic activity and increases macroeconomic 
risk in credit markets. In the extreme, the interaction between asset prices 
and the health of financial institutions following the collapse of an asset 
price bubble can endanger the operation of the financial system as a whole.
The financial and economic instability that followed the plunge in asset 
prices prompted central banks to revisit their policy response toward asset price 
bubbles. Central bankers generally have two options when faced with a surge in 
asset prices: they can either be proactive or reactive (Berger and Kissmer, 2006). To 
be proactive would be to lean against the wind, that is, to tighten monetary policy 
during the boom phase. The reactive policy would be to mitigate the consequences 
of an expected or an actual asset price bust.
This paper will look into: 1) the movements of asset prices, macroeconomic 
and financial variables in the Philippines from 2001 to 20093; 2) causes of asset 
price fluctuations; 3) effects of asset price booms and busts on the real sector and 
banking industry; and 4) effectiveness of alternative policy responses.
  Trends in Asset Prices  1.1 
  The financial instruments traded in the Philippine asset market are stocks, 
real estate, foreign exchange, money market instruments and bonds. This paper will 
focus on developments in the stock market and real estate sector. In this section, 
trends in asset prices from 2001 to 2009 will be discussed. 
1.1.1   Stock Prices
The Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) is the only existing stock exchange 
in the Philippines and is one of the largest in Southeast Asia. The PSE Composite 
Index (made up of 30 stocks) is the key indicator of share price movements in the 
market and is driven by six sub indices: the Financials Index, Industrial Index, 
Holding Firms Index, Property Index, Services Index, and Mining & Oil Index. 
As of June 2009, total market capitalisation of 248 listed companies reached P5.2 
trillion comprising almost 70 % of GDP. Total number of shares traded reached 
P629 billion for the first nine months of 2009.
The Philippine Stock Exchange Index (PSEi) recorded marked fluctuations 
in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2008, ranging from 20-68% year-on-year (y/y). (Figure 
1). The declines in 2001 and 2003 were associated with the widening fiscal deficit 
and heightened domestic and geopolitical uncertainties; while the sharp rebound
from the last quarter of 2003 until the first quarter of 2005 was fueled by the 
continued easing inflation, softening interest rates and the strengthening peso. In 
2007, the composite index surged to 3,660.9 index points in the second quarter, 
3.   The period covered was limited by the availability of historical quarterly data on real estate 
prices.201
68% higher than the level of the previous year, despite growing concerns over the 
U.S. subprime market. Optimistic expectations that emerging markets such as the 
Philippines, would decouple from the economic downturn in advanced countries, 
may have spurred stock market trading. This optimism was supported further by 
the 7.3% GDP growth attained by the Philippines in 2007, its highest in 30 years.
The deterioration in the global financial system and its adverse effects 
on the world economy saw equity prices plunge in 2008 as investors disposed 
of their emerging market assets. The index fell by 48.3% y/y to 3,621.6 index 
points at end-2008. Amidst investors’ jitters arising from the mounting global 
financial market stress, stock market volatility rose sharply in 2008. Specifically, 
the standard deviation of daily stock indices nearly doubled to 448.2 index points 
during the period from 242.0 index points in 2007. 
Figure 1
Philippine Stock Exchange Index (PSEi)
Year-on-year change in percent
              Source: Philippine Stock Exchange
1.1.2 Real Estate Prices
Measured in terms of gross value added (GVA), the combined ownership 
of dwellings and real estate sector amounted to P320 billion at current prices in the 
first nine months of 2009.  The GVA in the real estate sector includes the leasing, 
management and operation of real estate, the subdivision and development of land 
into lots, and activities like renting, buying, selling, managing and appraising real 
estate.
Existing data on real estate transactions, including pricing, are inadequate 
for policy formulation. In the absence of an officially published real estate price 
index, the property index of the PSE and commercial land values, residential 
capital/rental values are used as broad indicators of real estate prices.202
After  experiencing  a  slump  in  the  aftermath  of  the Asian  crisis,  the 
Philippine real estate sector slowly regained its strength starting 2004. Among the 
economies affected by the 1997 Asian crisis, it was the Philippines that experienced 
the biggest property price fall (Cruz, 2008).  The property index showed a volatile 
uptrend starting 2004 and surged by almost 100 % in the fourth quarter of 2007 
(Figure 2). Marked fluctuations in the property index reflected the liquid nature of 
property stocks and its sensitivity to market developments. 
Figure 2
PSE Property Index
Year-on-year change in percent
             
   Source: Philippine Stock Exchange
Commercial and residential land prices also recovered beginning 2004 and 
increased sharply y/y in the fourth quarter of 2007 and first quarter of 2008, with 
prices in Makati climbing by more than 30%, while those in Ortigas increased by 
more than 20%.4 These growth rates, however, were much lower than the annual 
71.2% and 63.6% surge in commercial land values recorded in the mid-1990s in 
Makati and Ortigas, respectively.
4 .   Makati and Ortigas are prime commercial districts in the Philippines.203
Figure 3
Real Estate Prices
Year-on-year change in percent
        Data source: Jones Lang LaSAlle, Asia Pacific Property Digest, Coliers
1.2   Trends in Asset Prices and Macroeconomic and Financial Variables 
In this section, trends in asset prices will be compared with those of 
financial and macroeconomic variables to get a broad view of the direction of 
their  movements.  The  influence  of  other  economic  and  legislative/regulatory 
developments on asset prices will also be discussed. 
1.2.1	 Asset	Prices	Compared	with	Inflation	and	Interest	Rates	
1.2.1.1		Inflation
Stock and real estate prices were generally on the uptrend, moving inversely 
with inflation that trekked downwards since 2001, except for certain quarters of 
2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008, when price increases accelerated due to supply-side 




Real Estate Prices and Infliation Rate
Year-on-year Growth
1.2.1.2  Interest Rates
The rise in asset prices may have also been driven by the downtrend in 
interest rates brought about by the benign inflation outlook, ample liquidity of 
the banking system, and improving fiscal outlook (Figures 6 and 7). The drop in 
interest rates, however, reversed in 2005 as the BSP raised interest rates to avert the 
expected build-up in inflationary pressures arising from high oil prices. 
When the global financial crisis intensified in the fourth quarter of 2008, 
the BSP began its monetary easing cycle in December 2008 to avoid tightness 
in liquidity. By July 2009, the BSP had reduced its key policy rates by 200 basis 
points on the back of easing inflation. 205
Figure 6
PSEi and Interest Rates
Figure 7
Real Estate Prices and Interest Rates
1.2.2  Asset Prices Compared with Domestic Liquidity and Credit
1.2.2.1  Liquidity
Movements in asset prices compared with those of domestic liquidity 
or M3, showed mixed trends (Figures 8 and 9).  The stock price index surged 
following the double-digit growth rates in M3 from a y/y increase of 11.8% in 
May 2006 to 28% in April 2007. 5  The rapid expansion in liquidity was traced 
to the strong inflows of foreign exchange from OFW remittances as well as from 
portfolio and direct investments. Real estate prices, on the other hand, moved 
inversely relative to M3. In 2007, the BSP implemented liquidity management 
5.    Figures  were  based  on  data  from  the  BSP’s  Depository  Corporations  Survey  (DCS).  The 
DCS, which replaces the Monetary Survey (MS) as the basis for measuring domestic liquidity, 
features an expanded list of surveyed institutions that includes the BSP, commercial banks, thrift 
banks, rural banks, non-stock savings and loan associations and non-banks with quasi-banking 
functions. The MS concept included only data from the BSP and the commercial banks in its 
survey.206
measures  to  ensure  that  emerging  risks  to  inflation  and  inflation  expectations 
were  addressed  in  a  timely  manner. The  said  measures  included  encouraging 
government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCS) and trust entities to 
deposit their funds with the BSP and the prepayment of its foreign obligations.   
In 2008, the steep drop in PSEi and the slowdown in real estate prices, 
due to the impact of increased uncertainty and risk aversion, were accompanied 
by a marked uptrend in M3. The growth in M3 resulted from the BSP’s measures 
aimed at ensuring sufficient liquidity in the system and addressing any liquidity 
distribution issues that could arise from the global liquidity crunch. Among the 
liquidity-enhancing measures were: the reduction in policy rates; the lowering of 
reserve requirements; and increase in the BSP’s rediscounting budget.  
Figure 8
PSEi and Domestic Liquidity
Year-on-year change in percent
Figure 9
PSEi and Domestic Liquidity
Year-on-year change in percent
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Fluctuations in stock prices moved inversely with credit. Meanwhile, changes in 
real estate prices moved in the same direction as loans. Rising property prices may 
have encouraged banks to channel their loans to the real estate sector. 
Figure 10
PSEi and Credit Conditions
Year-on-year change in percent
Figure 11 
Real Estate Prices and Credit Conditions
Year-on-year Growth
1.2.3   Asset Prices Compared with Economic Activity
Economic activity appears to have favorably influenced trading in the 
stock exchange as the PSEi moved in tandem with GDP and output gap changes 
(Figure 12). Favorable economic activity may have boosted trading in the stock 
market as it augured well for the profitability of PSE-listed companies. Real estate 
price and output indicators showed mixed patterns, moving in the same direction 
during some periods and in the opposite direction in others (Figure 13).208
Figure 12 
PSEi and Economic Output
Year-on-year change in percent
Figure 13 
Real Estate Prices and Economic Output
Year-on-year change in percent
 
1.2.4	 Asset	Prices	and		Industry-specific	and	Legislative/Regulatory			
    Developments
The fluctuations in asset prices may have also been influenced by industry-
specific and legislative/regulatory developments.
1.2.4.1 Stock Prices
The changes in the PSEi may have been driven by the increased participation 
of foreign investors in the domestic stock market. Foreign transactions accounted 
for more than 50% of total value traded from 2003 to 2006 and 2009 (Table 1). 
Increases in the stock price index were usually accompanied by net foreign purchases 
while declines came with net foreign sales (Figure 14). Foreign investors’ shift to 
safer assets (such as US Treasuries and gold) during the global financial crisis was 209
reflected in the reversal of the net buying position of foreign investors in 2007 to a 
selling stance in 2008. Net foreign purchases and sales were, in turn, influenced by 
the inflows in net foreign capital inflows and outflows, respectively (Figure 15). 
Table 1
Proportion of Foreign Transactions to Total Value Traded (%)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2009
(Jan-Sep)
45 42 61 55 51 55 49 49 40
Figure 14 
PSEi and Net Foreign Stock Transactions
Figure 15 
PSEi and Net Foreign Capital Inflows in PSE  -Listed Companies210
1.2.4.2  Real Estate Prices
A number of positive developments have contributed to the growth of the 
real estate industry.  These developments include the following:
Robust  demand  for  office  space  for  information  and  communications  •	
technology (ICT) related firms, such as call centers and other business process 
outsourcing (BPO) firms. Real estate developments targeting BPO clients have 
spread to provinces outside Metro Manila and Cebu. BPO employees, in turn, 
have increased demand for rental housing accessible to their place of work. 
Another factor that spurred property prices was the demand for housing from  •	
overseas  Filipino  (OFs).  From  2006  to  2007,  most  real  estate  developers 
reported that demand from OFs comprised the bulk of their buyers (Cruz, 2008). 
Around 70-80 % of new condominiums in Metro Manila and subdivisions 
in Cavite, Laguna, Rizal and Bulacan were bought or reserved by OFWs or 
their families. It has been estimated that 30 % of the OFW’s income is spent 
on housing, whether to buy a new house, fix present homes, or pay rent. As 
the global financial crisis triggered a severe contraction in economic activity 
worldwide, developers reported that only 20-30 % of their buyers were OFs in 
the fourth quarter of 2008. 
Demand for real estate may have been also supported by the relaxation of the  •	
BSP’s regulations on loan values. In 2002, the loan values for home building 
and  subdivision  development  for  low-and  middle-income  families  were 
increased to 80% of the appraised value of the real estate security and 90% if 
such loans were fully guaranteed by the appropriate government agency. 
Banks, likewise, have made funds more accessible to a broader market base  •	
including OFs, the low-cost segment of the housing sector as well as to private 
developers through various financing schemes.6 They also offered more liberal 
loan terms (e.g., lower down payment, longer terms, lower rates, flexible 
amortisation). Bank charges for mortgage financing have dropped significantly 
from  the  double-digit  interest  rates  charged  historically.  Moreover,  banks 
offered more fixed rates at longer terms, from 8% for one-year tenors up to 
12% for 20-year maturities. Banks have also been willing to grant loans up 
to 90% of selling price for selected projects/developers against the previous 
standard of 60-70% of the appraisal value. 
Demand for real property was also boosted by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225  •	
of 2003 which allowed Filipinos who have acquired foreign citizenship to 
become dual citizens, permitting them to acquire land in the Philippines. The 
6.     From presentations made during the 9th Environmental Scanning Exercise on “Property Sector 
in the Philippines: Developments and Financing” of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on 27 
November 2007.211
new law also affected the mix between foreign and local ownership allowed 
in condominiums.7 
The rise in demand for leisure, retirement and vacation properties also boosted  •	
demand for real estate. 
The real estate uptrend in the Philippines may have resulted in the formation 
of bubbles if not for the institutional weaknesses in the real estate industry and 
the underdeveloped capital market. The Philippine real estate industry lags behind 
its Asian counterparts on account of weak legal rights for borrowers and lenders 
and shallow credit information systems. The law establishing the country’s credit 
information system was passed only in 2008. Bringing legal rights and credit 
information systems at par with developed-country average would facilitate an 
increase in the size of emerging economies’ housing finance system by almost 20% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The absence of a secondary mortgage market for housing loans deterred 
the banking system and other non-bank financial institutions from securitising a 
large volume of their housing loans that would turn these illiquid assets to liquid 
assets. There are still a number of barriers to securitisation in the Philippines, 
which include: 1) difficulty in pricing of volatility and risk factors; 2) higher 
intermediation costs which could inflate overall costs and make it more expensive 
than  traditional  lending;  3)  lack  of  specialist  firms,  standardised  documents, 
qualified  intermediaries,  electronic  and  computerised  infrastructure;  and  4) 
remaining taxation and legal issues.
The rent control law has also tempered the increase in real estate prices. 
In 2002, the law extending the ceiling on the increase in rentals was approved. 
Beginning 01 January 2002 and for a duration of three (3) years thereafter ending 
on 31 December 2004, the monthly rentals of all residential units in Metro Manila 
and other highly urbanized cities not exceeding P7,500 (US$155) and the monthly 
rentals of all residential units in all other areas not exceeding P4,000 (US$82) shall 
not be increased annually by the lessor, by more than 10%.8 
2.   Causes of Asset Price Fluctuations
Relating asset price movements to fundamentals provides a handle by 
which a monetary authority can influence an asset price bubble (Filardo, 2004).
7.    Condominium  Act  of  the  Philippines  (R.A.  4726)  expressly  allows  foreigners  to  acquire 
condominium units and shares in condominium corporations up to not more than 40% of the 
total and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or -controlled corporation. With the 
passage of R.A. 9225, Philippine citizens of another country can now re-acquire their Philippine 
citizenship, allowing them to own a larger share of condominium corporations.
8.     This is the third time that a law was passed to extend the effectivity of rent control since the first 
law was passed in 1985.212
This  section  explores  the  causes  of  asset  price  fluctuations  in  the  Philippines 
by  using  some  statistical  tools  to  relate  stock  and  real  estate  prices  with 
liquidity,  interest  rate,  inflation,  output  variables,  and  exchange  rate.
2.1  Cross-correlation Analysis
Cross-correlation  analysis  showed  that  equity  prices  had  a  stronger 
relationship with the peso-dollar rate (-0.40), and output gap (0.31) compared with 
other variables (Table 2). This could indicate that an appreciation of the peso, 
resulting from strong portfolio inflows and increased investor confidence, tends to 
drive up demand for stocks and share prices. The inverse relation of equity prices 
with the exchange rate reflects the role of foreign players in the local stock market. 
The positive correlation with output gap could mean that the PSEi moves with the 
business cycle.
Real  estate  prices,  meanwhile,  recorded  a  relatively  strong  negative 
relationship with market and policy interest rates (-0.37-0.49). This is in line with 
economic theory that the lower cost money leads to an increase in investments, in 
this case, investments in real estate property. Said increase in real estate investments 
may have lifted property prices. 
The negative correlation of land prices with the peso-dollar rate may be 
traced to foreign exchange inflows, possibly remittances, resulting in a stronger 
peso, which in turn, boosts land prices.  
The positive correlation of real estate prices with credit variables may 
reflect the contribution of credit to the demand for real properties and the subsequent 
increase in real prices; or conversely, the uptrend in real estate prices may have 
prompted banks to lend to the property sector.213
2.2  Factor Analysis
Principal Component factor analysis attempts to establish the importance 
of the changes of a group of variables or “factors” to changes of indicators under 
study. In this section, these factors will be extracted from 16 possible explanatory 
macroeconomic and financial variables. After extracting the factors, each factor 
representing a group of variables will be assigned a name depending on the factor 
loadings of the variables. These factors may be named liquidity factor, real factor, 
and interest rate factor. These are then regressed against asset prices. 
For equity prices, three factors were generated. Factor 1 may be called 
the market interest rate factor given the high loadings in market interest rates 
(Annex 1). Factor 2 is a policy interest rate factor while factor 3 is a credit factor. A 
regression analysis of stock prices against these 3 factors did not reveal a significant 
relationship (Annex 2). 214
For land prices only two factors emerged. Factor 1 is predominantly a 
market  rate  factor  and  Factor  2  a  policy  rate  factor  (Annex  3). A  regression 
analysis of capital land values against these factors showed a significant inverse 
relationship with Factor 1 at the 5% level but the magnitude of change in asset 
prices is minimal. 
 
 
  Alternative estimation methodologies may be introduced to address the 
possible endogeneity of macroeconomic and financial variables and simultaneity 
between  asset  prices  and  macroeconomic  and  financial  variables.  The  weak 
statistical  relationship  between  asset  prices  and  macroeconomic  and  financial 
variables may be traced to the stronger influence of industry-specific, regulatory/
legislative developments, global developments and non-economic factors, such 
as the peace and order situation. For instance, stock market prices may be more 
sensitive  to  external  factors  (movement  of  Dow  Jones,  foreign  interest  rates, 
external shocks). Real estate prices may have also been driven more by increased 
demand for housing by OFs and call centers.      
   
3.   Effects of Asset Price Boom-Busts
Sharp swings in asset prices have called the attention of economists and 
policymakers because of their impact on economic activity and the soundness of 
the financial system (Borio, Kennedy and Prouse, 1994). Extreme fluctuations in 
asset prices tend to amplify the business cycle, leading to sharper upswings and 
downswings and moderate recovery. When asset prices are rising, they influence 
the economy in a favorable way and adverse effects are not fully recognised. Once 
the economy enters a downturn, the preceding favorable cycle reverses, and the 
harmful effects of a bubble become evident in the real sector and in the financial 
system (Shiratsuka,2003). The resulting deterioration in the balance sheet of banks 
and households, has caused widespread financial distress as was evident during the 
2007-2009 financial turmoil. 
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3.1   How do Asset Prices Amplify the Business Cycle
Marked fluctuations in asset prices can affect real output and prices through 
their impact on consumer spending and investments. Generally speaking, rising 
asset prices will stimulate consumer spending because: (1) households’ net capital 
expands; (2) a buoyant stock exchange climate and rising house prices usually 
boost consumer confidence; and (3) credit can be more readily available (Capel 
and Houben, 1998). 
A study of emerging markets showed that the increase in wealth arising 
from  the  rise  in  stock  markets  is  smaller  compared  with  those  of  advanced 
economies. Funke (2004) presents evidence of a small but statistically significant 
stock market wealth effect in 16 emerging markets over 1985–2000, ranging from 
0.2% to 0.4%  change in private consumption for a 10% change in equity prices. 
Pooled results of cross-country studies showed that for developed countries, a 10% 
increase in equity prices implies a 1% increase in long-run consumption in market-
based economies (Australia, Canada, United States, United Kingdom); and 0.4% 
for bank-based economies (Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway and Spain) 
(ECB, 2005; Ludwig and Slock,2002).
In the Philippines, aggregate wealth effect from changes in stock prices 
may not be significant given that less than of 1% of the total population invests in 
the equities market versus Malaysia’s 18%, Hong Kong’s 17% and Korea’s 10%. 
Moreover, the country’s economy remains bank-based as assets of the banking 
system accounts for more than 80% of the assets of the financial system. This 
could imply lower wealth effect similar to those observed in other bank-based 
economies.
3.2  Impact of Asset Price Fluctuations on the Soundness of Financial    
  System
The Philippine banking system remained resilient to the effects of the 
financial turmoil due to its limited exposure to the stock market at around 0.14% 
of their total assets as of October 2009 and to  real estate at 14.7% of total loans 
outstanding as of September 2009. Banks continue to be innately conservative, 
domestically-oriented,  and    traditional  in  nature,  as  it  remains  focused  on 
generating deposits and extending loans. Banking and other financial reforms have 
likewise helped shield the banking system from catastrophic fallouts that the other 
jurisdictions have seen. 
Non-performing loans ratio reached a high of 17.1% in 2001. The ratio 
was reduced gradually to its pre-crisis level with the implementation of the Special 
Purpose Vehicle Act (SPVA) which was passed in 2002 and took effect the following 
year. The SPVA facilitated the transfer and sale of banks’ non-performing assets by 
granting fiscal incentives. Another law was passed in 2006 extending the effectivity 
of SPVA for another two years.216
Banks have also been protected from loan losses by its high level of loan-
loss reserves. Loan-loss provisioning steadily grew from 45% in 2001 to 84.4% 
in 2009. In addition, their adequate level of capitalisation, resulting from the 
implementation of the Basel I framework in July 2001 and Basel II in July 2007, 
served as a buffer for trading losses incurred from the global financial meltdown. 
Their  aggregate  capital  adequacy  ratio  have  exceeded  international  accepted 
standard of 8% and Bangko Sentral’s 10% (Figure 17).
Figure 16 
Non-Performing Loans (NPL) and Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) 
(Banking System)
Figure 17 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Loan-to-deposit ratio recorded a decline due to the lackluster growth in 
bank lending relative to the increase in deposits. Moreover, banks’ high NPL ratio 217
prevented their being more aggressive in their lending operations. From 82.7% in 
2001, the loan-to-deposit ratio reached a low of 65.1% in June 2007. The sharp 
growth in total loans in the second half of 2007 led to an uptrend in the ratio until 
June 2008, then tapered close to 70%.
The loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of banks vary depending on the type of 
loan granted and the collateral used to secure the loan. The LTV ratios range from 
40% to 90%. These have remained generally conservative.
  The continued stability of the banking system may also be attributed to the 
prudential regulations adopted after the Asian crisis on banks’ credit and foreign 
exchange transactions (details are discussed in the next section).
4.   Alternative Policy Responses   
Approaches on how central banks should deal with asset price bubbles can 
be classified under two main policy options: they can choose either to be proactive 
or adopt a reactive policy strategy. Before the 2007-2009 financial turmoil, the 
consensus favored the reactive policy. In the light of the 2007-2009 credit crisis, 
the sentiment appears to lean more towards a more proactive stance.
On the reactive policy side, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) believe that 
under an inflation-targeting framework, monetary policy responds to asset prices 
only to the extent that they affect the central bank’s forecast of inflation. Once the 
predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for, there should 
be no additional response of monetary policy to asset-price fluctuations. 
In  contrast,  Cecchetti,  Genberg  and  Wadhwani  (2002)  argue  that  an 
inflation- targeting central bank might improve macroeconomic performance by 
reacting to asset price misalignments over and above their reaction to inflation 
forcasts and output gaps. Raising interest rates modestly as asset prices rise above 
what are estimated to be warranted levels, and lowering interest rates modestly 
when asset prices fall below warranted levels, will tend to offset the impact on 
output of these bubbles and enhance macroeconomic stability. 
A broader approach proposed by Dell’Aricia is for central banks to situate 
their price stability objective within a wider mandate for macrofinancial stability. 
In this context, monetary policy alone may be too drastic a step to quell asset 
price bubbles. Since the main problem with asset price booms is the potential for 
widespread bank failures, prudential and administrative measures may offer a more 
targeted solution. Central banks may consider the following:
  •  Introducing countercyclical capital regulation and loan-loss provisioning 
requirements.218
  •  Limiting  leverage  by  having  risk-weighted  capital  requirements 
accompanied by relatively simple, but explicit, limits on leverage.
  •  Limiting property lending volatility through countercyclical loan-to-value 
limits. 
  •  Limiting risk-taking by targeting specific sources of risks, for instance, by 
requesting tighter eligibility and collateral requirements for certain types 
of loans and imposing limits on foreign exchange exposures.
  •  Monitoring  problem  banks  through  intensive  surveillance  of  potential 
problem banks and stronger disclosure requirements of risk-management 
policies.
While some action on the part of central banks is called for, overreacting 
to asset prices could also be harmful. Taking action through raising interest rates 
could force the disorderly unwinding of speculative positions in reaction to an 
abrupt change in monetary conditions. Attempts to prick the bubble require large 
changes in interest rates which could impose a greater burden on the economy. 
In addition, the bubble could be immune to aggressive hikes in the first phase. In 
a second phase, though, even marginal intervention can precipitate a generalised 
sell-off, which can aggravate economic contraction (ECB, 2005).
4.1     BSP’s  Response to Asset Price Fluctuations 
   
Under  its  charter,  the  Bangko  Sentral  ng  Pilipinas  is  responsible  for 
maintaining  both  price  and  financial  stability. To  achieve  more  effectively  its 
objective of low and stable inflation, the BSP adopted inflation-targeting as its 
monetary framework in 2002. Under its inflation-targeting regime, the BSP is 
concerned primarily with the stability of the prices of consumer goods and services. 
Its strategy with regards to asset prices is one of benign neglect. Notwithstanding 
this, asset prices are included in the comprehensive data set being monitored by 
the BSP and in monetary policy discussions as they serve as indicators of financial 
imbalances and market expectations. It has been observed that a monetary policy 
strategy  that  monitors  closely  monetary  and  credit  developments  as  potential 
driving forces for consumer price inflation in the medium to long run has an 
important positive side effect. It may contribute at the same time to limiting the 
emergence of unsustainable developments in asset valuations (Issing, 2009).
Given that the supervision of banks and quasi-bank falls within the Bangko 
Sentral’s mandate, prudential measures are the primary tools to influence banks’ 
transactions related directly or indirectly to asset price movements. For instance, 
in the mid-1990s, growing concerns on the possibility of increased speculative 
activityin the real estate sector called for prudence on the part of banks in their 
lending to this sector. Restraining their lending to the real estate sector would help 
mitigate the impact of sudden reversals in the property sector on their balance 
sheets. Thus, the BSP in 1996, conducted studies on banks’ exposure to the real 
estate sector and foreign exchange liabilities that were generally viewed as the 219
factors affecting movements in asset prices. In June 1997, the following regulations 
were issued:
The BSP issued Circular Letter dated 5 June 1997 that prescribed a regulatory  •	
limit on banks’ loans to the real estate sector to not more than 20% of a bank’s 
total loan portfolio, exclusive of loans to finance the acquisition or improvement 
of  residential  units  amounting  to  not  more  than  P3.5  million.  However, 
aggregate real estate loans, inclusive of such loans, should not exceed 30% of 
the bank’s total loan portfolio. This regulation was subsequently liberalised in 
February 2008 as the regulatory limit on real estate loan was rationalised at a 
uniform rate of 20%.  The regulations also expanded the exemptions to said 
limit to include loans for construction of infrastructure projects and housing 
loans to households.
The BSP directed commercial banks to reduce the loan value of the real estate  •	
used as collateral for bank loans to not more than 60% of the appraised value of 
the real estate property, from 70%, exclusive of individual loans not exceeding 
P3.5 million. Housing loans extended or guaranteed under the government’s 
National Shelter Program (NSP), being non-risk assets, are exempted from 
these ceilings on real estate loans.9
The BSP has also adopted the following prudential measures related to 
overall credit, foreign exchange transactions and booking of transactions:
4.1.1 Credit   
A general loan-loss provision (GLLP), equivalent to 2% of the gross  •	
loan portfolio,10 was required under Circular No. 143 dated 1 October 
1997 and Circular No. 148 dated 10 November 1997). These circulars 
were subsequently amended by Circular No. 313 dated 27 December 
2001 which provides for a GLLP of 5% for unclassified restructured 
loans and 1% for unclassified loans other than restructured loans.
The BSP further tightened the provisioning requirement (Circular No.  •	
164 dated 13 April 1998, further amended by Circular 313 dated 27 
December 2001) to include “Loans Especially Mentioned”, regardless 
of collateral (5 %), and secured loans classified as “Substandard” (10-
25 %) among specified loans subject to loan-loss provisioning.
9.    Amended by Circular No.600 dated 4 February 2008. Said circular relaxed rules on real estate 
lending which, among others, excluded housing loans to individual households regardless of 
amount from the 20 % ceiling on outstanding loans to real estate. 





Loans especially mentioned  5%
Substandard
   Secured  10%
   Unsecured  25%
   Doubtful  50%
Loss  100%
Issued guidelines on the grant of loans and other credit accommodations  •	
consistent with safe and sound banking practices.
Tightened  the  rules  and  regulations  on  single  borrowers’  limit  •	
(SBL) by limiting the total amount of loans, credit accommodations 
and guarantees  that a bank may extend to any person, partnership, 
association,  corporation  or  other  entity  to  25%  of  the  bank’s  net 
worth.
Amended the rules governing banks’ dealings with their Directors,  •	
Officers, Stockholders and their Related Interests (DOSRI) which, as 
stipulated, should be in the regular course of business and upon terms 
not less favorable to the bank than those offered to others.
	 4.1.2	Foreign	Exchange		
Required prior clearance on the sale of non-deliverable forward (NDF)  •	
contracts to prevent speculators from using NDFs to artificially bid up 
demand for dollars.
Banks’ allowable open foreign exchange position (either overbought  •	
or oversold) shall be the lower of 20% of their unimpaired capital or 
US$50 million. 
Residents are allowed to make foreign exchange purchases for up  •	
to  US$30,000  for  non-trade  current  account  transactions  without 
documentation.
Residents are allowed to purchase from banks up to US$30 million for  •	
outward investments without prior BSP approval.221
4.1.3	Reclassification	of	Financial	Assets
  To minimise their losses from the collapse in asset prices arising from 
the global financial crisis, banks were allowed to reclassify financial assets from 
categories measured at fair value to those measured at amortised cost to give 
financial institutions flexibility in valuing their assets for a specified period.
4.2     Effectiveness of Policy Responses in Taming Asset Prices
The Bangko Sentral’s shift to inflation-targeting framework from monetary 
aggregate targeting may have helped prevent the formation of asset bubbles. The 
monitoring of a more comprehensive set of variables under an inflation-targeting 
framework may have enabled early detection by the BSP of spikes in asset prices. 
Prudential banking and foreign exchange measures put in place have addressed the 
unsustainable built-up of asset price bubbles.
The effectiveness of the response is shown in the more subdued fluctuation 
in equity prices and real estate prices during the inflation-targeting period. There 
was a reduction in volatility of changes in equity prices from 36.8 in 1991- 2001 
to 27.2 in 2002-2009 (Table 4, Figure 18). In the real estate sector, the volatility 
in land prices recorded a marked drop from 33.5 in 1991- 2001 to 10.6 in 2002-
2009 (Figure 19). Stricter regulations on lending to the property sector may have 
dampened speculative buying of real estate. Analysts and bankers said low interest 
rates and big demand from end-users supported appetite for real estate -- the exact 
opposite of the situation 10 years ago when people were buying real estate on 
speculation that prices would rise further (Dumlao, 2008).
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4.3     Policy Challenges and Directions  
The  reactive  “benign  neglect”  policy  adopted  by  the  Bangko  Sentral 
has not led to asset price escalations seen before the Asian crisis. However, the 
BSP may need to consider taking a more active approach once domestic asset 
markets become more developed. The BSP has pushed for the passage of bills 
aimed at the development of the country’s capital markets. Among these bills 
that have been passed into law were the Credit Information System Act, Lending 
Company Regulation Act and the Personal Equity Retirement Act. In the real 
estate sector, the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) Act is expected to boost 
the  real  estate  sector  and  therefore  would  have  the  potential to  drive  up  real 
estate prices.11 Once REIT is listed in the stock exchange, it would be easier 
to buy and sell the securities of companies representing an interest in income-
producing real estate firms than to directly buy and sell the properties themselves. 
Prudential regulations may need to be instituted to ensure that financial institutions 
engaged  in  these  transactions  are  able  to  manage  their  exposures  in  REITs.
The case for a more proactive approach in dealing with asset prices versus 
a reactive approach is gaining ground, given the recent experience with the global 
financial turbulence. The proposal that central banks should “lean against the wind” 
at the onset of an asset bubble is one of the options that may be studied. In adopting 
this stance, the challenge for Bangko Sentral would be to identify an incipient asset 
bubble or financial imbalance as well as assess whether the bursting of such bubble 
would have adverse consequences on the financial and real sectors.
Related to the issue of the role of monetary policy in addressing asset 
price swings is the proposal that existing monetary frameworks should take more 
explicit account of financial stability as an objective. Given that the collapse of 
the US housing market in 2007 led to a virtual freeze in credit transactions of the 
financial system, alternatives are being considered to include financial stability as 
an explicit secondary objective to complement price stability and to incorporate 
in monetary policy targets certain asset prices or developments in credit markets. 
Measures to be adopted may have to take a macro-prudential dimension to set 
safeguards for financial institutions taking speculative positions in asset markets. 
Strengthening the macro-prudential framework will most likely proceed at a slow 
pace amidst remaining institutional and economic challenges. Thus, this puts a 
strong premium on closer cooperation between prudential authorities and other 
policymakers.
11.   REIT, as defined in Republic Act No. 9856, is a stock corporation formed for the purpose of 
owning in income-generating real estate assets.  Income producing properties include apartment 
buildings, office buildings, warehouses, medical facilities, hospitals, mixed industrial/office 
buildings and other commercial and residential properties.224
The BSP may also have to gear up for the surge in capital inflows to 
emerging markets as part of these inflows are channeled to the stock, foreign 
exchange, real estate and bond markets. The International Institute of Finance 
(2009)  projected  increased  capital  flows  to  emerging  markets  given  the  more 
favorable risk perception of these markets compared to mature economies. Debt 
levels in mature markets have risen significantly due to the massive fiscal stimulus 
undertaken  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  the  financial  crisis.  Their  GDP  growth 
volatility has also increased making their growth outlook uncertain. Moreover, 
some analysts foresee the revival of currency carry trade in 2010 that could pump 
up asset bubbles. Currency carry trades are funded by low-interest currencies (most 
commonly the yen, US dollar and Swiss Franc) and invested in assets of higher-
yield currencies.12
5.   Conclusion  
The global financial crisis renewed interest on the debate on how central 
banks should react to asset price bubbles in the light of the severe effects of the 
collapse of the US housing market on financial and economic activities in emerging 
and advanced economies. The Philippines was not immune from the effects of the 
financial turbulence as shown by the downswing in its stock and real estate prices 
at the height of the financial crisis. The direct effects on consumption, however, 
may have been minimal given the marginal participation of individuals in the 
stock market. The financial system also showed resilience as reflected in the low 
single-digit non-performing loan ratio and the strong capital position of banks. 
The declining loans-to-deposit ratio indicated that banks remained conservative in 
their lending operations.  Banks’ credit activity was constrained by their double-
digit NPL ratios that prevailed from July 1998 to May 2005. Moreover, banks 
were protected from unexpected losses on their loans and investment in financial 
assets by their loan-loss reserves and capital buffer, which exceeded domestic and 
international standards.
  Statistical tests to determine the causes of asset price fluctuations in the 
Philippines  did  not  yield  significant  results. Asset  prices  and  macroeconomic 
and financial variables did not show a significant relationship. There are some 
indications that factors related to changes in interest rates and credit may have had 
some bearing on asset price movements but the magnitude is small.
  
  Consistent  with  its  inflation-targeting  framework,  the  Bangko  Sentral 
promotes price stability as its primary objective. The wider range of variables 
tracked under inflation-targeting may have enabled the Bangko Sentral to monitor 
financial imbalances which could lead to asset price swings. 
12.  Mikka Pineda et al., (2010),” Carry Trade Hotspots: A Currency by Currency Forecast for 
2010”, Roubini Global Economics, http://www.roubini.com/analysis/94821.php225
The Bangko Sentral may have also prevented the formation of asset price 
bubbles through prudential banking and foreign exchange measures. The cap on 
lending to the real estate sector, prudential regulations on overall lending and 
liberalisation of foreign exchange regime amid strong foreign exchange inflows 
helped contain the formation of unsustainable rise in asset prices. 
The global financial turbulence has prompted policymakers to revisit their 
strategy in dealing with swings in asset prices. The Bangko Sentral may consider 
taking a more proactive approach in its monetary policy stance towards escalating 
asset prices once asset markets become more developed. In the real estate sector, the 
enactment into law of the REIT Act will spur trading of real estate-related financial 
instruments. It may also have to situate its policy actions within a broader context 
of a macro-prudential framework, with financial stability objective explicitly being 
pursued hand in hand with price stability. The Bangko Sentral will also have to 
contend with the threat of capital inflows that could feed asset bubbles. Foreign 
investors could increasingly prefer placing their funds in emerging markets such 
as  the  Philippines  than  in  crisis-hit  mature  economies.  Currency  traders  may 
capitalise on the near-zero interest rates in advance economies to resume carry 
trades in 2010, that could in turn, boost asset prices. 
Caution,  however,  should  be  exercised  in  using  monetary  policy  in 
addressing asset price bubbles. The increase in asset prices may be driven not 
by macroeconomic and financial conditions but by changes in external factors, 
industrial demand structure and legislation/regulation. For instance, equity prices 
were  influenced  more  by  global  developments  given  that  foreign  transactions 
accounted for more than 50% of total transactions from 2003 to 2006. In the case 
of real estate prices, the uptrend in these prices was underpinned by the emergence 
of the BPO industry, and the rise in demand for real property by OFWs.226
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ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKS: 
THE CASE OF SRI LANKA
by S. M. Susanthi Medha Kumari1
1.   Introduction
Sri Lanka has not experienced a pronounced asset price bubble or threat 
to economic stability caused by asset price fluctuations in its past decades of 
economic progress as a developing country. However, in the country’s process 
of financial development, further financial liberalisation and deepening of capital 
markets, asset markets and their price dynamics are gaining greater prominence in 
the macroeconomy. 
  This research purports to understand the relationship between the various 
macroeconomic variables and asset prices in Sri Lanka as well as the impact of 
asset price bubbles on macroeconomic stability. It will thereby make appropriate 
policy recommendations to deal with asset price bubbles. Out of the various types 
of asset markets in the country, the present study focuses on land and stock markets, 
as important policy implications can arise from their price fluctuations, which have 
been sparsely investigated through policy research in the Sri Lankan context. 
  Secondary data on macroeconomic variables were drawn from various 
publications of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) and the Colombo Stock 
Exchange (CSE). A time series of land prices was developed with data from the 
Valuation Department of Sri Lanka. Land prices were considered for statistical 
analysis instead of house prices because of the ease to construct a series in the 
given time frame. Cross correlation and factor analysis were used to investigate the 
relationship between asset prices (land and stock) and macroeconomic variables. 
Data from 1996 to June 2009 were considered for the statistical analyses depending 
on data availability. 
1.1   Land Prices
1.1.1   Important Attributes of the Land Market and Trend in Land    
  Prices 
Sri Lanka advocated planned economic policies until 1978 and undertook 
liberalising  measures  thereafter.  Following  the  liberalisation  policies  in  1978, 
1.    The author is the Assistant Director of the Bank Supervision Department, Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka. All views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
official stance of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.230
there was a sudden drastic upsurge in real estate property prices especially in the 
Colombo urban areas. This trend in land prices of Colombo urban areas remained 
until about 1985 reinforced by the numerous construction activities by the private 
sector investors. Between 1985 and 1994 the rate of increase had decelerated. 
Especially the civil unrest which prevailed in the late 1980s caused a slackening of 
the land price growth. From 1994 to 1999, the growth rates in land values gradually 
declined. By 1999 the rate of increase had become rather small implicating many 
real estate developers (Wijepala, 1997 and Jinadasa, 2000). There is no published 
research on land price trends after 1999. 
Lack of a price index for land and housing complicates understanding 
the price dynamics in these markets and is a main constraint for this research. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this research, a series of land prices was constructed 
using professional valuations on land plots by the Valuation Department. To ensure 
the homogeneity of land plots considered and to disregard the effects on prices by 
other property characteristics, a specification of land types to be considered was 
first defined. The valuations reflect market prices while the legal interest is assumed 
to be the unencumbered freehold. Geographical coverage was restricted to five 
selected Divisional Secretariats in the Colombo district (wherein the commercial 
and administrative capitals of Sri Lanka are situated). The trends in market prices 
of different categories of land are plotted in Figure 12. 
Figure 1
Land Price per Perch3
                Source: Valuation Department
2.    These values provide the general tendency in land prices in the area under study and cannot be 
used to attribute value to any specific land. They will be invalid as evidence in support of value 
of a specific land before a Court of Law or Tribunal.
3.  1 perch = 5.03² meters.231
In order to ascertain the tendency of land prices depicted above, another 
source  of  data  was  approached,  namely,  nine  Registered  Finance  Companies 
(RFCs) which have high amounts of land stocks. Figure 2 provides the trend in 
residential land prices of land sales undertaken by RFCs in 11 selected Divisional 
Secretariats of the Colombo District from 1998 to June 2009. The trend is a 12 
month moving average.
Figure 2
Trend in Residential Land Prices in Colombo Based on Land Sales by 
Finance Companies
Both sources reveal the same trend. The gradual growth from 1998 to 
2004 is followed by a rapid upsurge until 2007. There is a decline in land prices in 
2008 and 2009.
For  the  analysis  of  land  price  movements  in  this  paper,  residential 
and  commercial  land  values  obtained  from  the Valuation  Department  will  be 
used. Industrial and agricultural land is sparse in the Colombo District due to 
high  population  density  and  urbanising  characteristics,  and  hence  will  not  be 
considered.
Existing literature provides a number of factors which primarily influence 
the general land price level in the Colombo District, such as the inelastic supply, 
high population density, urban migration, land fragmentation, foreign currency 
remittances of expatriates, and improvement of economic and social infrastructure 
(Wickramarachchi  2000,  Perera  1995,  Ariyawansa  2006),  apart  from  the 
macroeconomic variables considered and analysed in this study as being associated 
with land price movements.232
Land and housing constitute the bulk of household wealth and is the most 
important form of household savings. It can be contended that land and housing 
is more a consumption good than an investment good in the Sri Lankan society. 
The illiquid nature of real estate property leading to less instances of re-pricing 
complicates the monitoring of price movements as property is a heterogeneous 
product  (Financial  System  Stability  Review  2006,  CBSL). The  less  advanced 
mortgage financing systems and the resultant effect of small financial accelerator 
type mechanisms result in the possibility of a speculation-led asset price bubble being 
subdued to some extent. However, past studies have revealed that high inflationary 
environment or inflation expectations do make the public seek alternative investment 
opportunities other than bank deposits and gilt-edged securities, leading them to 
consumer durables, such as land and gold (Perera A, 1995, Premathilake 1999 as 
cited by Ariyawansa, 2006).  Also, a case study has revealed that profit motivated 
land transactions do take place in the Colombo District (Wickramarachchi, 2000). 
A study undertaken by the CBSL in 2006 by examining Land Registry records 
revealed that 23% of land transactions in the Colombo District between the period 
2004 to 2006 were for business or investment purposes (Financial System Stability 
Review 2006, CBSL). Regardless of the scope for speculation, property prices 
(land and buildings) are an important determinant of the level of investments and 
real economic growth. Property price fluctuations can affect output volatility and 
stability of the financial system. Therefore consideration of property prices in the 
conduct of monetary policy and prudential policy is important.
The subsequent sections attempt to infer the general association between 
land prices and macroeconomic variables, which cause asset price fluctuations and 
are affected by asset price booms and bursts. 
1.1.2   The Trends in Land Prices against the Trend in Credit and    
  Liquidity Measures
Land price growth has moved in tandem with growth in credit measures as 
depicted in Figure 3. This relationship between credit measures and land prices is 
an indication of land purchases being fueled by credit and more loans being granted 
secured on appreciating land values. Similarly, trends in monetary aggregates and 
land prices show that land prices have surged in the period with high growth in 
money supply (Figure 4). In 2007 and 2008, the land prices recorded a negative 
growth, amidst the tight monetary policy stance adopted by the Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka and the containment in credit to mop up the excess liquidity from the system 
during the high inflationary period. 233
Figure 3
 Land Prices and Credit Measures
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Figure 4 
Land Prices and Liquidity Measures
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka234
1.1.3 Trends in Land Prices and Interest Rates
  Asset  price  bubbles,  particularly  the  ones  which  created  the  greatest 
disruption  to  real  economic  growth  and  financial  system  stability  in  various 
countries were fueled by excess liquidity through low interest rate regimes. To 
study this phenomenon in Sri Lanka’s context, the trends in interest rates and 
land prices are depicted in Figure 5. The reversal of land price growth in 2008 
is associated with high interest rates with the Weighted Average Prime Lending 
Rate exceeding 20% in 2008. The interest rates increased in response to the tight 
monetary policy stance adopted by the CBSL to curb high inflation (as measured 
by the Colombo Consumers Price Index 1952=100 and 2002=100). Apart from 
this, an apparent causal relationship between interest rates and land prices cannot 
be deciphered through trend analysis. Due to the data restriction of land prices to 
10 years and 6 months, the cyclical movements in interest rates and land prices 
cannot be studied in depth. 
Figure 5
Land Prices and Interest Rates
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
1.1.4   Trend in Land Prices, Growth in Private Remittances and Net   
  Capital & Financial Account
The causal impact of foreign flow on land prices is low because of the 
prohibitive laws for foreigners to purchase land in Sri Lanka (due to a 100% 
transfer tax) and the regulations limiting banks from borrowing in foreign currency 
(which could be channeled to the real estate sector). However, private transfers 235
from migrant Sri Lankan employees are regarded as a major source of funds for 
many families to invest in land and housing. This fact is affirmed by Figure 6 to 
the extent that higher growth and decline in private remittances are accompanied 
by similar movements in land prices with a time lag. 
Figure 6
 Trend in Land Prices, Private Remittances and Net Capital & 
Financial Account
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
1.1.5 Land Prices and Real Economic Activity
The phase of land price upsurge is associated with GDP growth of 6% or 
higher and rapid increase in private consumption (Figures 7 and 8).  This phase 
is characterised by rapid growth in credit measures. Previous studies have shown 
that expansion in the construction industry and GDP in Sri Lanka are strongly 
associated (Ramachandra, 2006). In 2008, private consumption had continued the 
upsurge in spite of the falling land values. Reduced private consumption before 
increase in land values can also be deciphered.236
Figure 7
Land Price and GDP Growth
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Figure 8
Growth Rates in Land Prices and Private Consumption237
1.2   Stock Prices
1.2.1   Trend in Stock Prices and Important Attributes of the Stock    
  Market
  At present, there is one stock market in Sri Lanka, namely, the Colombo 
Stock Exchange. There were 235 listed companies in 2008.  Market capitalisation 
as a percentage of GDP was 30% in 2006 and 11% in 2008. 
  Figure 9 depicts the trend in the All Share Price Index (ASPI). The ASPI 
has been rather stable from 1995 to 2002, mostly recording negative year on 
year growth. Continuous high growth rates were recorded between 2002 and late 
2006. There is a large drop in prices especially during 2008. From June 2007 to 
March 2009, the reduction was 36%. The rapid upsurge in mid-2009 followed the 
eradication of terrorism from Sri Lankan soil and other favorable conditions in 
the macroeconomy, such as reduction in interest rates. However, the rapid growth 
was considered to have features of a bubble by certain financial analysts, before 
it stabilised subsequently. It can also be seen that land prices and ASPI exhibit 
similar trends, in that the higher growth phases and decline of both kinds of assets 
occur in same periods. 
Figure 9
Trend in the All Share Price Index (ASPI)238
The following section attempts to infer the general association between 
the ASPI, financial variables and macroeconomic variables which cause asset price 
fluctuations and are affected by asset price booms and bursts. 
1.2.2 Stock Prices and Interest Rates 
Low  interest  rate  phases  are  associated  with  strong  growth  in  ASPI 
particularly in 2003 - 2004 and in late 2009 (Figure 10). The crash in ASPI in early 
2007 is associated with high interest rates, with the yield on 3-month Treasury Bill 
reaching a peak of 20% in January 2008. This crash occurred amidst the slowdown 
in economic activity which was a result of the global economic downturn and high 
domestic inflation (stemming from high import prices). The increase in market 
interest rates was a response to the tight monetary policy stance adopted by the 
CBSL to curb high inflation. However, the period of rapid interest rate growth 
from 2005 is accompanied by high growth in the ASPI as well. 
Figure 10
ASPI and Weighted Average Yield on Treasury Bills of 6-month Maturity239
1.2.3 Trend in Stock Prices and Liquidity 
  The ASPI has moved in tandem with the growth in monetary aggregates 
as depicted in Figure 11.
Figure 11
Share Prices and Liquidity Measures    
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the Colombo Stock Exchange
1.2.4  Trend in Share Prices, Foreign Investment in the Stock Exchange 
and the Exchange Rate
Whereas certain phases of ASPI movements cannot be fully explained by 
interest rate fluctuations in the period from 2002 to 2006, the high growth in ASPI 
during that period is associated with higher net foreign purchases in the stock 
exchange (Figure 12). The climb in the ASPI took place after adopting a floating 
exchange rate regime in 2001. Foreign investment in the stock market does not 
exert a substantial pressure on the exchange rate. The net investments in stock 
by foreigners were LKR 14 billion in 2008 whereas the net capital and financial 
account balance in 2008 amounted to LKR 193 million. 240
Figure 12
Trend in Share Prices and Net Foreign Investment
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the Colombo Stock Exchange
1.2.5 Trend in Stock Prices and Real Economic Activity
Stock prices incorporate information on investor expectations for the future. 
The relative movements of ASPI and GDP growth exhibit no apparent relationship 
for Sri Lanka for the period under consideration (Figure 13). The listed companies 
do not represent all vital sectors of the economy whose performance determine the 
GDP, such as paddy cultivation in the agriculture sector and the apparel industry 
in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 13
Trend in ASPI and GDP Growth
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the Colombo Stock 
Exchange241
1.3   Regulations and Policy Responses to Asset Price Fluctuations
1.3.1 Government Policies
  The government did not introduce any polices or regulations aimed at 
controlling land and house prices or stock prices. The land and housing market has 
been widely regarded in terms of its social significance rather than their impact on 
the financial and economic stability. A synopsis of changes in government policies 
and major initiatives with regard to land and housing is as follows.
Figure 14
Government Policies and Initiatives for Land and Housing
Period Policies and Significant Measures Undertaken
Before 
1948
Establishment of the Land Registry and private property ownership.
1948-1970
The National Housing Department was set up which provided financial 
assistance to low income groups to overcome housing problems.
1970-1977
Government direct involvement in the provision of housing. Two Land 
Reform Acts in 1972 and 1975 vested large amounts of private lands with 
the State which controlled land allocation.
1977-1995
Government  policy  reverted  towards  private  property  ownership. 
The  government  engaged  in  providing  appropriate  infrastructure  and 
institutional set-up, including private sector participation in the banking 
sector.   The  Urban  Development Authority  and  the  National  Housing 
Development Authority were set up to address housing needs of the low 
income groups while programmes such as “Decade of Housing” and “Gam 
Udawa” were undertaken. Real estate firms mushroomed in this period.
After 
1995
The government pursued a supportive role for the private sector by providing 
infrastructure, mobilising finance, undertaking technological research, etc. 
It also undertook programmes such as the sustainable township program 
and the clean settlement programme and “Gama Neguma” for the rural 
sector. Attempts were made to increase land supply in Colombo through 
reclaiming land realising encroached lands. Importantly, the Condominium 
Management Authority was set up in 2005 to regularise and ensure the 
appropriate quality of condominiums being built by the private sector at 
a fast rate.
Source: Compiled by the author based on Ariyawansa (2008) and Ranasinghe (2006) 242
The applicable taxes, charges and levies are as follows:
For specialised housing banks, corporate income tax is at a concessionary  •	
rate of 20%. 
Stamp duty on gift and transfer of land and buildings: For gift, the first  •	
LKR 50,000 is at 3% while the rest is at 2%. For transfers, the first LKR 
100,000 is at 3% while the rest is at 4%. 
Stamp duty of 100% for non-residents to acquire land and buildings in Sri  •	
Lanka.
Housing projects with not less than 25 units can receive certain incentives  •	
under the BOI. They include a tax holiday for 5 years and a concessionary 
tax rate of 10% for 2 subsequent years and 20% thereafter. The import of 
capital goods is exempted from customs duty.
Interest  payment  on  housing  mortgages  are  tax  deductible.  Capital  •	
repayment too is deductible, qualifying up to a certain limit.
Apart  from  these,  there  are  interest  subsidy  schemes  for  low  income  •	
earners and government employees.
  At present, maximum rent cap for a number of types of buildings (mostly 
non-residential) are fixed under the Rent Act No 7 of 1972 while certain rent-
related issues can be resolved through “Rent Boards”. The Land Reform Law 
limits individual land ownership to 50 acres (1 acre = 4047 square meters).
1.3.2 Monetary Policy
The CBSL has not responded to fluctuations in asset prices. Moreover, 
it does not take into account property price movements in conducting monetary 
policy. The CBSL undertakes a monetary targeting framework, in which reserve 
money is the operating target and broad money (M2b) is the intermediate target. 
Market-based instruments are used including open market operations (OMO) and 
the statutory reserve requirement (to a lesser extent). However, the CBSL monitors 
the developments in the stock market as an important part of the financial system 
and an important source of information.243
Though the CBSL does not respond to asset price bubbles, policy rate 
changes in 2008 as a response to high inflation had a significant bearing on asset 
prices. The CBSL did not bring in direct credit controls, but it was a part of the 
policy package to contain inflation by containing credit. The policy rate corridor 
which prevailed in 2008 was 10.5% and 12% while the weighted average yield on 
3-month Treasury Bill reached a maximum of 19%. During this period, growth in 
bank credit contracted. Sharp decline in share prices accompanied this scenario in 
the background of adverse economic conditions from the global financial crisis, 
reduced profitability in listed companies and certain corporate governance issues 
in blue chips. As land and building purchases are largely funded by credit from 
financial institutions, the high interest rates led to contraction in the growth of loans 
for the said purposes followed by a reduction in the prices of land and buildings or 
a low amount of transactions. 
1.3.3 Prudential Policy
One of the two objectives of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka is financial 
system stability. Therefore, it has imposed important safeguards through prudential 
regulations which take into account the risk to the banking system from asset price 
fluctuations. The following are the major regulations prevailing which take into 
account systemic effects of asset price fluctuations.
Under the capital-adequacy ratio calculation for credit risk under Basel II  •	
standardised approach, the risk weights relevant for property loans have 
been specified. They take into account the type of mortgage, value of 
security and specific provision available.
Progressive discount rates have been stipulated for provisioning for non- •	
performing loans secured by property mortgages in order to take into 
account the risk of non-realisation of assets.
A general provision (portfolio provision) of 1% out of performing and  •	
watch listed loans need to be maintained by licensed banks, which can 
serve as a cushion against systematic risks. 
Foreign borrowings of banks (Domestic Banking Units) are restricted to  •	
15% of the capital funds. This limits borrowing from abroad to channel 
funds to the real estate sector.
Shareholdings of banks in listed and non-listed companies are restricted  •	
to certain proportions of the banks’ capital base and the paid-up capital of 
such companies.244
The Securities and Exchange Commission has imposed a regulation on  •	
margin trading, which stipulates that margin credit facility to a client should 
not exceed 50% of the market value of the client’s securities portfolio 
which is pledged to secure the facility.
Legislature allows the CBSL to impose credit controls and practice moral 
suasion on licensed banks and registered finance companies. However, no credit 
controls have been imposed restricting banks or finance companies from lending 
to the real estate sector. Loan to value ratios are also not controlled (except for the 
loan to value ratios of related party exposures of banks). The CBSL has undertaken 
to  facilitate  the  adoption  of  fair  value  accounting  in  terms  of  International 
Accounting Standards 32 and 39 and International Financial Reporting Standards 
9 which is pertinent to asset pricing and will improve the transparency of financial 
institutions.    
2.   The Causes of Asset Price Fluctuations
2.1   Cross-correlation Analysis Between Asset Prices and Macroeconomic  
  Variables  
  An analysis of the past behaviour of asset prices amidst changes in various 
macroeconomic variables can reveal the stylised factors relating to asset price 
booms and bursts. Through a cross-correlation analysis between asset prices and 
selected financial and macroeconomic variables, the results tabulated in Annex 1 
were obtained. 
2.1.1   Cross-correlation Analysis between Stock Prices and 
          Macroeconomic Variables
  Interest rates appear to have the strongest correlations with movements 
in ASPI (All Share Price Index). A strong negative relationship of around 0.35 
for yield on Treasury Bills is displayed on a contemporaneous basis or with ASPI 
leading by short time periods. Call money rate and prime lending rate too are 
related to the movements in ASPI on a contemporaneous basis or with ASPI 
leading by short time periods. Deposit rates are not so strongly related to ASPI but 
the correlation lasts for around 4 quarters with ASPI leading. 
  Liquidity measures, on the other hand, display a weak positive correlation 
with ASPI on a contemporaneous basis or with the ASPI leading by short time 
periods. Inflation (as measured with the Colombo Consumers Price Index) displays 
a weak negative relationship on a contemporaneous basis or with the CCPI leading. 
It also appears that share prices increase when the exchange rate is appreciating. 
Cross-correlation coefficients with credit measures do not display a meaningful 
relationship. However, banks are seen to be advancing more loans against equity 245
collateral on a contemporaneous basis when share prices appreciate. Stock prices 
are leading indicators of GDP which could be due to share prices incorporating 
expectations on future economic growth.
2.1.2  Cross-correlation Analysis Between Land Prices and           
          Macroeconomic Variables 
  Interest  rates  appear  to  be  leading  indicators  of  land  price  changes. 
According to the correlation coefficients, interest rates are leading with long lags, 
though the highest correlation is seen between 1 to 3 lags. Credit measures too are 
strongly correlated to land price movements on a contemporaneous basis or with 
land prices leading. The general pattern of the relationship appears to be that land 
prices are leading and the change in credit measures follow. However, there is a 
significant relationship at one or two quarter lag with credit measures leading. 
  Liquidity  measures,  too,  display  a  considerable  relationship  with  land 
price movements between -2 and +2 lags and leads of land price. GDP growth is 
positively related to land price for about 6 quarters with land prices leading. Private 
consumption is negatively related to land price movements and private consumption 
is basically leading in this relationship. This suggests that consumption spending is 
reduced in anticipation of high property prices. 
2.2   Factor Analysis
  Factor analysis was performed to derive a few common factors from the 
range of macroeconomic variables affecting asset prices, in order to identify the 
variables which mainly cause asset price fluctuations. 
2.2.1 Stock Prices  
  Four  factors  were  derived  for  the  group  of  macroeconomic  variables 
which were deemed to influence equity prices (Annex 2). The first three factors 
account for 90% of the cumulative variation. The first factor can be named as the 
interest rate factor by studying the loadings. The second factor represents money 
supply. The third factor mainly represents credit measures as well as consumer 
price inflation. This can be named as the “other factor”. Through regression of 
these factors on equity price, it was found out that the short term interest rate is the 
only significant factor.
2.2.2 Land Prices  
  Five factors were derived from the group of variables deemed to influence 
land prices. (Annex 3). The first four factors account for 90% of the cumulative 
variation. The first factor represents money supply.  The second factor represents 246
the interest rates while the third factor represents the credit measures. The fourth 
factor is the other factor in which consumer price inflation is significant. Through 
regression analysis, it was found out that the first two factors are significant.
  Rapid upward movements in asset prices were associated with more relaxed 
interest rate policy, and resultant growth in liquidity and credit measures. In the 
recent scenario, reversal in both share price and land price growth accompanied 
tight monetary policy which was a response to high inflationary pressure. Out of the 
variables considered, share prices and land prices are most responsive to interest 
rates. The effect of interest rates on share prices and land prices are of considerably 
different lags. Foreign currency inflows do not have a major impact on asset price 
changes, though private remittances for land transactions and foreign activity in 
the share market are seen to have some influence. The other causal factors for the 
asset price behavior in the recent past are terrorist activities, defeat of terrorism, 
global financial crisis and the ensuing economic downturn, etc. 
3.   The Effects of Asset Price Booms and Bursts  
  Asset price fluctuations can threaten the stability of the financial system 
while amplifying the business cycle through influencing the level of investment 
and consumption.
3.1   Impact of Asset Prices on Consumption  
  Considering the effects on the business cycle by private consumption, life 
cycle/ permanent income models advocate that consumption spending is a function 
of households’ lifetime financial resources. Financial and property wealth are a 
part of these resources. Therefore, changes in property values influence private 
consumption spending and thereby have the capacity to amplify the business cycle 
(International Monetary Fund, 2000). There were 128,250 local shareholders against 
a 21 million population in 2008, out of whom active individual investors amounted 
to 32,182. Therefore, share ownership is highly concentrated and represents quite 
a minute fraction of household wealth. Hence, the wealth effect of share prices on 
consumption can be considered negligible.  
  Land, on the other hand, constitutes a large proportion of households’ 
wealth. It was shown by the trend analysis that land prices and private consumption 
are associated. Financial institutions’ perception of an individual’s net worth is 
affected by values of property owned by them. It was revealed that as land values 
increased, consumption loans secured by property increased, and stagnated in 
2007/08 when land value growth reversed. 
  Apart from the wealth effect, asset prices, particularly property prices, can 
affect consumption spending through change in collateral values for consumption 
borrowing. This  channel  will  be  greatly  enhanced  by  efficient  and  developed 247
mortgage credit systems wherein diverse types of mortgage instruments and a 
secondary market exist (International Monetary Fund, 2008).
  The wealth effect of asset prices on consumption spending could not be 
estimated as a part of this research due to insufficiency of data. The land price 
series is limited for 10 years and data on private consumption and real national 
income are available only yearly. 
3.2   Impact of Asset Price Fluctuations on Investment  
  Property values exert a significant influence on investment by acting as 
collateral for credit. Changes in the level of investment credit extended by banks 
against changing property prices can amplify the business cycle. Investment credit 
will be reduced during phases of economic slump accompanied by low asset prices, 
while a credit boom will take place when asset prices rise accompanied by buoyant 
economic conditions.
  Correlation  and  trend  analysis  showed  that  advances  by  financial 
institutions in Sri Lanka are highly correlated with the growth rates in property 
prices. Also, more loans are advanced based on equity collateral when share prices 
appreciate. The slowdown in economic growth in 2008-2009, resulting from the 
global recession, was accompanied by high non-performing asset ratio (in May 
2009 the gross non-performing ratio was 11% while the net non-performing ratio 
was 4.9%), marked stagnation in private sector credit, and reversal in asset prices. 
Therefore, the quality of bank assets is closely related to the business cycle. Falling 
asset prices result in low level of credit as banks become more risk averse. The 
curtailment in credit to the private sector due to various reasons, including general 
economic downturn and decline in property prices, contributed to amplifying the 
slowdown in economic activity. 
3.3   Features of the Mortgage Market and its Impact on Consumption and 
Investment Credit
Asset prices affect the level of consumption and investment spending 
through affecting the collateral values of land and buildings, thereby amplifying 
the business cycle. The magnitude of this effect depends to a great extent on the 
level of sophistication of the mortgage financing system (International Monetary 
Funds, 2008). 
In Sri Lanka, mortgage credit out of total GDP in 2004 was 25.7% while 
mortgage credit out of total assets was 50.7% (Ranasinghe, 2006). Therefore the 
mortgage market is small compared to developed countries though the banks’ 
exposure to the mortgage market is substantial. The types of mortgage instruments 
are rather limited while property development loans are of a low life span. Also, 248
most loans are on fixed rates and the ability to refinance mortgages through higher 
property values is low. Registration of land and property transactions and mortgage 
bonds in the Land Registry is a rather cumbersome process. All records at the 
Land Registry are still maintained manually and organised according to systems 
introduced  many  decades  ago.  Financial  institutions  have  to  undergo  many 
legal burdens and bear large administration costs when executing or enforcing a 
mortgage bond. The time taken to realise funds from foreclosed properties is also 
rather long.
There is a lack of a secondary market for mortgage loans. There are legal 
impediments  for  “true  securitisation”  to  take  place. According  to  the  current 
practice, instead of the creation of a special purpose vehicle, a Trustee will be 
appointed with whom the underlying assets are mortgaged. The investors have full 
recourse on the issuer. The issuer is not allowed to de-recognise the securitised 
assets from its balance sheet and must maintain regulatory capital against them. 
Vehicle leases of finance companies and specialised leasing companies have been 
subject to securitisation in the financial sector while banks have not ventured into 
securitising their loan portfolios. Complex structured products are not common in 
Sri Lanka yet. This has also limited the alternative funding sources for banks.
  Due to the small shareholding among the public and small proportion 
of credit granted by banks for share purchasing or against share collateral, the 
consequential effects of share prices on real economic activities mediated by credit 
is low.
  These institutional features of the mortgage financing system reduce the 
financial accelerator effect of property values being collateralised for consumption 
and investment lending. Previous empirical research has shown that house prices 
and consumption correlate strongly when an advanced mortgage market is present 
(IMF, 2008). The less developed mortgage market and property financing systems 
in Sri Lanka hinder the extensive use of property as collateral, thereby reducing the 
impact of property price fluctuations on aggregate demand.
  However, the mortgage market is deregulated, and there are no limits 
on the amount and type of loans or ceilings on interest rates. The impending 
Securitisation Act is expected to enhance securitisation under the auspices of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Competition among the financial institutions 
in the background of minimum regulations can be expected to further develop 
the mortgage financing systems and create more innovative and flexible mortgage 
products.249
3.4   Effects of Asset Price Fluctuations on the Soundness of the      
  Financial System
  The imminent threat to financial system stability posed by bursting of asset 
price bubbles leading to recession has been well exemplified in other different 
countries. Financial institutions contribute to the forming of bubbles by excessive 
credit creation reinforced by low interest rate regimes and through adopting lax 
lending standards based on overly optimistic assumptions. Bursting of bubbles 
will result in the erosion of bank balance sheets through reduction in collateral 
values and increase in non-performing assets (NPAs), while market liquidity will 
dry up eventually, threatening the resiliency of the financial system. Moreover, the 
resulting contraction in credit will amplify the economic downturn. Therefore, it 
is important that financial institutions do not drive up asset prices and/or be geared 
to weather an asset bubble burst. As the Sri Lankan financial system is more bank-
based and the use of property collateral is widespread, the above transmission 
mechanism leading to financial system instability and its effects being spilled over 
to the real economy may be significant.
3.4.1 Overview of the Regulatory Role of the CBSL
           Sri Lanka has a multi-regulatory system. The CBSL, as per its co-objective 
of financial system stability, regulates and supervises licensed banks and registered 
finance  companies  which  account  respectively  for  57%  and  4%  of  the  assets 
in the financial system (as at 31.12.2008). The licensed banks with the bulk of 
the assets in the financial system represent the major sub-sector in the financial 
system. Supervision of banks emphasises on appropriate risk management tools 
and techniques to be instituted in banks, robustness of the internal control systems 
and good corporate governance. 
3.4.2 Diversification of Lending by Licensed Commercial Banks
  The threat to the stability of individual banks and the banking system 
depends, in part, on the exposure of banks to the asset markets. According to Figure 
15, banks’ exposure to the property market is substantial which has reached its 
maximum in 2007. Financial institutions prefer to make advances for consumption 
or investment based on physical collateral than on information. Correlation analysis 
also revealed that the amount of property loans and loans against immovable 
assets are strongly related to land prices. Banks’ exposure to the stock market 
is low (except that most of the private banks are listed on the Colombo Stock 
Exchange).250
Figure 15
Proportion of Loans against Stock and Property Collateral, 
and Housing Loans 
Granted by Licensed Commercial Banks (LCBs)
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Source: CBSL annual reports
3.4.3 Non-performing Assets (NPA) and Loan Loss Provision
  Non-performing assets of licensed banks have been closely aligned to 
business cycles as is evident from the gross NPA ratios in the last decade (Figures 
16 and 17). The gross non- performing asset ratio reached a maximum of 11% in 
May 2009. Banks have maintained high levels of provisions even when the NPA 
ratio declined. While the increase in NPA was mainly caused by adverse economic 
conditions due to the global recession, the increase in interest rates exacerbated the 
effect on NPA. The weighted average interest rates on loans secured by immovable 
property reached a maximum of 30% in 2008 (CBSL Annual Report 2008).  This 
scenario was also accompanied by falling land prices. Financial institutions trying 
to realise funds from foreclosed assets with increasing NPA also may have driven 
down property prices in the Colombo District. 251
Figure 16
Trend in NPA and Provisions
                               
Figure 17
Net NPA to Capital and Provision Coverage
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka 252
Figure 18
Movements in the Credit to Deposit Ratio
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
3.4.4 Capital Adequacy and Leverage
  Figure 16 depicts the movements in Capital Adequacy Ratios (CAR) under 
the capital adequacy regulations which prevailed in the respective time periods. The 
regulatory minimum is 10%. When the economic growth slowed down in late 2008 
and 2009 and the NPA ratio increased, the CAR has also increased. Throughout this 
period, the banking sector remained well resilient. Trend in leverage in terms of the 
credit to deposit ratio (Figure18) does not reveal any issues. The ratio decreased in 
2009 because of the contraction in credit.
3.4.5 Issues Faced by the Finance Companies
  The finance companies are heavily exposed to real estate dealings, through 
investment in real estate as well as land fragmentation to sell to customers along 
with credit products. Past studies have found that land fragmentation resulted in 
greater price hikes of land in the respective areas (Wickramarachchi, 2000). In early 
2009 finance companies faced liquidity problems when there were large deposit 
withdrawals. The declining land prices during this period added to the liquidity 
issue. The CBSL had to intervene to provide measures through a state-owned bank 
for the finance companies to avail themselves of the land stock and obtain liquid 
funds. However, the finance companies are not systemically important. And this 
issue was successfully resolved. A similar scenario occurred in finance companies 
during the 1980s together with a general reduction in the real estate prices. 253
3.4.6   Pro-cyclicality of Financial Regulations and Risk Taking 
          Behavior of Banks
  When the risk taking behavior of financial institutions is closely aligned to 
business cycles and highly correlated among themselves, the pro-cyclicality impact 
of asset bubble burst and economic downturn will worsen. Financial regulations 
as risk mitigation methods too are inherently pro-cyclical. The risks assumed 
during  booms  will  materialise  during  downturn.  During  economic  downturn 
when asset prices decrease and NPA increase, risks for financial institutions will 
increase, undermining their capital position and lending capacity leading to an 
amplification of the economic downturn. When capital requirements and other 
regulations, as well as banks’ own risk management methods are more sensitive 
to current measurements of risks, this pro-cyclicality effect will be greater. Banks 
will be compelled to bring in capital during economic downturn when capital is 
more expensive. The increased cost of capital may be passed on to borrowers as 
increased interest rates, leading to a credit crunch.
  Pro-cyclical risk taking behavior and herding behavior of banks and the 
public can arise from the usage of ratings developed by a few external rating 
institutes for risk management and performance assessment. The same outcome 
arises when financial institutions outsource the development of system technologies 
for internal controls and risk management procedures to the common quantitative 
analysts. 
  In the Sri Lankan context, the quality of banks’ assets is closely in line with 
the business cycle in the past decade. This increases the sensitivity of the capital 
charge and the pro-cyclical effect. As Sri Lanka will implement Basel II – Internal 
Ratings Based Approach in 2013, the effects of banks’ own assessments of risks are 
not strongly reflected in the capital charges yet. When the economic growth slowed 
down in late 2008 and 2009 CAR increased as the NPA ratio increased (Figures 
16 and 17). There are a number of reasons for credit contraction in 2008 and 2009, 
such as interest rate hike and increased investment in Treasury Securities by banks 
which yield a high return. But the causal effect of increased risk averseness of 
banks during this period and the reduction in asset prices cannot be ruled out.
4.   The Policy Response
4.1   Effectiveness of Past Policies
  The CBSL did not respond to asset prices using monetary policy, and does 
not take asset prices into account when formulating monetary policy. However, 
monetary policy had an impact on these markets as both stock prices and land 
prices had been rapidly increasing together with monetary liquidity and credit 
during in the first few years of the present decade. Monetary policy tightening 254
to contain inflation in 2007 accompanied falling prices in these asset markets as 
well. The loosening of the monetary policy stance in 2009 saw share prices rapidly 
increasing backed by improved investor sentiment from eradication of terrorism. 
But the effects of the tight monetary policy stance did not transmit through asset 
markets to adversely impact on the financial system and the real GDP growth due 
to the nature of the asset markets.
  Prudential  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  playing  an  important  role  in 
mitigating risks to the financial system and macroeconomic stability that can be 
caused by fluctuations in collateral values of banks. The general provisioning 
requirement of 1% ensured that banks provide in good times to weather the bad 
times and is a measure against pro-cyclical risk taking behavior. The financial 
system remained resilient to the various shocks during the past decade. However, 
regulations directly pertaining to asset price fluctuations, such as control on loan 
to value ratios and exposure limits to the real estate sector, were not brought in. 
The regulations are subject to inherent issues such as pro-cyclicality, to a certain 
extent. 
4.2   Policy Recommendation
  Property prices are an important determinant of the level of investments 
and real economic growth. Regardless of the scope for speculation, property price 
fluctuations can result in output volatility and instability in the financial system. 
Therefore consideration of property prices in the conduct of monetary policy and 
prudential policy is required.
  The appropriate response to an asset price bubble situation needs to be 
contextual. Alternative policy strategies are explored and debated in the literature 
by basing on past bubble episodes in various countries (Hunter, Kaufman and 
Pomerleano, 2002). One policy prescription is that asset price bubbles should be 
dealt with in the eventual unwinding and monetary policy should be focused on 
achieving macroeconomic goals of low inflation and stable growth. An opposite 
view is to tighten monetary policy in the early stages of the bubble and to relax 
in the unwinding, even if asset prices do not bear incremental information about 
macroeconomic goals of monetary policy. Monetary policy tightening to respond 
to asset prices can have an adverse impact on the rest of the economy through 
credit contraction and lowered consumption and investment. The cost of monetary 
policy tightening should be justified by the benefits to be gained in the long term by 
averting high future inflation, financial system instability, burden on real economic 
growth and amplification of the business cycle.
  Monetary policy tightening to respond to an asset price bubble requires 
identification of a bubble sufficiently early in its formation. One of the main 
reasons identified in the literature for not pricking an asset price bubble through 
monetary policy tightening is that it is impractical to identify ex-ante whether 255
asset price movements can be justified by fundamentals or not (Hunter, Kaufman 
and Pomerleano, 2002). The attempt made by this study to isolate some causal 
macroeconomic variables cannot provide conclusive information on the causes 
of behavioral patterns of asset prices in the future. The stock price upsurge in 
mid-2009 left many wondering as to whether it is a bubble because improvement 
in fundamentals were also present (peaceful investor climate, likely growth in 
productivity, improved macroeconomic situation through low inflation and interest 
rates, etc).
 
  The leading indicator properties of asset prices depend on the depth of 
the asset markets. Unless strong form market efficiency holds, asset prices will 
not reflect all available information. Whether assets are traded in deep and well 
informed markets in Sri Lanka is a questionable issue.
  The capital account in the balance of payment is not yet fully liberalised 
and  is  subject  to  stringent  exchange  control  regulations.  Foreign  investors 
exiting from their investments due to asset price collapses and financial system 
vulnerability can exert pressure on the exchange rate to depreciate, particularly in 
small open economies. It will impact adversely on inflation. The net stock exchange 
investments by foreigners (at LKR 14 billion in 2008) is small compared to total 
inflows of foreign currency (net capital and financial account amounted to LKR 
193 million in 2008), and therefore scope for effects of the above manner is low. 
  Responding through monetary policy when a bubble is identified can be 
complicated through long lags in monetary policy transmission. In some periods 
in Sri Lanka, such as the latter part of 2009, inflation, land prices and stock prices 
did not track each other. Therefore, tightening monetary policy to influence the 
growth in prices of one asset market can have unwanted outcomes on the other 
asset markets and the macroeconomy. Also the lag effect of interest rate changes 
on inflation is considerably different for stock and property. A bubble could arise 
in one asset class as well, as stock prices rose in the period of 2002-2006. 
  As the wealth effect of asset prices on consumption is low due to reasons 
such as the lack of a deep and advanced mortgage market, the impact on consumer 
spending is subdued to some extent. Therefore, the output volatility from financial 
accelerator effect caused by changes in property values is low. Monetary policy 
transmission through house prices (apart from the cost and availability of credit 
for consumption and investment) also depends on how advanced the mortgage 
market is (International Monetary Fund, 2008). In Sri Lanka, the mortgage market 
and housing finance system is not at an advanced state comparable with developed 
countries, and hence property value impact on investment through Tobin’s q and 
the impact on consumption through collateral value are low.
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  If the stability of the banking system is affected, relaxed monetary policy 
stance alone cannot resolve effects of an asset price burst. Banks will not be able 
to increase lending if their capital is eroded. The adverse effects of an asset price 
burst are the accumulation of debt and increased NPA. If policy rates are increased 
to prick a bubble and contain credit, the higher interest rate itself will exacerbate 
the NPAs and outweigh the benefit of reduced borrowing. The scenario which took 
place in late 2008, in which interest rates and NPA increased, and credit growth 
reduced, is an indicator of this outcome.    
  Although  “leaning  against  the  wind”  in  terms  of  tightening  monetary 
policy to counter a bubble and its effects remains one avenue, the above discussion 
points out that such a measure is impractical and its costs will far outweigh the 
benefits in the Sri Lankan context at present. The appropriate monetary policy 
strategy is not to tighten policy rates in an upswing, but to deal with the effects of 
a burst if financial system instability and low output growth are deemed. 
  The role of prudential policies and other structural adjustments to reduce 
the likelihood of a speculative bubble forming and to minimise the adverse impact 
of an asset price collapse are important. The exposure of the banking system to 
the property market is high in Sri Lanka, and pro-cyclical risk taking behavior 
could lead to credit-fueled asset price increases or a credit crunch during economic 
downturn. When the capital account of the balance of payment is liberalised, foreign 
flow through banks can have an important bearing on asset markets. The mortgage 
financing systems keep on advancing and the impending Securitisation Act will 
be quite important in this respect. Rapid growth in loan stock of the country is 
envisaged to increase GDP per capita. This environment calls for strong prudential 
policies to mitigate asset price bubbles forming, maintain the resiliency of the 
financial system and to minimise the spill- over of a burst to the real sector.
  In light of the above, a proper monitoring mechanism of asset prices 
needs to be developed, which brings forth the need for price indices for land and 
housing, and an appropriate institutional framework to gather and disseminate data 
on asset price trends. It is important that advances in mortgage financing systems 
and banks’ credit standards are continuously monitored. Policies and procedures 
are required to increase the flow and accuracy of information for asset pricing 
through adequate disclosures. As fair-value accounting can result in huge volatility 
in returns of banking stock leading to stock price crash, the guided adoption of fair-
value accounting is required especially where non-active markets or unreasonable 
market prices are present.
  To reduce the pro-cyclical risk taking behavior, risk management methods 
based on an understanding of the pro-cyclical nature need to be developed. Stress 
testing technique is an appropriate risk management tool in this respect as it allows 
a broader view of credit risk and the business cycle effects can be taken into 257
account. Dynamic counter-cyclical provisioning and counter cyclical features in 
collateralised lending are two other techniques to reduce pro-cyclicality. 
5.   Conclusion
  Asset prices have not become a source of macroeconomic instability in Sri 
Lanka, and did not warrant explicit policy response. However, the price dynamics 
in asset markets will be of greater concern to regulators as the asset markets expand 
and deepen in the process of economic development, especially with the envisaged 
high growth in loan stock, liberalisation of the capital account of the balance of 
payments, enhancement in mortgage markets including securitization, etc.
  Considering the present situation of asset markets, the systemic importance 
of the stock market is low and the scope for a speculation-led asset price bubble is 
low in the land and housing market. But contrary to the expectations of many of 
a constant increase in land prices, data gathered for this research revealed that a 
reversal in land price growth did take place in 2008. Monetary policy and its effects 
on market interest rates, liquidity and credit growth did have a significant bearing 
on asset prices. As revealed by this study, interest rates are a main cause for stock 
price and land price fluctuations. Monetary liquidity also has a certain amount of 
influence on stock and land prices while credit measures have an influence on land 
prices.
 
  Regardless of the presence of fundamentals and the scope for speculation, 
asset price fluctuations can threaten the stability of the financial system and amplify 
the business cycle, becoming a source of macroeconomic instability of a country. 
The Sri Lankan financial system is bank-based as opposed to being market-based, 
and the exposure of banks to the property market through collateral is substantial. 
Asset prices, particularly the prices of land and buildings, have a significant bearing 
on consumption and investment credit, and can thereby amplify the business cycle. 
However, the mortgage market and property financing systems are less advanced in 
Sri Lanka. This hinders the extensive use of property as collateral and the financial 
accelerator is dampened to a certain extent.  
  Policy measures to be taken with regard to bubbles need to be contextual. 
Monetary policy tightening to contain an asset price bubble can have adverse 
effects on the rest of the economy. In Sri Lanka, the wealth effect of asset prices 
on consumption is low and the impact on consumer price inflation through this 
channel is less. Increase in interest rates to prick a bubble can increase NPA while 
reducing credit growth. Meanwhile, to respond through monetary policy, bubbles 
need to be identified sufficiently early, for which there are practical implications. 
The lag effects of interest rate change and the situation of a bubble in one of the 
asset markets only need to be considered. Therefore, the better response to an asset 
price bubble (land and stock) in the Sri Lankan context is “benign neglect” and 
“mop up after burst” according to the threat to the financial system. 258
  However, it is important that the CBSL and other relevant policy makers 
monitor asset price movements and their interaction with financial variables as well 
as the causal impact on real economic activities. In the event of an asset price burst 
or large reduction in prices, the central bank can bring in appropriate monetary 
policy measures to deal with a liquidity tightening, if the financial system stability 
is affected.
  Since the Sri Lankan banks are substantially exposed to property markets, 
property price burst or an increase in non-performing loans accompanied by property 
price decline can implicate the smooth functioning of banks. The effects of an asset 
price burst can exert significant influence on the stability of the financial system 
considering the high exposure of banks to the asset markets and the contribution 
of credit to property price growth. Banks will remain resilient to high NPA in 
a scenario of economic downturn, high interest rates, and asset price decline if 
risk management in banks is strong and banks have taken prudential measures in 
advance. The business cycle can be affected also by the pro-cyclical risk taking 
behavior of banks. Therefore, the CBSL can take into consideration the structural 
adjustments needed to ensure properly functioning asset markets and evaluate the 
impact of prudential policies on asset markets. Prudential policies can be used to 
respond to asset price fluctuations as well as to ensure a properly functioning asset 
market.
  In light of the above, policy recommendations that can be made at this 
juncture are not to respond to asset price fluctuations with monetary policy but to 
strengthen prudential policy. It is also important to establish a proper mechanism 
of evaluating asset price dynamics, their causal financial variables and the impact 
on the stability of the financial system, as well as the real economic growth.259
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CHAPTER 9
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO TAIWAN’S 
CENTRAL BANK
by Ho Dong Ching*1
1.  Introduction
The Central Bank of the Republic of China, Taiwan (CBC) adopts monetary 
targeting as its institutional framework for conducting monetary policy. CBC’s 
policy instrument is the rediscount rate. The Financial Supervisory Commission, 
Executive Yuan (FSC) was inaugurated as the sole statutory financial supervisor 
and conferred authority for the supervision of all financial institutions, including 
banks, securities and insurance companies effective 1 July 2004. From then on, 
CBC ceased the function of carrying out regular full-scope on-site examinations of 
individual financial institutions. Pursuant to the Financial Supervisory Commission 
Act, there is a coordination mechanism in place among the financial supervisory 
authorities. The “Financial Supervision Coordination Group”, which comprises 
the senior officers of the FSC, CBC and other related financial authorities, meets 
every month and whenever it is necessary to coordinate and deliberate on issues of 
financial supervision, management and examination.
  This paper studies the observed price fluctuations from 1989 to 2009 of 
two major assets in Taiwan: stocks and houses. The first task for this analysis 
is to define workable asset price booms/busts and bubble. Busts1 are defined as 
periods when the four-quarter trailing moving average of the annual growth rate 
of the asset price falls below a particular threshold. The threshold is set at –5 % 
for house prices and –20 % for stock prices. The thresholds also pick up the major 
well-known asset price busts—Japan in the early 1990s, the dot-com episode in 
the 2000s—while still leaving asset price busts as relatively infrequent episodes. 
Booms are defined as the opposite way. We also define boom as a bubble which 
bursts as a bust occurs immediately after this boom.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Following the introduction 
in Section 1, we discuss the causes of asset prices fluctuations in Section 2. We use 
simple correlation and factor analysis to derive factors from macro and financial 
variables  and  discuss  which  factors  mostly  affected  asset  prices  fluctuations. 
Section 3 explores the effects of asset price boom-busts. We measure the wealth 
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effect of asset prices on consumption and discuss how asset prices amplify the 
business cycle. We look at the extent to which banks are well diversified and the 
impact of the financial stability measures, such as LTV ratios, loan-to-deposit ratio, 
and the Basel capital ratio, to analyse the effects of asset price fluctuations on the 
soundness of the financial system. Section 4 discusses the policy response. In this 
section, we discuss to what extent were the policy responses effective in taming 
asset prices. What is the most appropriate monetary policy instrument in reacting 
to asset prices? What are the side effects of over reacting to asset prices? The 
conclusion is presented in Section 5. 
1.1   Trends in Asset Prices and Macroeconomic and 
  Financial Variables
1.1.1 Stock Market 
  There are three big cycles in Taiwan’s stock market over the past four 
decades2 (Figure 1). We identify 16 stock price booms and 10 stock price busts 
from 1989:Q2 to 2009:Q1 (Figure 2). 
1.1.2 Housing Market
  Taiwan has enjoyed four years of rising house prices and the recent house 
price boom periods started in the first quarter of 2006. The Cathay Real Estate 
Indicator rose from around 80.51 in the fourth quarter of 2002 to a peak of 107.76 
in the fourth quarter of 2008. This boom has lasted longer than any other - five 
years. Taipei City and County are hardest hit by this boom.
We identify 13 house price booms and 5 house price busts from 1989:Q2 to 
2009:Q1 (Figures 1 and 2). However, an extraordinary housing market boom took 
place from 1986 to 1991. There followed a bust from 1995 to 20033. 
2.     The first and biggest one occurred between the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s and 
peaked in February 1990. The weighted price Index of the Taiwan Stock Exchange shot up more 
than 10-fold from late 1986 to early 1990 and then plummeted by more than 75% from the peak 
in just 6 months. Since 1990, Taiwan’s stock market has been the worst-performing major stock 
market in the world, except for Japan. The second cycle started in 1996 and ended in 2001. The 
third one started from 2005.
3.     The monetary policy stance, which was also unprecedented, eased during this period, with the 
monetary aggregates growing at unusually high rates (e.g., M1B growth reached 51% between 
1986:Q4 to 1987:Q1). The stock price index climbed rapidly from around 1100 at the end of 
1986 and reached its peak of 12,000 in early 1990. In August 1989, the central bank raised the 
rediscount rate twice from 4.5% to 7.75%, and increased the required reserve ratio by 4%, aim-
ing to abate the high growth rate of money supply.269
Figure 1
Stock Prices and House Prices
Figure 2
Asset Booms/Busts
(Real GDP gap is a good leading indicator for stock price booms/busts)
According to bubble’s definition, there is only one small asset bubble  stock 
price bubble occurred from 2007:Q3 to 2008:Q1 and it burst in 2009:Q1.
1.1.3 Macroeconomic and Financial Variables
1.1.3.1 GDP Gap 
Low new loan interest rate helped feed the rise in house price since 2003. 
However, declining new loan interest rate and house price existing simultaneously 270
during 1997-2002 show other factors, for example negative GDP gap, dominating 
this result4.
Boom and bust phases in asset prices are associated with the economy’s 
growth prospects and the size of the economy’s output gap5. We can find a close 
relationship between the real GDP gap and house price index (Figure 3). But real 
GDP gap does not have predictive power for house price booms/busts (Figure 2).
Figure 3
Close Relationship between Real GDP Gap and House Price Index
1.1.3.2 Other Macroeconomic Variables  
Empirical  results  show  that  the  fundaments  are  inconsequential  in 
explaining the variation of the Taiwan’s stock price (Chen & Chen 2007). The 
close trend relationship and cointegrating relationship between real consumption,
4.     The main results of Borio et al. (1994), and Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) analyses are the 
following. (i) There is evidence of a significant multi-directional link between house prices, 
monetary variables, and the macroeconomy. (ii) The link between house prices and monetary 
variables is found to be stronger over a more recent sub-sample from 1985 to 2006. (iii) The 
effects of shocks to money and credit are found to be stronger when house prices are booming.
5.  The results of cointegration analysis suggest that there exists a long-run relationship between 
house prices and macroeconomic variables. Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is usually 
used to investigate the short-run dynamic relationship between house prices and macroeconomic 
variables. The results of VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Test show that there is 
bi-directional causality between house prices and interest rates and exchange rates.271
real GDP, stock price and house price are found in empirical study6. We also thought 
that securitisation has affected both the stock price and house price7.
1.2   Regulations and Policy Responses to Asset Price Fluctuations
1.2.1 Regulations  
Taiwan experienced asset price booms/busts during the second half of the 
1980s. These booms/busts not only have a huge interactive impact on monetary 
policy, but also have significant and persistent effects on real economic activities. 
The Taiwanese press has been full of stories about the “house price bubble”.
There are two conditions for foreigners who want to buy properties in 
Taiwan. First, reciprocality - their home country must allow Taiwanese to buy 
properties in its territory. Second, the foreigner must apply to the appropriate 
municipal authority when buying and/or leasing a property.
1.2.2 Policy Responses to Asset Price Fluctuations
CBC once imposed a series of selective credit controls on bank loans 
secured against vacant plots of land and on loans made to investment companies 
in February 1989 Figure 4. In counteraction to the house market downturn from 
1997 to 2003, a bill allowing foreigners to buy property was ratified to revive the 
housing market after in October 2001. The base lending rate was lowered from 
7.1% in 2002, to an average of 3.7% in 2003. Other additional measures were 
adopted8. The corrective measures worked. The economy bounced back.
6.     But estimation effect of Error Correction Model is not ideal. According to the analysis of impulse 
response function and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, loan was the most important 
variable affecting asset price gap and rediscount rate and new loan interest rate cannot explain 
the fluctuations of housing price and stock price. However, the result does not mean monetary 
policy cannot affect asset prices. VAR analysis also shows that overnight interest rate, growth 
rate of real GDP, CPI, M2 and foreign exchange rate can affect house price and stock price. The 
trend of loan growth rate and house price index was quite close (Ho, 2007).
7.     Goswami, Jobst and Long (2009) indicated that securitisation has complicated both the conduct 
of monetary policy and the effect of interest-rate transmission to the real economy and altered 
the nature of some macro-financial linkages.
8.   The measures included low-interest mortgage loans, allowing enterprises with capital from 
mainland China to invest in Taiwan’s real estate market, slashing land value incremental tax 
rate, helping organise private asset management corporations; and expanding the supply of new 
housing units to people with lower incomes, workers, government employees, and families of 
servicemen.272
Figure 4
Selective Credit Control and Stock Price
2.   The Causes of Asset Prices Fluctuations
2.1   Financial Liberalisation and Deregulation
A notable feature of the Taiwanese economy in the 1980s is the huge 
capital flows. A common background for most asset price boom-bust cycles was 
financial liberalisation and deregulation9 including capital flows and substantial 
credit expansion. Credit expansion is then accompanied by a rapid rise in asset 
prices (Figure 5).
2.2   Low Interest Rate
Low interest rate has contributed to the growth in household debt10 (Figure 
6). Household debt could be as a potential indicator of boom-bust behaviour. The 
rapid increase in household debt has been accompanied by strong growth in house 
price. Household debt and house price exhibit strong correlation during boom and 
bust periods (Figure 7). In general, Taiwan’s term structure of interest rates11 is
9.     Measures included deregulation of interest rates, exchange rate, the banking industry, securities 
markets, promoting competition among financial institutions and lifting of the capital mobility 
restraint and the desire to suppress the pace of the NT dollars appreciation.
10.   Low interest rate allows households to borrow more from financial institutions. The ratio of  
borrowing from financial institutions to household debt was fairly stable at around 90% in 
Taiwan.
11.     Some refer to yield curve in academic study. We describe it as different term structure of different 
rates usually used by practitioners. 273
quite reasonable12. The low level of the interest rate structure has contributed to the 
growth in housing market since 2003 (Figures 6, 7, and 8).
Figure 5
Interest Rate and Credit Contribute to House Price 
Figure 6
 Low Interest Rate Has Contributed to the Growth in Household Debt
12.   Taiwan’s money market rates (Cp and ON) generally traded below rediscount rate since 2003. 
In principle, government bond yield, new loan interest rate and one-year deposit rate should 
be higher than the rediscount rate. But as a result of an unbalance in the demand and supply 
condition in the government bond market, its unsound mechanism, and the banking sector’ 
competition, these rates trended lower than the rediscount rate in some episodes of 2008. 274
Figure 7
Household Debt as a Potential Indicator of Boom-Bust Behaviour
Figure 8
Taiwan’s Term Structure of Interest Rates
2.3   Abundant Market Liquidity
We use the outstanding amounts of CBC’s CDs to represent market liquidity. 
Situations of market liquidity are often associated with asset-price booms. There 
are a number of emerging markets, including Taiwan, which are characterised by 
a structural surplus of liquidity. Taiwan’s market liquidity was quite strong since 
2001. We may attribute the high level of asset markets to “the elevated level of 
market liquidity” (Figure 9).275
Figure 9
Abundant Market Liquidity
2.4   Cross-correlation Analysis 
We  examine  quarterly  data  over  periods  of  over  9  to  20  years,  most 
data from 1989:Q2 to 2009:Q1, depending on the availability of the data in our 
country. House prices during this period primarily represent the to-be-constructed 
residential house prices in whole Taiwan area. The stock price index is the value-
weighted index of the Taiwan Stock Exchange.
Interest  rates  used  in  this  study  include  inter-bank  overnight  rate, 
commercial paper rate, bank deposit rates, and bank loan rates. Data description 
details are given below in Table 1.276
Table 1
Data Description
Variables Description Period Source
CA Current account balance 1989:Q2-2009:Q1 FSM*
Cdout Amounts outstanding of CDs issued by CBC 2001:Q1-2009:Q1 FSM
Cons Real private final consumption expenditure 1989:Q2-2009:Q1 DGB
Corecpi










31-90 days commercial paper rates in secondary 
market
1989:Q2-2009:Q1 FSM
CPI Consumer price index 1989:Q2-2009:Q1
DGB
(Monthly data)
CPIR Annual growth rate of CPI 1989:Q2-2009:Q1
Calculated 
from cpi by 
author
Creditr The ratio of Loan/RGDP 1989:Q2-2009:Q1
Calculated by 
author
Dep 1-year deposit rates by banks (end of period) 1989:Q2-2009:Q1 FSM
Faca












To-be-constructed residential housing prices index 






Li Taiwan Business Cycle leading index 1989:Q2-2009:Q1 CEPD
Loan
Loans  of  major  financial  institutions  (end  of 
period)
1989:Q2-2009:Q1 FSM
M2 Average of daily M2 monetary aggregates figures 1989:Q2-2009:Q1 FSM








Weighted  average  of  overnight  interest  rates  of 
interbank call loan market
1989:Q2-2009:Q1 FSM
Rd Discount rate of CBC 1989:Q2-2009:Q1 FSM
RGDP Real GDP 1989:Q2-2009:Q1 DGB
RGDPGAP Real output gap 1990:Q2-2009:Q1
Calculated by 
author
RGDPR Annual growth rate of real GDP 1989:Q2-2009:Q1 DGB
TWSE
The  value-weighted  index  of  the  Taiwan  Stock 
Exchange
1989:Q2-2009:Q1 FSM
*FSM：Financial Statistics Monthly Republic of China (Taiwan)
DGB：The Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) of Executive Yuan277
Table 2 shows the cross correlation of the asset prices with other variables. 
The cross-correlation coefficients between stock price and GDP, CPI, liquidity (M2 
and Cdout), credit (loan), cons are positive. Negative correlation exists between 
Rd and future stock price. Rd is leading indicator for stock prices. As expected, 
stock price and house price shows positive correlation. 
The cross-correlation coefficients between house price and GDP, liquidity 
(Cdout), credit (loan) are positive. New loan interest rate will have lagged impact 
on house price. Strong currency fuels booms in the housing market.  
Basically, strong GDP, CPI, liquidity, credit, and consumption will fuel 
booms in asset prices.13
Table 2
Cross-correlation Coefficients Asset Prices and Other Variables
TWSE ( i ± )
-4Q -3Q -2Q -1Q 0 +1Q +2Q +3Q +4Q
RGDP 0.0431 0.1196 0.1801 0.2026 0.2014 0.2118 0.2381 0.2617 0.3130
CPI 0.1299 0.1610 0.1740 0.1521 0.1180 0.1503 0.2161 0.2810 0.3692
M2 0.0870 0.1334 0.1558 0.1542 0.1526 0.1778 0.2123 0.2555 0.3317
Cons 0.3192 0.2307 0.2171 0.1850 0.1583 0.1246 0.1283 0.0911 0.0296
Rd 0.1734 0.1523 0.1461 0.1411 0.0912 -0.0088 -0.1020 -0.1815 -0.2360
Cdout 0.4559 0.4502 0.4963 0.5243 0.5255 0.5324 0.5467 0.4834 0.3746
Loan 0.0836 0.1386 0.1713 0.1765 0.1718 0.1955 0.2396 0.2955 0.3889
House 0.2835 0.3136 0.2988 0.2512 0.2049 0.1882 0.1630 0.1376 0.1226
House ( i ± )
-4Q -3Q -2Q -1Q 0 +1Q +2Q +3Q +4Q
RGDP -0.0558 0.0252 0.1059 0.1828 0.2466 0.2904 0.3171 0.3209 0.3098
M2 -0.1563 -0.0842 -0.0162 0.051 0.1109 0.1220 0.1320 0.1394 0.1439
Cons -0.0849 -0.0331 0.0442 0.0799 0.1354 0.1203 0.1580 0.1439 0.1675
Newr 0.3765 0.3249 0.2706 0.2106 0.1516 0.0990 0.0343 -0.0256 -0.0831
Cdout 0.1474 0.2530 0.3551 0.4610 0.5663 0.5904 0.6122 0.6416 0.6339
FX -0.5166 -0.5270 -0.5278 -0.5187 -0.5090 -0.5241 -0.5175 -0.4880 -0.4371
Loan -0.0013 0.0732 0.1422 0.2070 0.2608 0.2677 0.2597 0.2474 0.2324
2.5   Factor (Principal Component) Analysis
The main objective of factor analysis is to find a small number of factors 
that can explain most of the variation in the original data series. Two original data 
series (real variables and financial variables) are used to extract a list of common
13.  We also calculate cross correlation between asset price changes and other variables. However, 
the results are very similar with the results of Figure 11.278
factors in this study. Table 3 presents the factor analysis result based on these 
two original data series. Each Eigen value represents the proportion of variance 
accounted for by the corresponding factor. Normally the first factor accounts for as 
much of the variability in the data as possible, and each succeeding factor accounts 































Two original data series: real variables (CA, Cons, CPI, LI, RGDP) and financial variables (ON, Rd, 
CP, FX, Newr). 
Two criteria are used to choose the number of factors in this analysis. The 
Kaiser criterion keeps those factors with their corresponding Eigen values greater 
than one. The Joliffe criterion discards those remaining factors once the percentage 
of explained variance reaches a certain threshold (for example 80%). The result 
shown in Table 3  indicates that the first factor, real1 and f51 in the two original 
data series, satisfies the Kaiser criterion as their corresponding Eigen values are 
greater than one. Also, these two factors account for 81.97% and 87.86% of the 
variability in the data, respectively. These findings suggest that there does exist one 
common factor that drives these two original data series respectively.
Regression results indicate that only one factor, real1, significantly and 
positively affected house price change (Table 4). There are several reasons why the 
real economy tends to be positively correlated with house price developments. One 
reason is that these real variables may react in the same direction to cyclical shocks 
to the economy. For example, large current account may be indicative of loose 
monetary policy which leads to the creation of excessive liquidity in the economy 
and fuels excessive price changes in the housing markets14.
14.   In order to make sure no spurious regression exists, we examine the unit-root tests and find 
that f51, real1 and TWSE are I (1). Thus, cointegration test is needed to make further analysis. 




∆ TWSE ∆ House
Coefficient (t-Statistic) Coefficient (t-Statistic)
f51 113.27 (0.96) -0.18 (-0.59)
real1 51.31 (0.26) 1.01 (4.01＊)
2 R =-0.01, D-W=1.96
2 R =0.19, D-W=2.04
3.   The Effects of Asset Price Boom/Busts  
The effects of asset price boom-busts can have adverse effects on financial 
stability and economic activity. Benign neglect view, activist view and discretionary 
judgment view are three views on policy implications of asset price movements for 
important policy debate15.
In Taiwan, cumulative rise/decline in stock prices is 527%/-307% over 
the entire duration of the boom/bust periods (Tables 5 and 6). Cumulative GDP 
gap during stock price booms’ periods is 43%. However, it is a costly, cumulative 
GDP gap -43.3%, for the 4 quarters after last stock price boom. Cumulative GDP 
gap during stock price busts’ periods and for the 4 quarters before first bust is 
–32% and –4.7%, respectively. The relationship of the negative GDP gap and stock 
price busts is positive during bust periods. Real GDP gap is a very good leading 
indicator for stock price booms/busts.
Cumulative  rise/decline  in  house  prices  is  87%/-30%  over  the  entire 
duration of the boom/bust periods. Cumulative GDP gap during house price booms/
busts periods is -16%/4%. Real GDP gap does not have predictive power for house 
price booms/busts.
15.  Effects of asset prices are sufficiently incorporated in a flexible inflation targeting regime, so-
called the ”benign neglect view”, such as Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Bean (2003), Mishkin 
(2007) . The ”activist view” thought macroeconomic performance can be improved by respond-
ing proactively to asset prices, such as Cecchetti et.al (2000). The ”discretionary judgment 
view” supports some discretion should be entertained, acknowledging that abrupt changes in 
asset prices, followed by sharp unwinding of financial imbalances, may inflict substantial costs, 
such as Borio and Lowe (2002), Bordo and Jeanne (2002). A broad framework is outlined in 
which these policy questions are addressed in Filardo (2001) and Filardo (2004). Filardo (2008) 
considered endogenous propagation of (fundamental and non-fundamental) asset price move-
ments with feedback from key state variables (output, interest rates) and multivariate extension 
with (weak and strong) interaction between stock and housing markets and their spillovers into 
the real economy (macro economy block) to revise previous framework. See Eitrheim (2008).280
Table 5
 House Price and Stock Price Booms
House Prices Stock Prices







Cumulative rise in prices (%)1 87% 527%
Cumulative GDP gap during boom periods2 -16% 43%
Cumulative GDP gap for the 4 quarters before first 
boom
13.3% 13.8%
Cumulative GDP gap for the 4 quarters after last 
boom
3.9% -43.3%
1  Cumulative price rise is measured over the entire duration of the boom periods.
2  Cumulative GDP gap is measured as the accumulated deviation from a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott 
filter with a smoothness parameter of 1600 for the boom periods.
Table 6
House Price and Stock Price Busts
House prices Stock prices







Cumulative decline in prices (%)1 -30% -307%
Cumulative GDP gap during busts’ periods2 4% -32%
Cumulative GDP gap for the 4 quarters before first 
bust
-1.4% 5.9%
Cumulative GDP gap for the 4 quarters after last 
bust
-0.04% -4.7%
1   Cumulative price decline is measured over the entire duration of the bust periods.
2   Cumulative  negative  GDP  gap  is  measured  as  the  accumulated  deviation  from  a  one-sided 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothness parameter of 1600 for the bust periods.
Table 7
Regression Results of Asset Price Boom/Bust
Stock  House 
Coefficient (t-Statistic) Coefficient (t-Statistic)
Loan/RGDP (-1) 13.22 (3.38** ) 6.07 (2.16*)  
Rd (-1) -5.05 (-3.07**) -1.79 (-4.38**)
Yg (-2) 4.48 (5.94**) 0.63 (4.16**)
Facaratio (-2) 32.14 (1.03) -21.47 (-2.60**)
FX (-1) -4.03 (-3.61**) -0.52 (-2.01*)－
2 R =0.40, D-W=0.46
2 R =0.25, D-W=0.42
Loan/RGDP, Rd, real GDP gap, FX are leading indicators of stock and 
house price boom/busts. There is a clear negative relationship, in which greater 
cumulative real housing appreciation is associated with bigger deficit increases or 281
capital inflows. Housing appreciation fuels increased borrowing from abroad in 
several ways, whereas increased availability of foreign funds could ease domestic 
borrowing terms and encourage housing appreciation16.
Facaratio is a leading indicator of house price boom/busts (Table 7, Figures 
10, 11, 12 and 13). This is consistent with the findings of Aizenman and Jinjarak 
(2009) (one percent of GDP increase in the current account deficit is associated 
with a 10 % increase in real estate prices) and IMF (2009). (Credit and current 
account deficits providing useful leading indicators of asset price busts).
Figure 10
Loan/RGDP is a Leading Indicator for House Price Booms/Busts
Figure 11
Loan/RGDP is a Leading Indicator for Stock Price Booms/Busts
16.   See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009).282
Figure 12
Monetary Policy Stance (Rediscount Rate) is a Leading Indicator 
for Stock Price Booms/Busts
Figure 13
Monetary Policy Stance (Rediscount Rate) is a Leading Indicator 
for House Price Booms/Busts
3.1   How Do Asset Prices Amplify the Business Cycle?  
Asset prices incorporate information about future output growth. Asset 
price busts can be an amplifying factor of the business cycle. Asset prices and283
business  debts  both  co-move  with  the  business  cycle17.  Bank  credit  behaves 
procyclically. Banking sector can affect asset prices and amplify the magnitude of 
the business cycle.
The result of regressing LI (or its proxy RGDP) on house bust shows that 
the coefficient is significant and positive shown as follows. The result of stock bust 
is similar.
Correlation coefficient between Taiwan’s house price and total private 
consumption  is  very  small.  Correlation  varies  significantly  across  countries, 
ranging from 0.79 in the U.K. to 0.042 in Taiwan18. Taiwan’s real income positively 
affected real consumption. The real consumption elasticity of real income was 
0.519. Both behaviors of Taiwan’s asset price booms/busts and leading indicator 
have consistent behaviors (Figures 14 and 15). Asset prices do amplify business 
cycle.
17.   Asset prices incorporate information about future output growth (i.e., asset prices affect current 
spending only to the extent that they are “leading indicators” of future changes in economic 
activity). On the basis of the findings of various studies, asset prices do seem to provide useful 
information about the pace of future economic activity and, in particular, about variations in the 
output gap. There is extensive empirical evidence that asset price changes tend to lead output 
growth in industrial countries. In general, stock prices are found to have a significant predictive 
power on output growth in many countries. In contrast, property prices tend, for the reasons 
fixed supply in the short-run and traded in less liquid markets, to be less forward-looking and 
more contemporaneously correlated with output growth. Yet, it appears that the leading indicator 
properties of house prices are considerably stronger regarding the output gap, which is a closer 
indicator of business cycle conditions. Recent studies have shown that interactions between 
debts and asset prices can potentially amplify the effects of various shocks and contribute to 
business cycle fluctuations (Liu Zheng, Pengfei Wang, and Tao Zha [2009]).
18.  Correlation of other countries as follows: Spain (0.66), Denmark (0.66), Canada (0.52), United 
States  (0.52),  France  (0.45),  Netherlands  (0.40), Austria  (0.23),  Belgium  (0.15),  Germany 
(0.12), Italy (0.15). Sources: Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2007), Ho (2007).
19.  Ho (2007), Gali (1990) indicated that there is cointegration relationship among consumption, 
income, stock market wealth and house market wealth.284
Figure 14
Stock Price Booms/Busts and Leading Indicators
Figure 15
House Price Booms/Busts and Leading Indicators
3.2   What are the Effects of Asset Price Fluctuations on the Soundness of 
Financial System?  
Macro-prudential tools, such as Basel capital ratio, macro-stress tests and 
loan-to-value ratios, can be used to help tackle problems in financial markets, 
which may help limit the need for aggressive monetary policy reactions. Financial 
stability index will be helpful for us to evaluate the effects of asset price fluctuations 
on the soundness of the financial system.
Asset  price  fluctuations  provide  a  crucial  link  through  which  adverse 
macroeconomic developments can cause financial instability20. Monetary policy 
stance (rediscount rate) is a good leading indicator for stock price booms/busts
20.   The chapters in Hunter et al. (2003) provide an overview of the inter-linkages between monetary 
policy, asset prices and financial stability. Asset price booms have triggered many previous 
episodes of financial instability (Ahearne et al., 2005; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2007).285
(Figure 12) and house price booms (Figure 13). That means asset price fluctuations 
precede  the  shift  of  monetary  policy  stance  which  could  have  immediate 
repercussions on the stability of financial institutions. Using monetary policy to 
guard against financial instability by offsetting asset-price movements has sizable 
effects on economic activity.
4.   The Policy Response  
Asset  price  developments  are  a  serious  cause  of  concern  for  central 
banks since they may affect price and financial stability. Central banks should not 
introduce asset prices into their monetary policy reaction function. Because it is 
difficult to implement a sound monetary policy while focusing on highly volatile 
indicators and determine asset prices scientifically. However, a stronger monetary 
reaction to signs of overheating or asset price bubble could also be useful21. Such 
a broader approach to monetary policy requires that concern for financial stability 
be explicitly included in central banks’mandates, as CBC has done.
4.1   Were the Policy Responses Effective in Taming Asset Prices? 
The housing market became sluggish, if not outright collapsed, after CBC 
implemented selective credit controls to curb house price booms in February 1989. 
Economic activity was hit hard in the aftermath of the asset market slump (Chen 
2001). Furthermore, monetary policy stance (rediscount rate) is a good leading 
indicator for stock price booms/busts (Figure 12) and house price booms (Figure 
13). CBC’s policy responses are effective in taming asset prices.
However, how large are the effects of monetary policy on asset prices22 
depend to some extent on the financial market and the country. Nowadays, it 
is hard to use monetary policy to pop bubbles before they get too big. Interest 
rate increases or credit tightening to contain surging asset prices once these have
achieved a momentum of their own is not easy. Asset price bubble promises to 
deliver large capital gains, a small change in policy interest rates and further 
decreases of credit given liquidity surplus are unlikely to alter the balance between
21.   There is one view that central banks should “lean against the wind” to try to stop bubbles 
forming, rather than let them happen and then mop up afterwards. However, if banks could 
stop the bubbles forming, they would not have to be so tough in bursting them. In practice, it 
is impossible to identify bubbles in real time or before they burst. Attempts to prick them by 
raising rates were likely to do more harm than good. Ben Bernanke said it is difficult to know 
for sure when we are in a bubble. Few central banks embrace the idea that it should “lean against 
the wind” when asset prices are rising rapidly. 
22.  Monetary policy has large and predictable effects on property prices and that these effects are 
roughly coincident with its effect on real economic activity. If the central bank makes a 25 basis 
point increase in short-term interest rates, it depresses real GDP by about 0.2% and real property 
prices by 0.6%. Of course, the effect is not immediate. The time lag for the full effect to be 
realised is about four years (Katrin and Gerlach, 2008).286
the costs of financing the bubble and the expected profits from investing in it. 
Monetary and other relevant authorities need to be coordinated to prevent asset 
bubbles. Moreover, government should not employ booming market to stimulate 
economic activity.
4.2   What is the Most Appropriate Monetary Policy Instrument in 
Reacting to Asset Prices? 
Central  bank  action  may  be  effective  under  certain  circumstances  in 
affecting asset prices. Since September 2008, CBC turned its traditional monetary 
policy instruments (interest rate and M2) to loose monetary policy and so-called 
“unconventional”  measures  (expansion  of  OMO’s  counterparties  and  eligible 
collaterals) to fight liquidity risk and the stock price bubble burst in 2009Q1. 
Financial stability has improved after the unconventional monetary policy was 
implemented.
4.3   What Are the Side Effects of Over Reacting to Asset Prices?
The size of interest rate movements required to prevent a bubble from 
developing must be large. It can cause output and inflation to fall substantially 
or even below the central bank’s objectives. In practice, monetary policy is too 
blunt an instrument to be used to target asset prices – sometimes unexpected tight 
monetary policy followed by booming markets. In particular, there is a risk that 
setting monetary policy for over reacting to asset price movements will lead to 
large output losses and even political debate.
5.   Conclusion 
We define workable asset price booms/busts and bubble. 16 stock price 
booms, 10 stock price busts and 13 house price booms, 5 house price busts are 
found from 1989:Q2 to 2009:Q1. It is costly after stock price boom. There is only 
one small asset bubble – stock price bubble – occurred from 2007:Q3 to 2008:Q1 
and it burst in 2009:Q1.
The causes of asset price fluctuations were financial liberalisation and 
deregulation. Cross correlation indicates strong GDP, CPI, liquidity, credit, and 
consumption will fuels asset prices. New loan interest rate will have lagged impact 
on house price. However, rediscount rate is a leading indicator for stock prices. 
Strong currency fuels the housing market. 
Factor analysis suggests that there does exist one common factor that drives 
real  variables  and  financial  variables  respectively.  Regression  results  indicate 
that only one factor is significantly and positively related to house price change. 287
However, no cointegration is found between stock price and the two factors at the 
0.05 level.
Real GDP gap is a very good leading indicator for stock price booms/bust. 
Loan/RGDP growth rate and Faca/RGDP ratio are potential leading indicators 
for future house price busts. Monetary policy stance (rediscount rate) is a good 
leading  indicator  for  stock  price  booms/busts  (consistency  with  the  result  of 
cross correlation) and house price booms. By accommodating wider output gap, 
loosening  credit  conditions,  rising  current  account  deficit  and  loose  monetary 
policy, CBC will increase the risks of a boom/bust. However, over reacting to asset 
price movements will risk the possibility of large output losses and disinflation.
Conventional  wisdom  about  “benign  neglect  and  mopping-up  later 
approach,” in the sense that central banks do not react pre-emptively in the boom 
phase but rather ease monetary policy reactively, if and when asset bubble bursts, 
may be too optimistic in the current policy environment. Given the huge costs of 
the current crisis, there is a growing view central banks have to combat damaging 
bubbles and justify “leaning against the wind” during the upswing phase of a credit/
asset price boom. Monetary policy of leaning against the surging asset prices or 
bubble can be implemented in a mechanical way. But it is a good idea for monetary 
policy to “lean against the wind” of excessive risk taking when times are good. 
To battle against asset price fluctuations, CBC does not adhere to “benign 
neglect and mopping-up later approach”, “activist view”, “discretionary judgment 
view” or “leaning against the wind”. CBC also does not target asset prices, try to 
prick a bubble, react automatically to changes in asset prices and determine some 
appropriate level for asset prices. CBC does examine what is driving asset price 
movements and is prepared to act in response. CBC followed a “mop up” strategy 
after the burst of a bubble.
For example, CBC implemented very loose monetary policy after the bust 
of stock price bubble in 2009:Q1. However, a stronger monetary reaction to signs 
of overheating or asset price bubble could also be useful. CBC will pay more 
attention to asset price bubbles than they have in the recent past. How large are the 
effects of monetary policy on asset prices depend to some extent on the financial 
market and the country. Nowadays, even independent central banks find it hard to 
use monetary policy to pop bubbles before they get too big. Monetary and other 
relevant authorities need to be coordinated to prevent asset bubbles. Moreover, 
government should not deploy booming market to stimulate economic activity. 
Without political antidotes, any financial and economic measures will only cure 
the symptoms and not the disease.288
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CHAPTER 10
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKS:  
THE CASE OF THAILAND 
by Dr. Pariyate Potchamanawong1
1.   Introduction
 
  The term “bubble” is used to describe a phenomenon of rising prices that 
is entirely explained by economic fundamentals.  In most cases, it is very hard to 
identify them with certainty and almost impossible to reach a consensus about 
whether  the  asset  price  booms  are  induced  by  productivity,  non-fundamental 
factors or both.  This causes policymakers to hesitate in their response to react 
since identifying asset price misalignments or bubbles is usually challenging.
For policymakers, the most vital question is whether the bubble can be 
identified accurately since the volatility in the asset prices could amplify risks in 
the financial system.  A financial crisis can make it very difficult to maintain price 
stability, which is the priority of most central bankers.  There is much evidence 
that major financial crises are related to the collapse of asset prices, led by high 
volatility in the preceding phase. 
There is an ongoing debate among economists and policymakers how 
to react to asset price movements. Currently, the focus of the debate is on the 
choice of approach whether “leaning against the wind” or “mopping-up-later” is a 
more suitable strategy to tackle the asset price bubbles.  Unfortunately, there is no 
consensus reached just yet about the method to deal with asset price bubbles under 
condition of asymmetric information.
Nevertheless, it is useful to review some relevant characteristics of asset 
price movements or bubbles before assessing the case for monetary responses to 
asset price bubbles. The following observations represent some stylised facts of 
relationship between asset prices and macroeconomic variables for the case of 
Thailand. 
1.1   Asset Prices in Thailand: Stylised Facts
1.1.1 Brief History of Thailand’s Economy     
Thailand’s real GDP achieved an average growth of 10.3 % per year during 
1986-1990 and 8.2 % per year during 1991-1996, with the peak of 13.3 % in 1988.   
In the corresponding periods, exports grew at an average annual rate of 25.1 % 
and 15.7 %, respectively.  The US$/baht exchange rate had been remarkably stable 
1.     Author is Economist of the Monetary Policy Group of Bank of Thailand.292
over the long run, after adopting the basket-peg exchange rate regime in November 
1984. Exchange rate stability was conducive to the inflows of both foreign direct 
investment and portfolio capitals which helped fuel export-led economic growth.   
Pressure on inflation was relatively subdue and manageable, with CPI inflation 
averaging 3.9 % and 5.0 % per annum in the same periods, attributable to high 
domestic savings which averaged 32.5 % of GDP during 1986-1996, as well as 
relatively  stable  US$/baht  exchange  rate.    Fiscal  balance  actually  turned  into 
surplus in 1988 and continued every year until 1996, with an average surplus of 3.0 
% of GDP.  The positive public savings had made up for the decline in household 
savings in the 1990’s.  On the negative side, stable US$/baht exchange rate and high 
domestic interest rates had attracted large short-term inflows which contributed to 
increased current account deficit, with the ratio of deficit to GDP increasing from 
3.0 % during 1986-1990 to 6.6 % during 1991-1996.      
Financial liberalisation and exchange control deregulation, which began 
in earnest in the early 1990’s, led rapidly to the opening up of capital account 
and globalisation of the domestic financial market, while the basket-peg exchange 
rate regime was left intact.  The establishment of Bangkok International Banking 
Facilities (BIBFs) in 1993 encouraged even more short-term foreign borrowing by 
domestic corporations.  Consequently, net private capital inflows increased from 
5.6 % of GDP on average during 1986-1990 to 9.6 % of GDP on average during 
1991-1996.   Despite persistent current account deficit problem, continued capital 
inflows allowed Thailand to accumulate more international reserves in the 1990’s, 
reaching the peak of US$ 39.9 billion in October 1996.  On the negative side, 
Thailand’s foreign debts, most of which were private sector’s, grew rapidly from 
US$29.3 billion (accounting for 204 %  of international reserves) at the end of 
1990 to US$89.8 billion (accounting for 227 %  of international reserves) at the 
end of 1996.  Signs of economic instability emerged in 1995 when current account 
deficit, fed by huge short-term inflows, widened to 8.0 % of GDP from 5.6% the 
previous year.  But this was largely overshadowed by the impressive export growth 
of 23.6%.  Meanwhile, deflation of asset prices began to put pressure on corporate 
balance sheet and impair financial institutions’ asset quality.  The sharp decline in 
export growth to zero percent in 1996 and a current account deficit close to 8 % of 
GDP for the second year running shook investors’ confidence in the Thai economy.   
Large capital outflows, exacerbated by massive speculative currency attacks, led to 
the eventual floatation of the baht on 2 July 1997.293
Figure 1
Thailand’s Output Gap
After the crisis, it took almost a decade for Thailand’s economy to fully 
recover. However, the economic structure faded from domestic demand-led growth 
to become more export-led growth. Besides, investment both domestic and foreign 
declined significantly. This was partly due to financial institutions becoming more 
risk averse and to the sluggish performance of the business sector. Nevertheless, 
the economic confidence picked up during 2004-2005 which saw some economic 
expansion. Unfortunately, political turmoil impacted Thailand in 2006 and the 
economic confidence has remained subdue since allowing export to be the main 
engine to drive economic growth.
1.1.2   Trends in the Thailand’s Housing Market, 1991 – 2008
The housing market had been one of the driving forces in generating asset 
price bubbles during the 1990s after the crisis struck in the late 1990s.  However, 
property was not all to be blamed. It was a by-product of high speculation or risk 
taking by investors due to the large inflow of capital.  One of the main incentives 
of speculative behavior, started in 1993, was the government’s introduction of tax 
incentive, i.e., a 5-year income tax exemption for real estate developers whose main 
products were low-and-middle price housing, which were selling below 600,000 
baht (US$240,000).  Meanwhile, increment in civil service salaries created more 
liquidity and demand in the property market. In addition, the establishment of the 
Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) allowed the raising of loans in US 
dollars, and increased the incentive of commercial banks and financial institutions 
to expand their housing credits more extensively.  The companies could borrow at 
lower rate from abroad, while the exchange rate had been fixed.294
In 1994, commercial banks lowered loan rates to their lowest level in 
twenty years at 10%. While land prices remained stable, property development 
companies accumulated their land banks, which put more pressure on property 
prices. This was reflected by 10 billion baht in foreign bonds issued by registered 
companies, who invested in land and launched many projects in new locations 
expecting  continued  expansion  of  the  Thai  economy.  At  this  rapid  pace  of 
investment, the over-supply soon developed in the housing market, contributing to 
more non-performing loans in the financial system subsequently. The evidence was 
established by the findings of the study of the Government Housing Bank (GHB) 
on “empty or unoccupied completed houses in developer-built housing projects” in 
Bangkok and surrounding areas.  In 1994, 160,000 units were unoccupied. By the 
end of 1995, 300,000 units or 14% of the total housing stock would be unoccupied. 
In addition, the study found that developers were delivering about 170,000 housing 
units per year to the market, while the demand for housing was between 100,000-
120,000 units per year.  
Figure 2
Housing Loans and House Prices
  In 1995, the Bank of Thailand, concerned that economic growth was out 
of control, began clamping down on the amount of lending allowed to real estate 
projects, in turn, putting more pressure on lending interest rate to rise.  It caused 
difficulty to property developers who would use down payments to obtain loans to 
build the projects which they would then sell to pay back the loans. Without loans, 
developers could not complete their projects and buyers could not buy houses from 
them.  And with a glut developing, buyers - often speculators - had second thoughts 
about buying and held back with increasing frequency. Developers were hit from 
both sides, and suddenly it appeared that the banks and finance companies had made 
a lot of loans that might not be so easy to collect and that the value of the property 
collateralising those loans might be worth a lot less than they originally thought.   
Sources: Bank of Thailand, Government Housing Bank295
What hurts developers also hurts banks and finance companies. Consequently, 
foreign loan providers became more risk averse and started pulling back short-
term debts.  This intensified the illiquidity problem in the financial market, causing 
the economic bubbles to collapse. 
 
Pursuant to Thailand’s acceptance of IMF assistance, the Bank of Thailand 
(BOT)  subjected  commercial  banks  to  tighter  rules  on  loan  classification  and 
provisioning  as  well  as  write-offs.  Commercial  banks  became  cautious  about 
extending credit, with a resultant contraction in bank credit. Thailand’s real estate 
industry remained sluggish until 2002 when the loans offered for property started 
to pick up.  Besides, the number of newly-launched housing units doubled each 
year and housing price accelerated to its highest level in 2006.  However, the 
house price began to drop in the year after due to the political tension, following a 
military coup at the end of year 2006. This ongoing political uncertainty reduced 
the housing demand and caused the price to drop further.  
Figure 3
House Prices and Lending Rate
Generally, a real estate bubble occurs when property prices rise quickly 
in a short period, primarily from speculation - resulting in a supply-and-demand 
imbalance. Property speculation and a housing boom normally occur after long 
periods of continuous economic growth, low interest rates and easy access to money.   
However, the Thai housing market boom-bust during the previous years was not 
primarily from excess demand and supply, but the bust was from political turmoil 
that caused the price to drop.  Moreover, there had been a boom in condominium 
construction along the newly built mass-transportation area in Bangkok.  This 
helped to explain the continued expansion in property loans even though the house 
price began to decline.
Sources: Bank of Thailand, Government Housing Bank296
The statistics of Jones Lang LaSalle showed the biggest jumps in the 
average asking prices of condominiums in Central Bangkok during 2003 and 2004, 
of almost 30%.  However, the surge in condominium price slowed down to an 
average of 10% per annum in 2005 and 2006. In the first half of 2007, prices grew 
only slightly, by 1.5% on average to the present average level of 81,000 baht/m2.   
However, the global financial crisis left the consumers with low confidence of 
investing in condominium property. Besides, the demand from foreigners also dried 
up.  Thai law prevents foreigners from buying land, but they are allowed to purchase 
up to 49% of the saleable space in a condominium, hence the sector’s dependence 
on overseas investors. The agency’s research has found that the switch in demand 
from condominiums to detached houses and townhouses has left Bangkok with 
a significant oversupply of new condominium projects. Condominium prices are 
expected to drop by 10-15% in the second quarter of 2009 to stimulate demand 
from Thai buyers, who tend to opt for luxury single-detached houses rather than 
condominiums. 
Nevertheless, the Thai real estate market of 2008 was not experiencing a 
bubble-like boom as compared to the 1997 situation because:
1.   Property prices have not changed dramatically in most areas.
2.   Interest  rates  are  continuously  rising.  Overall  in  the  housing  market, 
speculation is not significant even though there is some speculation in 
condominium properties and tourist area properties.
3.   Low consumer confidence because of unstable political and economic 
environments.
4.   Global financial crisis discourages overall property speculation.
1.1.3 Trends in the Thailand’s Equity Market, 1991 – 2008
The vast majority of Thai companies still seem to prefer financing through 
financial intermediaries. These companies continue to rely heavily on financing 
from  banks  rather  than  the  capital  market.  It  is  true  even  among  large  firms 
that were eligible for listing. This suggests that business owners may not have 
sufficient knowledge or understanding about the role and working mechanism of 
capital markets and regulations.  As a result, Thailand’s capital markets in recent 
times have grown at a very slow pace. The size of the stock market compared 
to GDP is only 51% (as of June 2009) which is smaller than other countries in 
the region, such as Hong Kong (845%), Singapore (202%), Malaysia (104%) and 
South Korea (66%).  Moreover, capital market utilisation was not well diversified 
across sectors.  A total of thirty business sectors have tapped the capital market, but 
the great majority of funds raised are clustered in only few sectors, i.e., financial 
corporation, energy, construction, and real estate.  297
Figure 4
Equity Market Capitalisation
The capital market experienced significant growth from the mid-1990s.   
The SET peaked at 1,682 in 1994 and plummeted to 816 in 1996.  The main engine 
steering the economic growth, or someone would describe as pricking the economic 
bubbles, were the liberalisation measures implemented during this period, such 
as interest rate liberalisation, phased-in exchange control deregulation, and the 
establishment  of  Bangkok  International  Banking  Facility  (BIBF)  -  a  vehicle 
intended to prepare the domestic financial system for more competition in the 
intermediation of financing from abroad.
With  freer  and  cheaper  means  of  funding  from  abroad,  enhanced  by 
various tax concessions, private capital inflows accelerated from approximately 
20 billion baht per month previously to some 40 billion baht per month from the 
end of 1995.
With the liquidity enhancement nature of these capital inflows, private 
credit growth accelerated from 21% in 1990 to the peak of 30% in 1994. The 
consequent misallocation of these financial resources, led to over lending and 
leveraging of corporate. 
Sources: World Federation of Exchange as of September 30, 2009298
Figure 5
Stock Market Prices, Current and Capital Accounts
The inflow of capital was larger than needed to finance current account 
deficit.  The balance of payments during 1990-94 recorded a stable surplus of 
average 100 billion baht per year before increasing to 180 billion baht in 1995. 
International reserves consequently rose from US$10.5 billion at the end of 1989 
to US$37.0 billion at the end of 1995.  External debt relative to GDP also rose from 
28 % at the end of 1989 to 49 % by end-1995.  
As the overall economic activities began to slow down in 1996, the stock 
and property market prices came under severe pressure. The SET Index experienced 
sharp declines.  Moreover, the property index declined more than the overall index.   
It peaked at 2,266 in early 1994 and dipped to 519 at the end of 1996.  
During the period between 1999 and 2003, the SET index stabilised at 
around 400 points. Due to positive prospects in the economy, the SET index reached 
772 points in December 2003. The market stabilised at that level for a couple 
years. It then declined to 400 points in November 2008 as the result of the global 
financial crisis originating from the sub-prime crisis in the United States.  Besides, 
there were other depressing domestic factors such as the economic downturn and 
political turmoil in Thailand.
1.1.4   Trends in the Thailand’s Other Macroeconomic and 
  Financial Variables
1.1.4.1  Exchange Rate                                               
From the late 1980s the BOT followed a policy of absorbing the surge 
in capital inflows into foreign reserves. Before 1997, net foreign reserves grew 
Sources: Bank of Thailand, SEC299
on average by 54% per annum, almost doubling in some years. The mounting 
pressures from capital inflows together with rising interest rates started to cause 
trouble for the Thai economy. Monetary policy during 1993-96 was not effective 
in checking the overheating of the economy resulting from capital inflows. The 
combination of a fixed exchange rate regime and free capital mobility paved the 
way for the 1997 crisis. When the dollar started appreciating in late 1995, the 
Thai baht (THB) became overvalued.  Thailand lost its export competitiveness in 
the major foreign markets. Thus, the drastic drop in exports and widened current 
account deficits, coupled with asset bubbles, maturity mismatches and domestic 
financial troubles, all came together to erode investors’ confidence.
Figure 6
Thai Baht Exchange Rate
As a consequence, the BOT turned to a managed float regime on 2 July 
1997.  By 31 July 1997, the BOT’s net international reserves fell drastically to a 
paltry US$1.1 billion from a level of over US$30 billion a year ago. When the THB 
was left to float, it overshot to 53.7 baht per dollar in January 1998. It recovered 
and stabilised subsequently, moving within a range of 36-43 baht per US dollar 
between April 1998 and 2001 (FSRA, 2002).
*NEER: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
REER: Real Effective Exchange Rate
Sources: Bank of Thailand300
Figure 7
Thailand’s Foreign Reserves
Upon recovery, capital flows started to move back in the early 2000s, 
Thailand’s international reserves accumulated through such interventions amounted 
to US$46 billion (BOT, 2004).  Lately, with the persistent surge in capital inflows, 
especially since 2006, intervention has led to unprecedented reserve accumulation, 
which  is  consistent  with  the  regional  trend  (Akyüz,  2008).  As  the  reserve 
accumulation  continued,  reserves  finally  hit  the  US$100  billion  mark  around 
October 2007.  The prospect of a massive surge in capital inflows and difficulties in 
stabilising the currency has caused serious concern among Thai policymakers, as 
pointed out by a senior official from the Thai Ministry of Finance. Thailand’s last 
experience with extensive liberalisation of the capital account in the early 1990s 
shows how easily a small open economy without adequate safeguards can fall 
victim to massive speculative inflows. Sound macroeconomic fundamentals and 
a well-regulated financial system are no longer sufficient conditions for financial 
stability if all funds can freely flow into and out of the country (Sangsubhan, 
2008).
The BOT attempted to check massive capital inflows twice by tightening 
foreign exchange controls in November and December 2006. The measures in 
November included prohibiting financial institutions from issuing and selling bills 
of exchange in THB to NRs. On 6 December 2006, the BOT imposed a stronger 
measure to curb foreign exchange influx and prevent rapid appreciation of the THB 
by prohibiting the selling and buying of all types of debt securities through sell-
and-buy-back transactions for all maturities. Still, the THB kept on appreciating. 
On 18 December 2006, the BOT decided to impose a 30% unremunerated reserve 
requirement (URR) on all capital inflows. This required all financial institutions to 
withhold 30% of foreign currencies bought or exchanged against the THB for any 
transactions, except those related to trade in goods and services, repatriation of 
investments abroad by residents, and foreign direct investment. 
Sources: Bank of Thailand
As of August 2009301
The imposition of the URR triggered an immediate sharp (20%) decline 
in stock prices and created a relatively wide margin between onshore and offshore 
exchange rates of the THB against the US dollar. On 19 December, the Minister 
of Finance had to exempt the equity market from the URR. However, it applied to 
debt securities until March 2008 when it was finally abolished.
1.1.4.2  Liquidity and Credit Measures
Bank loans expand as the monetary base increase, other things remain 
unchanged. However, despite the constant level of the monetary base, bank loan 
can increase rapidly as banks may become reckless and aggressive in lending 
during the time when the values of collateral are increasing. As a result the credit 
multiplier will increase rapidly during the period of lending spree as banks become 
more lenient with their credit risk assessment. This is what actually happened at 
the height of the lending boom cycle starting in 1994 up to 1998.
Figure 8
Commercial Banks’ Credit per GDP and Real GDP Growth
Figure 9 shows that the credit multiplier increased abnormally high and 
deviated entirely from the behavior of deposit and money multipliers. Thus we 
can monitor the financial sector by using the credit multiplier as an early warning 
indicator for over-lending. When interest rate is high, commercial banks are willing 
to take more risk to obtain higher returns from their assets.
Sources: Bank of Thailand, NESDB302
Figure 9
Money and Credit Multipliers
The boom created a tremendous demand for money.  Local banks had 
more lending opportunities than they could handle during the early 1990s, and 
still there was a demand for more.  The powerful demand for money put a strain 
on the local banking system there as there was simply not enough local savings 
to fund the investments. So, in March 1993, the then-Finance Minister Tarrin 
Nimmanhaeminda opened the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), 
which would allow Thai companies to obtain loans in US dollars.  With the baht 
effectively pegged to the dollar, and interest rates in dollars about six percent lower 
than local interest rates, the decision was simple: between 1992 and 1996, foreign 
borrowings grew 750%.  Finance companies sprung up as a means to channel 
the surplus generated by exports into riskier projects, and to supply funds for the 
nouveau riche. Fast loan growth and fat loan spreads meant big profits and rapid 
growth for these companies. 
1.1.4.3  Inflation    
  Thailand officially adopted inflation targeting in May 2000 after adopting 
managed floating on 2 July 1997.  Under this framework, the long-run objective 
is price stability.  Thailand succeeded in implementing inflation targeting over the 
medium term.  Thailand adopted this framework because the relationship between 
output growth and the money supply was unstable under a monetary targeting 
framework adopted in July 1997.  This framework is also based on the belief that 
low and stable inflation could help to stimulate economic growth in the long run. 
In addition, monetary policy can only affect inflation in the long run while it can 
affect output just in the short run. Therefore, the key feature of inflation targeting 
is setting price stability as the long-run objective and hitting forecasted inflation as 
the short-run objective.
 
Sources: Bank of Thailand,  NESDB303
Figure 10
Headline and Core Inflation
  The Bank of Thailand targeted core inflation within the range of 0-3.50% 
per annum. The hike in oil prices in the second half of 2004 pushed headline 
inflation to the highest rate at 3.57 % in September 2004, since the adoption of 
inflation targeting regime. In addition, the oil price rose again at the beginning 
of 2008. This caused tremendous pressure on inflation but within a short period.   
However, the pressure eased rapidly due to the eruption of the subprime crisis.   
Indeed, since the adoption of this framework, Thailand has not faced demand-
push inflationary pressure as the inflation expectation has been anchored with the 
targeted inflation rate.
1.2     Regulation and Policy Responses to Asset Price Fluctuations  
 
The Bank of Thailand (BOT) has two main monetary policy goals: low and 
stable inflation and stable exchange rates.  However, it is important to emphasise 
that the overriding goal under the inflation targeting framework is price stability, 
with a view to enhancing sustainable growth in the long term.  Exchange rate 
stability, however, is regarded as a desirable condition under the price stability 
goal.  For an open economy like Thailand, it is undeniable that the exchange rate 
still bears important influence on domestic prices.  Therefore, mild exchange rate 
volatility complements overall price stability, and the two goals should not be 
considered as independent.
Financial instability has mostly originated from imbalance of asset prices, 
causing  anxiety  to  the  central  bank  whether  to  react  by  implementing tighter 
monetary policy to curb the increasing pressure of asset prices.  In practice, the 
Bank of Thailand (BOT) does not have asset price target, explicit or implicit, but it 
is monitoring asset price information to detect economic vulnerabilities.  The use 
of asset price information can serve both monetary and prudential policy, and the 
Sources: Ministry of Commerce, NESDB304
choice of policy instrument may vary as the BOT deems suitable.  For instance, 
when asset price bubble mirrors overall demand pressure, monetary policy could be 
tightened along with heightening prudential measures to maintain macroeconomic 
and financial institution stabilities.  
For  instance,  in  December  2003,  the  BOT  initiated  some  preventive 
measures  to  depress  speculative  behavior  of  domestic  investors  by  requiring 
financial institutions to: (1) Lower the post-construction loan-to-value ratio to 
70% for residential property with the transaction price exceeding 10 million baht; 
(2) Extend credit to property developers only when the projects are legal; and 
(3) Report to the BOT on new real estate loans made over 100 million baht on a 
quarterly basis.
In some cases, however, the asset price bubble reflects a localised fragility, 
and the use of monetary policy is likely to be too broad to handle the problem even 
though it pertains to macroeconomic stability.  Under such circumstances, the BOT 
could choose to use prudential measures over tightening monetary policy, to reach 
the macroeconomic stability goal.  This simply demonstrates how the BOT uses 
its policy tools flexibly and concertedly, for macroeconomic and financial stability 
goals in the end serve the same ultimate objective of economic stability in support 
of long-term growth.  
2.   The Causes of Asset Price Fluctuation
2.1   Correlation Analysis
  The basic question addressed in this paper is whether information obtained 
from the various macroeconomic variables is useful to predict the buildup of 
asset price bubbles, especially in the equity and property markets. For correlation 
analysis see Appendix A, it may be noted that the correlation between changes 
in asset prices, housing and stock prices, and change in various macroeconomic 
variables seem to have close relationship during the pre-currency-crisis period, 
1991-1997.  However, during the post-crisis period, 2000-2009, the correlation of 
the asset prices and economic variables seem to be subdued.  
  According to the correlation analysis of 1991Q1 – 1997Q3, the stock index 
trended in line with money aggregate, commercial bank credits, current and capital 
accounts, and GDP.  Moreover, when the stock price increased, there was pressure 
on exchange rate appreciation, measured by NEER and REER.  However, the 
relationship of stock price and economic variables changed during the post-crisis 305
period of 2000Q1-2009Q2. The stock index does not present any high correlation   
with other variables except exchange rate.  Nevertheless, inflation and lending rate 
are found to have more negative influence on the stock market. This phenomenon 
could be partly explained by the adaptation of inflation targeting regime. The Bank 
of Thailand has been closely monitoring the pressure of inflation and conduct 
monetary policy when the inflation show tendency to deviate from the target. 
  For the housing price, lending rate and growth of credit seemed to be 
more positively correlated during the pre-crisis period than the post-crisis period.   
However, in the post-crisis period, the relationship of commercial bank credit and 
housing price is unstable. Instead, we analysed the relationship between property 
loans, provided by financial institutions, and housing price. We found that property 
loans tend to lead housing price for about two quarters with a correlation of 0.4. 
Nevertheless, the political uncertainty during 2006 has depressed both demand and 
supply of the property as reflected in the declining housing price since then.
 2.2   Factor Analysis  
 
  Factor analysis, a technique for searching patterns in the data that consist 
of high dimensions, suggests that macroeconomic variables could be divided into 
three groups, given that Eigen value (total variance from each factor) is greater 
than two (see Appendix B). These groups comprise interest rate, exchange rate, and 
liquidity measures (money aggregate and credit).  Then we use these factor scores 
extracted from factor analysis to explain the relationship with asset prices by using 
the OLS approach with the data coverage of 1991Q4-2009Q2 (see Appendix C).
  The Figure 11 shows the OLS result of the impact of interest rate, exchange 
rate and liquidity measure factors on the stock price during 2000Q1 to 2009Q2.  It 
could be concluded that when interest rate increases, it is likely to lessen the stock 
price in the next quarter, with a significant level of 99%. This confirmed a normal 
behavior of the stock market for the tendency of stock price to have a negative 
relationship with interest rate.  However, exchange rate and liquidity measures do 
not seem to have much impact on stock price significantly.306
Table 1





Convergence achieved after 10 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(F1_INTEREST(-1)) -0.270967 0.100476 -2.696848 0.0109
D(F2_ER) 0.095829 0.051580 1.857884 0.0721
D(F3_LIQUIDITY) 0.074028 0.041630 1.778238 0.0846
C -0.009003 0.035625 -0.252709 0.8021
AR(1) 0.516573 0.159701 3.234623 0.0028
R-squared 0.391828     Mean dependent var 0.003987
Adjusted R-squared 0.318110     S.D. dependent var 0.123218
S.E. of regression 0.101749     Akaike info criterion -1.610532
Sum squared resid 0.341646     Schwarz criterion -1.395060
Log likelihood 35.60010     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.533868
F-statistic 5.315235     Durbin-Watson stat 1.712726
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002039
Inverted AR Roots       .52
  The following table shows the regression result of housing price during 
2000Q1 to 2009Q2. As compared to analysis of stock market price, housing price 
analysis did not produce strong result. 
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Table 2





Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(F1_INTEREST) -0.016318 0.010011 -1.630041 0.1123
D(F2_ Exchange Rate) 0.008459 0.006589 1.283674 0.2079
D(F3_LIQUIDITY(-1)) 0.018966 0.011666 1.625751 0.1132
C 0.004821 0.003078 1.566257 0.1265
R-squared 0.124269     Mean dependent var 0.005995
Adjusted R-squared 0.046999     S.D. dependent var 0.017476
S.E. of regression 0.017060     Akaike info criterion -5.204839
Sum squared resid 0.009896     Schwarz criterion -5.032462
Log likelihood 102.8919     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.143509
F-statistic 1.608238     Durbin-Watson stat 2.018123
Prob(F-statistic) 0.205568
3.   The Effects of Asset Price Boom/Busts
3.1   Measuring the Wealth Effect of Asset Price
  A decline in economic activity in connection with the bursting of a real 
estate price bubble generally has a more negative impact than the bursting of an 
equity price bubble. It is prices of real estate that trigger high-cost asset price 
booms, where the period following them is characterised by a sharp decline in 
real economic growth.  This claim is confirmed by regression analysis of the 
effects of stock market (SET Index) and single-house price on the Thailand’s real 
GDP, by using the following equation, with the data coverage between 1994Q1 to 
2009Q2:
 
- - - Eq.(1)308
Table 3




Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q2
Included observations: 60 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 14 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(LNSET_INDEX) 0.012003 0.009212 1.302984 0.1980
D(LNSINGLEHOUSE) 0.101018 0.025888 3.902128 0.0003
D(Real Policy Rate) 0.001562 0.001330 1.174377 0.2453
C 0.006301 0.003971 1.586745 0.1183
AR(1) 0.485294 0.141036 3.440926 0.0011
R-squared 0.325893     Mean dependent var 0.006811
Adjusted R-squared 0.276867     S.D. dependent var 0.018460
S.E. of regression 0.015698     Akaike info criterion -5.390877
Sum squared resid 0.013554     Schwarz criterion -5.216349
Log likelihood 166.7263     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.322609
F-statistic 6.647353     Durbin-Watson stat 2.075273
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000194
Inverted AR Roots       .49
 
  The Table 3 shows the impact of asset prices on real private consumption. 
The impact of real estate price on the consumption growth is statistically significant, 
while  the  stock  market  price  does  not  have  a  significant  impact  on  private 
consumption.  One of the explanations is that real estate form a greater proportion 
in the households’ assets. This fact probably has to do with its importance and 
position in the framework of households’ wealth, as well as with the role of loans 
(or real estate as their collateral) and their financial intermediaries.  
Besides, the bursting of a price bubble of the real-estate market usually 
exerted a very strong and quick negative impact on the banking system and its 
lending capacity. In the period of a fall in the prices of equities and other securities, 
however, the growth in lending continued. While the bursting of asset price bubble 
have a bearing in decreasing economic activity and triggering related economic 
losses, the prices of shares, equities and other securities have shown to be a less 
reliable indicator of the risk of financial instability, or crisis. However, policymakers 309
should still regularly monitor the price development in the stock market since it 
could provide a sign of speculation in the economy.  
3.2   The Effects of Asset Price Fluctuation on the Soundness of Financial 
System
Since the currency crisis in 1997, the Bank of Thailand implemented 
numerous reform measures to strengthen the supervision framework and improve 
the financial system infrastructures. The framework has become more market-
oriented with the emphasis on corporate governance, internal control, and risk 
management (Bank of Thailand, Supervision Report 2003: 45). For years, the 
Bank  of Thailand  progressively  enhanced  the  supervision  framework  to  meet 
the  international  standards.   This  has  contributed  to  the  improvement  of  risk 
management and resiliency of the banking system. 
 
The Thai commercial banks saw an improvement in their stability. The ratio 
of gross non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans has been steadily decreasing.   
The ratio of gross NPLs to total loans of commercial banks reached its peak of 
50% around the first quarter of 1999, declining gradually thereafter. They were 
only about 6% of total loans by the second quarter of 2009. 
The increased stability is also reflected in the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), 
which is the ratio of bank’s capital to risk-weighted assets. It measures how well 
banks can absorb a reasonable amount of losses.  On 1 January 1993, the Bank of 
Thailand modified the regulations on capital adequacy ratio in order to comply with 
the guidelines of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Thai commercial 
banks were required to maintain a minimum capital ratio of 7% of total assets 
and contingent liabilities (off-balance-sheet items); of which at least 5% must be 
first tier capital2. By the end of 1994, these two ratios were adjusted upward to 
9% and 5.5%, respectively (Vichyanond 1995).  Branches of commercial banks 
incorporated abroad or foreign banks were required to maintain capital funds in 
Thailand as well and the adequacy ratio was 6.25% of total assets and contingent 
liabilities. Commercial banks are required to maintain the capital adequacy ratio 
of 8.5%. 
2.     First tier capital comprised paid-up capital, legal reserves, reserves appropriated from net profits 
and retained earnings.310
Figure 11
Thailand’s Commercial Banks’ Capital Adequacy and NPL Ratios
As of the fourth quarter of 1998, the CAR of commercial banks was 
around 10% but by the Q2 2009, this ratio reached 15%. Commercial banks are 
now much more resilient to negative shocks. This is mainly due to the financial 
reforms implemented by the Thai authorities in the last decade and the changes 
implemented by commercial banks facing increased competition.
In preparing for Basel II, the BOT developed a range of risk management 
systems and a set of prudential guidelines to enhance banks’ risk management 
practices. The BOT continuously carried out risk-based examination and supervision 
focusing on strategic risk, credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and operational 
risk of commercial banks. The BOT also implemented consolidated supervision 
for commercial banks. So far, banks have undertaken organisational restructuring 
to enhance effective risk management, internal control, and corporate governance, 
as well as improving the use of risk management tools.
  However, Basel II has consequently been attacked for being “pro-cyclical”. 
It adds to the pressure on banks by suddenly ratcheting up capital needs when 
profits are lowest and capital is most expensive. Critics of Basel II have argued 
that Basel II might inadvertently foster fallacy composition. It might be rational 
for individual bank normally to give loans when the economy is sound but refuse 
to lend them when the economy turns bad. Collectively, however, such behavior 
will exacerbate a recession, causing larger losses for banks.  Secondly, in good 
times, capital markets provide banks with a wide-open window for raising capital, 
but banks generally do not need to use it. On the other hand, when banks most 
need to raise capital during a credit crunch, the window is closed. A bank could 
raise capital in good times to prepare for bad times, but the current rules do not 
encourage it.
Sources: Bank of Thailand311
In addition, Basel II makes certain that a bank reserves adequate capital 
for losses that have yet to be realised. In addition to these potential losses, a bank 
must also supply capital to cover losses from existing non-performing loans. An 
increase in NPLs will use up capital, while at the same time the deteriorating health 
of other companies requires capital levels to be raised. Again, banks seek capital 
when the capital market is tight.
There is ongoing discussion in improving Basel II. For instance, Spain’s 
central bank introduced a dynamic provisioning regime in 2000 to build up a 
capital buffer for losses that have not yet been incurred. The provision is calculated 
based on the difference between the average losses on loans over the business 
cycle and the amount of “specific provisions” set aside for existing NPLs.  In other 
words, when the economy booms, the requirement for provision is increased as a 
precautionary cushion during downturns. 
4.   Policy Response
  Asset prices play a key role in the central bank’s conduct of monetary 
policy. Firstly, asset prices contain very useful information in that they reflect the 
anticipations of market participants concerning future economic conditions, such as 
prices and the level of business activity, as well as the direction of monetary policy. 
Asset prices also represent an important channel for the transmission of monetary 
policy. Asset price stability is one of the principal targets which the central bank 
itself works towards. It should be particularly noted that asset prices are heavily 
influenced by factors unconnected with economic fundamentals, as well as by the 
markets’ anticipations of underlying business conditions, which are arguably the 
principal factor deciding asset price levels. 
Economists and policymakers, however, agree that it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify a price bubble in real time, since by their very nature asset 
prices are essentially forward-looking. Therefore, it is very difficult to evaluate 
their development ex ante, since we do not know whether the expectations on 
which the bubbles are founded are realistic.
Empirical evidence suggests that there is no close, reliable relationship 
between changes in monetary policy and equity prices. Tatom (2002) illustrates 
that stock prices are independent of the federal funds rate in the long run. He argues 
that since stock prices represent the discounted value of a future earnings stream, 
thus a stock price is a relative price that depends on the relationship between output 
prices and costs. Accordingly, there will not be a reliable long-run relationship 
between changes in monetary policy and changes in stock prices.
Mishkin and White (2002) note that: “The linkage between monetary 
policy and stock prices is weak. Most fluctuations in stock prices could take place 
from motives unrelated to monetary policy, either reflecting real fundamentals or 312
pure speculation. Therefore, the weak link between monetary policy and stock 
prices creates the limitation for central bank to control stock prices. As a result, 
if the central bank indicates that it wants stock prices to change in a particular 
direction, it is likely to find that stock prices may move in the opposite direction”.
In addition, Stock and Watson (2001) and Tatom (2002) argue that there is 
no close reliable positive empirical relationship between changes in equity prices 
and changes in general prices. Therefore, stock prices would not serve as a useful 
indicator or target for monetary policy since the central bank could neither control 
equity prices nor effectively influence policy goals by changing equity prices.
In reality there is likely to be much doubt in the early stages about whether 
rising asset prices constitute a bubble. Asset-price bubbles rarely arise out of 
nothing—instead, they happen when  the evolving economic fundamentals are 
consistent with some rise in asset prices. While there will always be some doubt 
about whether rising asset prices constitute a bubble, these doubts would seem 
particularly acute when the suspected deviation of asset prices from fundamentals 
remains small and has been short-lived. For these reasons, there would seem to be 
no strong case for central banks to respond to small asset-price misalignments.
There are two competing schools of thought in the literature regarding the 
appropriate response of monetary policy to asset-price bubbles. The first, often 
associated with Bernanke and Gertler (2000), argues that monetary policy should 
only respond to observed changes in asset prices to the extent that they signal 
current or future changes to inflation or the output gap. The second, advanced 
by Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003), argues that raising interest rates 
modestly as asset prices rise above what are estimated to be warranted levels can 
reduce the effects of asset-price bubbles on output and inflation, thereby enhancing 
macroeconomic stability.
Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003) agree that a buildup of asset 
price misalignments can lead to macroeconomic imbalances. When there are shocks 
in asset markets, a policy of “leaning against the wind” of asset price changes 
may balance outputs. Central bank responses to asset price misalignment yield 
beneficial results only in very limited circumstances. Macroeconomic performance 
has improved after policy has reacted modestly to asset price misalignments when 
these misalignments are due to financial shocks. However, policy responses have 
not been useful when productivity shocks or a change in fundamentals are the 
underlying determinants. Therefore, responding mechanically to all asset price 
changes can produce worse outcomes than not responding to any at all.
Where sufficient information about the bubble process is not available 
to policymakers, a robust approach, something along the lines of the standard 
inflation-targeting approach, may be the best that can be achieved.  Bordo et al. 
(2000), adds that “a monetary regime that produces aggregate price stability will, 313
as a by-product, tend to promote stability of the financial system.” Knowing the 
limitations of current monetary policy arrangements, economists inside and outside 
of central banks have been working on developing alternative instruments. To see 
what might be both desirable and practical, we can start by noting that leverage 
is the ultimate source of the instability caused by bubbles. That is, the boom-bust 
cycles arise because people borrow to make purchases at high prices. And the 
financial system is put at risk because of the loans that are backed by collateral 
valued at inflated prices. The natural response is to look for policies capable of 
tempering the level of borrowing.
Additionally, Jean-Claude Trichet (2003) expresses the view that central 
banks should not introduce asset prices into their monetary policy reaction function. 
Firstly, it is difficult to implement a sound monetary policy while focusing on 
highly volatile indicators. Secondly, it is questionable that asset prices could be 
determined scientifically. Trichet also emphasises that measures aimed at improving 
market transparency and reducing herding behavior can improve the functioning 
of the financial system. The recommendations focused on regulatory, accounting 
measures, tax rules and regulations, as well as of codes of good conduct and good 
practices.
Nevertheless, monetary policy is a blunt instrument for responding to 
a narrow class of asset markets. Therefore, the suppression of most asset price 
volatility through monetary policy is neither feasible nor desirable. As a result, 
policymakers and bank regulators should encourage a resilient, stable, safe and 
sound banking system with competent prudential regulation and supervision of 
that system. Part of this involves the enforcement of required adequate liquidity 
and capital standards as well as the promotion of healthy balance sheets. Schwartz 
(2002) recommends a regulatory, not monetary policy solution to the problem of 
excessive asset price volatility. In particular, she supports the adoption of “capital 
requirements that increase with the growth of credit extensions collateralised by 
assets whose prices have escalated.”  This would help to stabilise the financial 
system in the face of asset price bubbles. 
Whether monetary policy should respond to (or attempt to influence) asset 
price “bubbles” remains a controversial issue. Some policymakers are inclined to 
act in a determined way to prevent escalating asset price. While low and stable 
inflation promotes financial stability, it also increases the likelihood that excess 
demand pressures show up first in credit aggregates and asset prices, rather than in 
goods and services prices. Accordingly, in some situations, a monetary response 
to credit and asset markets may be appropriate to preserve both financial and 
monetary stability. A number of researchers advocate that several alternative non-
monetary options to help stabilise asset prices are available. They could be adopted 
and would help to minimise sharp asset price movements or “bubbles” as well as 
help stabilise the financial system.314
5.   Conclusion   
Asset  price  bubbles  are  inevitable.  While  attention  must  be  paid  to 
asset prices, macroeconomic policy should be geared towards macroeconomic 
outcomes.  Financial regulators can help mitigate the negative consequences of 
bubbles by making their systems more diversified. Improved market transparency, 
designed effective financial regulatory structure, and reduced moral hazard from 
implicit government guarantees are necessary to keep financial markets healthy 
and protected against the worst consequences of bubbles. 
Some advocates of monetary intervention argue that the central banks 
should pay more attention to asset price movements or asset price bubbles since 
such movements influence and help to predict general price inflation. Further, 
sharp asset price movements associated with asset price bubbles can endanger 
price stability. Several advocates of monetary intervention argue that asset prices 
and their movement should be included in a broader, more comprehensive measure 
of the economy’s general price level and inflation rate. The central bank would 
subsequently use this more comprehensive figure as a basis for its inflation policy 
goal.
Financial  imbalances  and  the  economic  instability  associated  with 
pronounced asset price misalignments pose important challenges for monetary 
policymakers.  Concentrating  on  price  stability  alone  as  a  growing  number  of 
inflation-targeting  countries  do,  is  no  guarantee  financial  instability  and  the 
serious after-effects of bubbles bursting can be avoided. Therefore, introduction 
of macroeconomic prudential would give a helping hand for monetary policy to 
soften the asset price bubble when a bust is inevitable. 315
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